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A B S T R A C T

is thesis explains coalition formation in presidential regimes with evidence from Latin America.

e conventional view has been that coalition formation is considerably difficult in presidentialism,
and as a result, parties have only exceptionally been expected to form coalitions. However, since the
s, the frequency of coalition formation has increased across the region. Most democracies have at
some point elected a presidential candidate backed by an electoral coalition, or have been ruled by a
president backed by a government coalition.

is thesis presents three major findings that contribute to the development of a theory of coalition
formation in presidential regimes. First, it shows that simple majority plurality for presidential
elections, unicameralism, proportional representation, larger legislatures, smaller average district
magnitudes, a higher effective number of electoral parties, and the government party’s legislative
majority are crucial predictors of electoral coalition formation. It also shows that when an outsider
presidential candidate is present, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation decreases.
Second, this thesis shows that weak presidents elected with a low vote share are more likely
to form government coalitions. It shows that simple majority plurality for presidential elections,
longer presidential terms, unicameralism, smaller legislatures, and fewer legislative parties are crucial
predictors of government coalition formation. It also shows that when the incumbent president was
backed by an electoral coalition in the immediately previous election, or when the government is
going through political turmoil, the probability of forming a government coalition increases.

ird, it shows that coalitions may or may not form even when variables related to presidential
power, electoral institutions, electoral systems, and party systems are not perfectly aligned. It shows
that while presidential power is relevant, electoral arrangements and the party system are what
ultimately determine coalition formation. While the former variable is a sufficient condition, the
latter variables are both sufficient and necessary conditions. Finally, this thesis shows that political
culture and critical junctures play an important role in exacerbating or ameliorating these structural
incentives.
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L AT I N A M E R I C A

is chapter presents the research puzzle, the research questions and the hypotheses that attempt
to explain coalition formation in Latin America. 
e second section reviews the literature on
coalition formation. It covers the three main approaches normally used to explain coalition for-
mation in parliamentary regimes. It then differentiates between the traits of coalition formation
under parliamentarism and presidentialism, showing that contrary to conventional wisdom,
parties have several reasons to form coalitions in presidential regimes. 
e third section outlines
three theories that may be able to explain coalition formation in the region. 
e fourth section
presents the research questions and the hypotheses that guide the study. 
e final section outlines
the methodological arrangement of the following chapters.
. 

is thesis explains coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America. 
e conventional
view has been that coalition formation is considerably difficult in presidentialism, and as a result,
parties have only exceptionally been expected to form coalitions. However, since the s, most
of the democracies in the region have at some point elected a presidential candidate backed by an
electoral coalition, or have been ruled by a president backed by a government coalition. Only in the
s did coalitions form in Argentina (, ), Bolivia (), Brazil (, , ), Chile
(, , ), Ecuador (), Guatemala (), Panama (, ), Paraguay (),




e discrepancy between the conventional view and the actual behaviour of coalitions has not been
explained by the literature. 
e gap is in part a consequence of a comparative research programme set
forward by Juan Linz in the early s, in which he compared the “virtues of parliamentarism” to
the “perils of presidentialism” (Linz, a,b). In his landmark work, Linz looked at both regimes,
comparing their essential characteristics, such as the division of powers and term lengths. Among
other things, he found that parliamentary systems were more effective than presidential systems when
it came to the survival of democracy. Linz’s findings would go on to spark two additional waves of
literature comparing parliamentary democracies to presidential ones (Elgie, ).

e second wave of parliamentary/presidential studies was triggered by the critiques of David
Horowitz (), whose main argument was that Linz had mistakenly based his inferences on a
“highly selective sample of comparative experiences” (p. ). Similarly, Matthew Shugart and John
Carey () criticised the conclusions in which they stressed the superiority of parliamentarism
over presidentialism, because they were “considering only a dichotomous classification of regimes” (p.
). 
eir view was complemented by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (), who suggested
that the consequences of presidentialism inherently vary from one democracy to the next, and by
Mainwaring and Shugart (b), who suggested that presidentialism functions relatively well when
presidents “have weak legislative power, parties are at least moderately disciplined, and party systems
are not highly fragmented” (p. ).
In the third wave, Robert Elgie () argued that the comparison should be guided by more
general theories of political science. 
e research objective, according to Elgie, should be to study and
compare the balance of power of political actors within both parliamentarism and presidentialism. In
this vein, George Tsebelis and Kaare Strøm applied veto player theories and principal-agent theories
to explore power sharing relations within each type of regime. Tsebelis (; ) argued that the
multi-party setting in parliamentarism and the executive-legislative balance in presidentialism were
what ultimately shaped partisan strategies. Similarly, Kaare Strøm () applied the principal-agent
theory to the study of parliamentary and presidential regimes, arguing that the chain of delegation is
the decisive factor behind the motivation of political parties.
One common finding across the three waves of parliamentary/presidential studies was that parties
that would normally form coalitions in parliamentarism would only exceptionally form coalitions
in presidentialism (Linz and Valenzuela, , p. ). Indeed, academics across all three waves
concurred that the institutions found in parliamentary regimes generated stronger incentives for

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parties to cooperate with one another than those found in presidential regimes (see Linz and Stepan,
, p. ; Mainwaring, ; Scully and Mainwaring, , p. ; Stepan and Skach, , p.
). As a backlash to this particular finding, coalition formation in presidential regimes was relegated
to a secondary role in subsequent scholarship.
In a recent contribution, José Antonio Cheibub () revived the debate that took place across
the three waves of literature more than a decade earlier. In the process, he made a major breakthrough
regarding the role of coalitions in presidential regimes. He showed that institutions found in presi-
dential regimes did not, as initially suggested, hinder coalition formation. After controlling for the
distribution of seats and policy preferences, he argued that parliamentary and presidential systems
were equally likely to host government coalitions, and if these were less frequent in the latter it would
only be in cases in which legislatures were relatively weak (or presidents were extraordinarily strong).
Cheibub’s work is a landmark in the study of coalition formation in presidential regimes. It breaks
with the notion that government coalitions are rare in presidential regimes. As a consequence, his
work marks the starting point for a new scholarly agenda. It established a framework to answer
additional research questions related to coalition formation in presidentialism. For example, do the
trends that Cheibub observed hold over time? And what other independent variables – other than
the ones used in his study – determine coalition formation? Furthermore, do the trends that Cheibub
finds for government coalition formation also occur for electoral coalition formation? And if they do,
do the same independent variables apply?
Latin American presidential regimes are ideal for exploring the reasons behind coalition formation.
In contrast to the s, the period Linz looked at, today almost half of the democracies in the region
constantly undergo electoral and government coalition formation. 
e evolution in the frequency
of coalitions provides a perfect backdrop to explore how, when and why parties decide to form
coalitions. Data stemming from almost three decades of democracy is bound to hold important
hints that will almost certainly uncover the dynamics behind one of the most important forms of
political organisation in the region today.
Figure . and Figure . show a fractional-polynomial prediction plot with confidence intervals
for electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America in -. 
ey show that in
For example, the coalitions that won presidential elections in Argentina are substantially different from the coalitions
that won presidential elections in Bolivia. Indeed, the former are commonly conceived as the result of a strategic elite




 around  per cent of the elections had at least one electoral coalition, and that around  per
cent of the incumbent presidents formed a government coalition. 
ey also show that the frequency
of both electoral and government coalitions increased over time. Figure . and Figure . further
show that in  over  per cent of the elections had at least one electoral coalition, and that over
 per cent of the presidents elected formed a government coalition. (Note that some of the countries
in the sample only made the transition to democracy after ).
Figure ..: Electoral Coalition Formation,
-
Figure ..: Government Coalition Formation,
–

e tension between the conventional view and the actual behaviour of coalitions in the presidential
regimes of Latin America requires a revision. 
ough the overall trend of coalition formation in the
region has fostered a growing scholarly interest in the process of cabinet formation (Altman, ),
legislative performance (Alemán and Saiegh, ), and executive-legislative crisis (Pérez-Liñán,
), fundamental questions on the determinants of coalition formation remain unanswered. Why
do parties cooperate with one another in the form of coalitions, despite Linz’s initial findings that the
characteristics of presidentialism were shown to hinder coalition formation? And, specifically, why do
parties form electoral and government coalitions?

is thesis examines coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America. It attempts
to explain why parties cooperate with one another in the form of coalitions, despite the institutional
characteristics of presidentialism that have been found to hinder coalition formation. It also attempts
to explain why some parties form electoral coalitions and others form government coalitions. Because
this particular body of literature is burgeoning, this thesis borrows from theories of coalition formation
in parliamentary regimes. 
is does not mean, however, that it simply uses evidence of partisan

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behaviour pertaining to parliamentarism to presidentialism. Instead, it uses established concepts from
proven power sharing theories to fill in the gaps.

is thesis also borrows from the work of Cheibub (). It uses his contribution as a point of
departure to develop a more sophisticated theory of coalition formation in presidential regimes. It aims
to advance his original research agenda by providing additional descriptive context and explanatory
power related to the type of coalitions found in presidential regimes and the independent variables
that explain their formation. In addition to looking at coalition formation at the government level (as
Cheibub did), this thesis looks at coalition formation at the electoral level. It also builds on Cheibub’s
work by adding a significant number of independent variables – classified in three different theories –
to provide a more comprehensive account.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e second section reviews literature that
has been previously used to frame coalition formation. It covers the three main approaches normally
used to explain the formation of coalitions in parliamentary regimes. It then differentiates between
the traits of coalition formation under parliamentarism and presidentialism, showing that contrary
to conventional wisdom, parties have several reasons to form coalitions in presidential regimes. 
e
third section outlines three theories that aim to explain coalition formation in the region. 
e fourth
section presents the research questions and hypotheses that guide this study. 
e final section outlines
the methodological arrangement of the following chapters.
.  
.. Approaching Coalition Formation
In most democracies rational parties compete for votes, both to control office and for the opportunity
to influence policy (Strøm and Müller, ). In multi-party systems, however, a single party is
often unable to garner a majority of support. 
us, parties that wish to win elections are typically
forced to cooperate with other parties and form coalitions. 
is is normally the case in parliamentary
democracies where parties cooperate to avoid minority governments, and sometimes the case in
presidential democracies where parties cooperate to avoid minority presidents (Laver and Schofield,
; Strøm, ). William Riker () argues that these coalitions attempt to form with the
minimum number of parties possible to maximise office spoils. Sona Golder (c) distinguishes

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between coalitions that form before elections, and coalitions that form after elections.
An important part of the literature focuses on those that form before. Royce Carroll and Gary Cox
(), for instance, focus on pre-electoral coalitions. 
ey argue that they can be weak or strong,
depending on how member parties relate to each other. 
e weakest form of an electoral coalition is
the pure announcement to work together, since parties can easily back out. 
e second-weakest form
occurs when parties announce a joint platform, yet have not necessarily agreed on the conditions or
degree of their cooperation. A stronger electoral coalition occurs when parties run joint district lists
or a joint national list for legislative elections, and the strongest when the parties negotiate mutual
withdrawals (i.e., a legislative candidate of one party competes in one district and a candidate of the
other party competes in another so that the two do not compete against each other).
José Antonio Cheibub, Adam Przeworski and Sebastián Saiegh () focus on post-electoral
coalitions, distinguishing between legislative and government coalitions. 
ey define the former as a
set of legislators belonging to parties that vote in the same direction with the same intensity in the
legislature, and the latter as a set of politicians belonging to parties that share cabinet posts in the
executive. Depending on each of the parties’ campaign strategies and the harmony between their
political programmes, they may also attempt to maximise their chances of winning votes or passing
legislation by forming a joint legislative and government coalition. Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh
() argue that if parties are disciplined, every legislative coalition is a government coalition. In
line with Carroll and Cox’s () classification, a joint legislative and government coalition is the
strongest form of a post-electoral coalition.
Both electoral and government coalitions form because of preconditions and precipitants. 
ey form
because of institutional rules, sociological cleavages or specific critical junctures. From a theoretical
perspective, when forming coalitions, parties of different sizes and ideologies consider the strengths
and limitations of bargaining with each other. 
e asymmetry of power and policy orientations
distort the way, shape and form they negotiate with each other. Based on evidence stemming from
parliamentary regimes, Daniel Nagashima (, pp. -) argues that the literature on coalition
formation can be broadly categorised around three core approaches: () office and interest-based
models, which are framed from a rational choice and game theory perspective; () institutional-based
models, which emphasise the incentives and constraints of structural variables; and () policy and
ideology-based models, which are framed with spatial theory.

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Office and Interest-based Model
Office and interest-based models follow the assumption that rational political actors seek to maximise
their self-interest of gaining office. For example, Anthony Downs () argues that voters evaluate
a candidate based on that candidates’ ideological proximity to their own ideal point. Based on
an economic model of competition, Downs argues that political actors situate themselves along a
multidimensional spectrum to maximise their odds of winning. 
e theory is partially based on
formal models that show that the further away a candidate positions himself from the voters’ ideal
point, the less likely he is to be elected (see Black, ). Generally speaking, this approach argues
that coalitions will form to control a small or the smallest possible winning majority (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, , pp. -). Coalitions will only form among parties that are close to
each other’s ideal points. As the main penman behind this line of literature, Riker () argues that
coalitions will only include parties whose support is essential to meet a minimal winning size.
Institutional-based Model
Institutional-based models hold that while political actors are important players of the game, the
institutional framework is what ultimately constrains the strategies available to them. For example,
David Austen-Smith and Jeffery Banks () and David Baron () highlight the role of the
formateur party. Others emphasise the importance of incumbent cabinets and presidents (see Strøm
and Swindle, ). Lieven De Winter (, pp. -) argues that the combination of power,
party strength, informal assumptions on policy distance and institutional constraints could very well
determine coalition formation in terms of composition, portfolio allocation and policy formulation
processes. 
e correlation between party strength and cabinet presence is known as “Gamson’s law”
(see Gamson, ). Indeed, many scholars have found that the share of cabinet portfolios that each
government receives is almost perfectly proportional to the share of legislative seats it contributes
to the government coalition (Browne and Franklin, ; Browne and Frendreis, ; Laver and
Schofield, ; Warwick and Druckman, , ).

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Policy and Ideology-based Model
Policy and ideology-based models follow the assumption that political actors form coalitions to
influence policy and seek to maximise their policy interests once in office. For example, Robert Axelrod
() argues that coalitions are not only minimum winning, but also ideologically connected. 
is
is based on the idea that coalitions normally form adjacent to one another across a uni-dimensional
scale. Generally speaking, this approach argues that coalition formation is dependent on ideology
thus political parties with similar programmatic points of view are more likely to form a coalition
(De Swaan and Rapoport, ), regardless of the size of the alliance (Laver and Shepsle, ,
). Lanny Martin and Randolph Stevenson () find that minimal winning and ideologically
connected coalitions are more likely to form than others, while Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis
() show that cabinet ministers usually come from the parties with similar ideologies to the
formateur’s party.
.. Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Regimes and Presidential Regimes
Mainwaring and Shugart (c) note that while coalition formation normally takes place after
elections in parliamentary regimes, it generally takes place before elections in presidential ones. In
parliamentary regimes coalitions tend to form after elections to produce majority governments, and
thus avoid constantly bargaining with other parties for support in order to prevent being ousted on a
motion of no confidence. In presidential regimes they tend to form before elections to have a greater
chance of defeating other parties. Although in both regimes parties have incentives to form coalitions
before the election, in parliamentary regimes parties have stronger guarantees that they can join a
government coalition, even when they are not successful in the election. And though in both regimes
parties have incentives to form coalitions after the elections, in presidential regimes parties are less
likely to have leverage to negotiate with the president after he is elected.
While there is substantive literature assessing the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches in presidential regimes, there is little research on the determinants of electoral and government
coalition formation (see exceptions Alemán and Tsebelis, ; Altman, ; Chasquetti, ;
Deheza, ; Parra, ). 
is can be mainly explained as a backlash to the faulty conclusions
derived from the three waves of literature comparing parliamentary and presidential regimes. Because
coalition formation was considered a rare occurrence, little effort was made to design a research agenda
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to explore its causes and consequences. As explained above, with the exception of Cheibub (),
most scholars bypassed the topic completely. Even in the light of the growing trend of coalition
formation in the region, the literature addressing it has only marginally increased over the years.
Contrary to the conventional belief that coalition formation is rare in presidentialism, parties have
several reasons to cooperate and form coalitions.
One reason parties may be willing to join a coalition is if the president has weak as opposed to
strong legislative power. In situations where the president has limited legislative faculties, he will often
seek additional support from other parties to pass legislation. If the president is weak it will be difficult
for him to pass policy with his party alone. At the same time, other parties may be willing to join the
coalition if they have better chances of influencing the agenda from within. 
is is especially the case
for small parties that find themselves in the middle of the road, distant from both the incumbent
party and the opposition. 
us, while the president’s party needs other parties to pass legislation,
other parties need the president’s party to gain leverage over the direction of policy. While parties
may initially form coalitions because they have a higher chance of changing policy together, they
often decide to uphold the coalition because they find that they have a higher degree of affinity than
initially expected. Recent evidence from Uruguay demonstrates that legislators who form part of a
government coalition tend to subscribe to a more pro-government agenda than what their ideology
would otherwise predict (Zucco, ).
A second reason a party may be willing to join a coalition is that it may be the best strategy
available if the electoral institutions and the electoral system are restrictive, as opposed to permissive.
Restrictive electoral provisions essentially aim to reduce the size of the party system, and force parties
to adopt one of two strategies: to merge with other parties in the form of coalitions, or to take their
chances alone and risk losing their legal standing. Indeed, David Samuels () shows that when
electoral institutions and electoral systems have restrictive effects, large and small parties alike often
adopt the former strategy. Evidence from Chile shows that the electoral institutions and electoral
systems established by the military government have had a restrictive effect on the party system, and

is distinction originally appeared in Gary Cox’s Making Votes Count (, p. ). He argued that a restrictive
electoral system generates incentives for a small party system, and a permissive electoral system generates incentives
for a large party system. 
e distinction was stressed in José Antonio Cheibub’s Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and
Democracy (, p. ). He argued that there are two major types of electoral system, considering that they each
represent different institutional paths to enhance governability. One type of electoral system limits the variety of views
that can enter the political process (restrictive electoral system), and the other allows for a larger variety of views that
can enter the political process (permissive electoral system).
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as such have effectively generated incentives for like-minded parties to form coalitions in order to win
elections and pass policy once in power (Magar, Rosenblum and Samuels, ).
A third reason a party may be willing to join a coalition is if the party system is highly fragmented.
If this is the case, a coalition may attract more voters than any party alone. Santiago Basabe-Serrano
and John Polga-Hecimovich () advance the idea that coalition formation and maintenance in
highly fragmented presidential regimes is crucial to overcoming policy deadlock. 
ey suggest that
a coalition can present itself as a platform with sufficient support to change policy, showing that
institutions have an important influence, even over the judicial power, which can ultimately be used to
change the direction of policy. Using evidence from Ecuador, Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich
show that under some circumstances legislators sought to remove judges further from their own ideal
points, as the composition of the legislative coalition changed in order to pass pieces of legislation
closer to the ideal point of the new coalition.
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Taking into account the literature stemming from parliamentary regimes, and the evidence collected
from case studies and descriptive method studies in presidential regimes, three major theories aim
to explain coalition formation in Latin America. One theory concerns presidential power. It holds
that weak presidents have more incentives to bargain with other parties than strong presidents. A
second theory relates to electoral institutions and the electoral system. It holds that restrictive electoral
provisions provide more incentives for parties to negotiate with other parties than permissive electoral
provisions. A third theory relates to the party system. It holds that large multi-party systems are more
inclined to produce strategic cooperation between parties than small party systems.
.. Presidential Power 
eory
Cooperation among parties is a function of the utility they can receive in elections, and the policy
leverage they can attain once in power. Octavio Amorim Neto () argues that parties with
presidential aspirations normally adopt one of two strategies. One is the legislative strategy, where
the party decides to cooperate with other parties to obtain a majority in congress. 
e other is the
administrative strategy, where the emphasis is placed on the faculties of the president to pass legislation
through extraordinary measures. Initially, the strategy adopted depends on the legislative support of
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the party. If the party has low support in congress it will choose to form a coalition with other parties.

is decision is reinforced if the president does not have significant legislative power.
It has often been argued that the weaker the president’s power, the higher the need for the incumbent
party to join a coalition. In some cases incumbent parties chose to join coalitions with other parties to
avoid constitutional crisis. In other cases they chose to join coalitions because it was the only means of
passing legislation. In contrast, when power is highly concentrated in the executive there is little need
for the incumbent party to join a coalition. 
ese are both extreme examples, signalled as potential
obstacles to democratic consolidation and governance. It is not surprising, then, that electoral reforms
have tended to create incentives for the incumbent party to cooperate with other parties, yet still
provide the president with extraordinary power to govern alone in the case of legislative stalemate.
Table . shows that constitutions in some countries grant the president more power than in others.

is implies that presidents in these countries have more leverage to govern without relying on the
legislature (see Jones, ; Zucco, ). As the power invested in the president decreases, the
likelihood that he will seek cooperation from other parties is expected to increase. Countries that
grant their presidents strong constitutional power include Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Countries
that grant their presidents weak constitutional power include Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay.
Some countries that grant their presidents moderate constitutional power are Colombia, El Salvador,
and Panama.
.. Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems 
eory
Cooperation among parties is also determined by the rules of the game. Restrictive electoral institutions
and electoral systems generate incentives for small party systems, while permissive electoral institutions
and electoral systems generate incentives for large party systems (Cheibub, ; Cox, ; Remmer,
). Naturally, coalitions will be more likely to form in the former than in the latter. When electoral
institutions and electoral systems are extremely restrictive, parties will have strong incentives to either
join other parties in the form of coalitions or expire. In contrast, when electoral institutions and
the electoral system are extremely permissive, there will be strong incentives for existing parties to
maintain their independence and for new parties to emerge.
It thus seems natural that any given democracy that would like to move from a multi-party to a
coalition system would aim to adopt restrictive electoral rules. However, while most countries in the
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region have attempted to protect democracy through amendments to their constitutions (Mainwaring
and Scully, ; Pérez-Liñán, ), they have not always been able to do so. Indeed, even though
Latin American electoral rules are more notable for their fluidity than their stickiness (Remmer, ),
it has not been easy to modify electoral institutions and electoral systems to obtain certain party
systems. As Douglass North () suggests, “[i]nstitutions are not necessarily or even usually created
to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of
those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (p. ). 
us, it makes sense, as Remmer ()
shows, that electoral alterations have tended “to reinforce rather than precipitate changes in patterns
of political representation” (p. ).
Table . shows that some democracies have more restrictive electoral institutions and electoral
systems than others. Restrictive electoral rules (e.g., simple majority plurality for presidential elections,
and proportional electoral systems with low district magnitudes for legislative elections), as explained
above, can be defined as those that favour larger parties and create incentives for parties to coordinate,
and thus shrink the size of the party system (see Cox, ; Duverger, ). For example, while
Chile and Panama have restrictive electoral rules which favour a small party system, Ecuador and
Paraguay have permissive electoral rules which favour a large party system. Some cases, like Honduras
and Mexico, are in the middle of the road, with both restrictive and permissive electoral rules, and as
such simultaneously offer incentives for both small and large party systems.
.. Party System 
eory
Party systems naturally differ across Latin America. Manuel Alcántara () argues that democracies
can be classified into four types, according to the effective number of parties (ENP): two-party systems
(ENP=.-.), moderate multi-party systems (ENP=.-.), extreme multi-party systems (ENP>),
and hegemonic party systems (such as the PRI in Mexico in -). Since the s there
has been a significant increase in the average ENP; today, the region’s party spectrum is dominated
by multi-party systems (Bunker and Navia, ). In a study of  Latin American governments
between  and , Daniel Chasquetti () reports that . per cent of democracies were
ruled by two-party systems, and . per cent were ruled by multi-party systems (of which . per
cent were moderate multi-party systems and . per cent were extreme multi-party systems).
As suggested above, it is more likely that coalitions will form in large multi-party systems. It
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makes intuitive sense, then, that coalition formation would be more frequent in the  per cent of
democracies ruled by multi-party systems. Yet, this association may not be as direct as expected. As
Chasquetti () notes, it was only during the s that a chain of coalitions began to win elections.
Although there is some evidence of party cooperation patterns in the s, it was only a decade later
that serious coalitions began to appear. It is not entirely clear why coalitions were not as predominant
in the s as they were in the s, but it seems to be linked to the increase in the size of party
systems in between those years.
Table . shows that some party systems are larger than others. 
e size of a party system, as
explained at length below, can be categorised according to the number of parties that either compete
in elections or the number of parties that have legislative representation (see Taagepera and Shugart,
, ). Some countries have large multi-party systems (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay),
other countries have moderate multi-party systems (e.g. Argentina, Costa Rica, and Peru), and yet
other countries have small party systems (e.g. the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras).
Table ..: Characteristics of  Latin American Presidential Democracies
Country Presidential Electoral Institutions Party
Power and Electoral Systems System
Argentina Strong Restrictive Moderate
Bolivia Moderate Permissive Moderate
Brazil Strong Permissive Large
Chile Strong Restrictive Moderate
Colombia Moderate Restrictive Small
Costa Rica Strong Restrictive Moderate
Dominican Rep. Weak Restrictive Small
Ecuador Moderate Permissive Large
El Salvador Moderate Permissive Moderate
Guatemala Weak Restrictive Small
Honduras Weak Mixed Small
Mexico Weak Mixed Moderate
Nicaragua Weak Restrictive Small
Panama Moderate Restrictive Moderate
Paraguay Weak Permissive Moderate
Peru Moderate Restrictive Moderate
Uruguay Strong Mixed Large
Venezuela Strong Restrictive Moderate
References. Presidential Power is based on Negretto (), Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems is based on
Remmer (), and Party System is based on Gallagher and Mitchell ().
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.. Research Questions

e research questions that guide this thesis are: () why do parties form electoral coalitions in the
presidential regimes of Latin America? and () why do parties form government coalitions in the presidential
regimes of Latin America? 
e remainder of this section outlines the hypotheses that can be derived
from each of the three theories mentioned above. Most of the hypotheses are used to explain both
electoral and government coalition formation. Some of the hypotheses correspond only to electoral
coalition formation, and some correspond only to government coalition formation.
.. Hypotheses: Presidential Power
In general, coalition formation is expected to be less likely in democracies with strong presidents (in
contrast to democracies with weak presidents). 
e objective of this subsection, then, is to define the
causal relationship between coalition formation and some variables that indicate the level of power
that constitutions grant their presidents.
One hypothesis that derives from presidential power is that democracies with presidents that have a
high concentration of policy-making power (such as veto power, decree power, and budgetary power)
are less likely to see government coalitions form. When the president has strong legislative powers,
he will be less likely to seek the support of other parties to execute his campaign programme. If the
president’s party can pass legislation alone (without support from other parties), it will choose to do
so. In contrast, if the president has weak legislative powers, he will have to rely on other parties to
achieve his goals. In the latter scenario, the president will bargain with other parties in exchange for
their support in congress.
A second hypothesis that derives from presidential power is that democracies with presidents that
have a high concentration of power in areas different from policy making (such as appointment power,
emergency power, and inter-branch conflict power) are less likely to see government coalitions form.
Similar to the hypothesis above, when the president has strong powers to govern in areas other than
the legislative realm, he will be less likely to seek the support of other parties.
A third hypothesis, also deriving from presidential power, is that presidential democracies with
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incumbent presidents elected with a high percentage of votes are less likely to see government coalitions
form. A popular president will attempt to use citizen support as leverage to both execute their campaign
programmes and generate governability. When the president obtains a high share of votes in an
election, his overall power will tend to be unmatched by opposition parties, making him relatively
strong in the political system. In contrast, if his vote share is low, he will be considered a lame duck,
and will have to reach out to other parties for support.
.. Hypotheses: Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems
In contrast to the direction of the hypotheses outlined above, coalition formation is expected to be
more likely in democracies with restrictive electoral institutions and electoral systems (as opposed
to democracies with permissive electoral institutions and electoral systems). 
is subsection aims to
define the causal relationship between coalition formation and some variables that indicate the level
of restrictiveness of the respective electoral institutions and electoral systems.
One hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral systems, is that presidential democracies with
simple majority plurality (SMP) are more likely to see both electoral and government coalitions form.
When a presidential candidate has only one shot at an election (as opposed to two shots, when a
run-off is available), he will attempt to maximise his chances of winning by forming a broad enough
coalition to surpass the required threshold. In most cases, parties that are asked to join a coalition
will seek a reward in exchange for their endorsement, such as cabinet portfolios. 
us, while SMP
offers strong incentives to join a coalition before an election, the president-elect will often decide to
uphold the agreement for the duration of his administration.
A second hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral institutions, is that democracies with
incumbent presidential candidates are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Because incumbent
presidents that seek re-election are usually considered front-runners (with a high probability of
winning), smaller parties that do not stand a chance will seek to back them in exchange for cabinet
portfolios.
Another hypothesis that can be derived from the above is that democracies with presidents in their
Most incumbent presidents that bid for re-election in Latin America win. In -, this was the case for Carlos
Menem () and Cristina Fernández () in Argentina; Evo Morales () in Bolivia; Fernando Henrique
Cardoso () and Lula da Silva () in Brazil; Álvaro Uribe () in Colombia; Joaquín Balaguer (, )
and Leonel Fernández () in the Dominican Republic; Rafael Correa () in Ecuador; Alberto Fujimori (,
) in Peru; and Hugo Chávez (, ) in Venezuela.
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second term are more likely to see government coalitions form. Similar to the hypothesis above, and
also derived from restrictive electoral institutions, is that once an incumbent president is elected
he will tend to uphold any partisan agreement made prior to the election. 
is is reinforced, since
popularity levels tend to drop in the second term, and presidents often need strategic alliances to pass
legislation.
A third hypothesis, also derived from restrictive electoral institutions, is that presidential democracies
with long presidential terms are more likely to see both electoral and government coalitions form.
When term limits are short (say, four years), smaller parties will be willing to take their chances in
competing against larger parties in elections, since they will have another chance to compete (or at
least reassess their strategy) in just a few years. In contrast, when term limits are long (say, six years),
smaller parties will not be as willing to take the same chances, since the distance to the next election
is significantly longer. In this case, when the smaller parties opt out of competing on their own and
join a coalition with a larger party, they maximise their chances of obtaining cabinet portfolios.
A fourth hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral systems, is that presidential democracies with
concurrent presidential and legislative elections are more likely to see both electoral and government
coalitions form. Concurrent elections force parties to have a national strategy, in which larger parties
will tend to negotiate with smaller parties for legislative support, and smaller parties will tend to
negotiate with larger parties in exchange for cabinet portfolios. When elections are concurrent,
coalitions are usually a win-win strategy for both large and small parties.
A fifth hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral institutions, is that presidential democracies
with unicameral congresses are more likely to see both electoral and government coalitions form.
Unicameralism institutionally offers a faster legislative process, in which policy is normally approved
or rejected faster than in bicameralism. In anticipation of this situation, presidential candidates will
form coalitions before elections to boost the chances of passing their programme if they are eventually
elected. Similarly, incumbent presidents will form government coalitions (either by upholding
pre-electoral agreements, or by inviting rival parties) to effectively pass legislation once in power.
A sixth hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral systems, is that presidential democracies in
which most seats are distributed by proportional representation electoral rules for legislative elections
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. 
is is based on the premise that PR systems encourage
multi-party systems, and thus boost the chance that at least some of the parties will find a common
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platform to campaign on.
A seventh hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral systems, is that presidential democracies
with electoral thresholds to gain legislative representation are more likely to see electoral coalitions
form, the logic being that the survival instinct of small parties will force them to find a way of
remaining active in the political system. If a small party anticipates a low vote share in the upcoming
election, the incentive to cooperate with a larger party increases.
An eighth hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral institutions, is that presidential democracies
with large legislatures are more likely to see both electoral and government coalitions form. When
there are many seats in congress, larger parties may be willing to co-opt smaller parties to avoid
potential veto-players. Likewise, smaller parties may seek to cooperate with larger parties, since their
vote share will probably not give them a significant quota of power in congress anyway.
A final hypothesis, derived from restrictive electoral systems, is that presidential democracies with
small average district magnitudes are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. 
e logic behind
this hypothesis is that because small parties face elimination if they decide to compete against large
parties in districts where few seats are available, they will tend to maximise their chances of survival
and join a coalition. However, it is important to note that there is a district magnitude “sweet spot”,
which tends to be large but not too large (see Carey and Hix, ). Parties have just as few incentives
to join coalitions when district magnitudes are too small as they have when district magnitudes are
too large.
.. Hypotheses: Party System
Finally, coalition formation is expected to be more likely in democracies with large multi-party systems
(in contrast to democracies with small party systems). As above, the objective of this subsection is to
define the causal relationship between coalition formation and some variables that indicate the size of
the party system.
One hypothesis, derived from the size of the party system, is that presidential democracies with
many parties are more likely to see both electoral and government coalitions form. 
is follows the
same logic as the PR system hypothesis stated above, in which parties in large multi-party systems
will be more likely to find a common platform with other parties. In contrast, in two-party systems
there are no incentives for cooperation. As the party system becomes larger, the likelihood that at
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least some of the parties will converge in ideologically akin policy platforms increases.
A second hypothesis, also derived from the size of the party system, is that presidential democracies
in which the government party has a large legislative majority are more likely to see both electoral and
government coalitions form. 
e logic behind this hypothesis is counterintuitive, since one would
expect that a party with a large legislative majority should not have incentives to bargain with other
parties. Yet, other parties are often intimidated by large legislative majorities, and find higher rewards
when they join the government party in a coalition. 
is is more practical than forming a weak and
inefficient opposition. 
e negotiations often start before elections – and endure beyond them –
since massive electoral victories are often forecasted months in advance.
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is thesis uses a mixed methodology to answer the research questions and hypotheses outlined above.
One part relies on a large-N inferential analysis (using evidence from  Latin American countries),
and another part relies on a medium-N case study (using evidence from Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico).

e combination of methodological approaches allows the thesis to approach coalition formation
from different angles. While the inferential analysis provides an initial exploration of the reasons
parties form electoral and government coalitions, the medium-N case study deepens the inferential
analysis by making sense of the findings in different contexts.
Chapter  describes the history of coalition formation in Latin America. It takes into account
 democracies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. It first defines the concepts and definitions used throughout the thesis, before
describing the differences and similarities between why, how and when coalitions form. It presents
the data used in subsequent chapters, particularly focusing on some of the elements that may hinder
comparability between countries. It also shows some of the main patterns of coalition formation in
the region. Finally, it assesses the precipitants and preconditions of coalition formation, according to
the three core approaches outlined above: the office-seeking approach, the policy-driven approach
and the vote-seeking approach.
Chapter  analyses the causes of electoral coalition formation in the  countries mentioned above.
It answers the research question why do parties form electoral coalitions in the presidential regimes of
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Latin America? and the corresponding hypotheses presented above. It shows that simple majority
plurality for presidential elections, unicameralism, proportional representation, larger legislatures,
smaller district magnitudes, a higher effective number of electoral parties, and the government party’s
legislative majority are crucial predictors of electoral coalition formation. It also shows that when an
outsider presidential candidate is present the likelihood of electoral coalition formation decreases.
Chapter  analyses the causes of government coalition formation in the same  countries. It
answers the research question why do parties form government coalitions in the presidential regimes of
Latin America? and the corresponding hypotheses presented above. It shows that as the incumbent
president’s power and vote share increase, the likelihood of forming a government coalition decreases.
It also shows that simple majority plurality for presidential elections, longer presidential term lengths,
smaller legislatures, fewer legislative parties, and the government party’s legislative majority are crucial
predictors of government coalition formation. Finally, it shows that when the incumbent president is
backed by an electoral coalition or when the government is going through crisis, the probability of
forming a government coalition increases.
Chapter  looks at electoral and government coalition formation in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

e three countries represent the complete range of possible outcomes. While Chile has both
electoral and government coalitions, Ecuador occasionally has an electoral or a government coalition,
and Mexico never has either. 
e countries in the sample also differ in their presidential power
provisions, their electoral institutions and electoral systems, and their party systems. It shows that
while presidential power is relevant, electoral arrangements and the party system are what ultimately
shape determine coalition formation. While the former variable is a sufficient condition, the latter
variables are both sufficient and necessary conditions. Finally, this thesis shows that political culture
and critical junctures play an important role in exacerbating or ameliorating these structural incentives.
Chapter  summarises the empirical findings of Chapter  and Chapter , and the qualitative
findings of Chapter . It explains how the findings are both original and relevant, and contribute to
the development of a theory of coalition formation particular to presidential regimes. It also describes
some of the limitations encountered during production, and suggests alternatives for future research.

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L AT I N A M E R I C A

is chapter describes the history of coalition formation in Latin America. 
e second section
defines the concepts and definitions used throughout the thesis, and the third section outlines the
differences and similarities between why, how and when coalitions form in  Latin American
countries. It particularly focuses on the distinction between electoral and government coalitions.

e fourth section presents the data, focusing on some of the elements that may hinder com-
parability among democracies, such as the number of elections, term and tenure limits, and
interrupted presidencies. 
e fifth section describes patterns of coalitions occurring across the
region between  and . 
e final section assesses the precipitants and preconditions
of coalition formation, according to three core approaches: the office-seeking approach, the
policy-driven approach and the vote-seeking approach.
. 
Coalitions are the predominant form of public administration in parliamentarism. In these regimes,
negotiations between parties tend to occur after the election, once each party has received its share of
votes. Parties that do not reach an absolute majority of support in a given election tend to negotiate
with other parties, in order to avoid a hung parliament, and form government. In contrast, coalitions
are less common in presidentialism. In these regimes, negotiations between parties tend to occur in
anticipation of the election, before each party has received its share of votes. Parties often attempt to
maximise their chance of winning a given election by forming coalitions large enough to meet the
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often high electoral threshold (usually ranging from  per cent to absolute majority).
Most of the literature on coalition formation has focused on evidence stemming from parliamentary
regimes. A long span of uninterrupted democracy has provided scholars with a large number of
observations. In these regimes, institutions are purposely designed to favour stable government
systems, in which parties with minority support are encouraged to form majorities that can share the
premiership and steer away from instability. 
is is contrary to the constitutional rules in presidential
systems, in which institutions do not encourage parties to cooperate per se. While stable governments
are also an important objective, minority parties are not seen as a threat to democracy. As a result,
little effort has been made to explain coalition formation in presidentialism.
Some advances have been made in recent years (see Cheibub, ). Yet, most research has focused
on specific cases. An early example is David Altman’s () study of Uruguay, which used quantitative
methods to focus on the likelihood of cooperation and stalemate among political actors. Another
example is Carlos Huneeus’s () study of Chile, which looked at the prospects of party realignment
following a change to the electoral system. Other studies have resorted to descriptive method studies.
For example, Daniel Chasquetti () looked at the combination of democracy, multi-party systems
and coalition formation across  countries of Latin America in -. Similarly, Adrián Albala
() used evidence from three countries to examine patterns of coalition formation in the southern
cone.
Literature regarding coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America can be divided
into two broad lines of research: case studies and descriptive method studies. While the former draws
specific conclusions of regional dynamics based on findings from specific countries, the latter draws
generic conclusions of regional patterns based on findings from descriptive inquiries. Two important
drawbacks arise from these approaches. On the one hand, while case studies are generally useful to
understand local dynamics, they cannot be used to make valid cross-regional inferences. On the other
hand, while descriptive method studies are useful to approach an overall notion on how coalition
formation operates, they fall substantially short of identifying causal mechanisms.

ough the study of coalition formation in Latin America is burgeoning, there is no substantive
evidence it is advancing towards an explanatory agenda. Case studies focused on uncovering local
dynamics and descriptive method studies focused on identifying patterns have consolidated as the
predominant manner of research. 
e possibility of testing theories generated with case studies or with
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descriptive method studies is limited. While some quantitative research exists (see Freudenreich, ,
; Negretto, ), the lack of evidence gathered and processed with a cross-regional scope has
significantly narrowed down the conclusions that can be discussed about party cooperation patterns
in the region.
As the research questions become more specific (as they do with case studies), the findings become
less generalisable. And as research attempts to lump together significantly different countries (as they
do in descriptive method studies), the findings become more abstract. Yet, scholars have insisted on
using these methods, for two reasons. First, case studies generally depart from the assumption that
within a given country coalitions tend to form in different manners depending on the election. 
us,
alternative scenarios are rarely considered. Second, since descriptive method studies have generally
focused on democracies with electoral coalitions, they have mainly aimed for classifying coalitions,
rather than testing hypotheses.
Explaining coalition formation is an essential process for understanding other dynamics that occur
within democracy. Indeed, a theory of coalition formation specific to presidentialism can complement
other fields of study within the discipline. In essence, understanding why, how, and when parties
decide to cooperate with other parties can provide key insight for understanding how democracies
operate. 
us far, parties’ motives for forming coalitions in presidential regimes have only been
partially assessed. Specific hypotheses remain untested. For example, parties may respond to the
results of legislative elections, or they may behave strategically to maximise policy leverage once in
power. 
ey may have a predisposition to negotiate according to underlying social cleavages, or they
may be willing to cooperate because of specific institutional incentives.

e four examples of untested hypotheses outlined above stem from research focusing on case
studies and descriptive method studies. For example, Daniel Buquet () argues that parties are
likely to cooperate in Uruguay, suggesting that political cooperation may rely on legislative behaviour.
Andrés Mejía Acosta (), meanwhile, argues that parties in Ecuador tend to form coalitions to
optimise government policy leverage; this may be evidence that political cooperation is instrumental.
Timothy Scully () argues that parties in Chile organise according to cleavages, pointing to the
possibility that social structures determine party systems. Finally, Barry Ames () argues that the
multi-party system in Brazil is the product of proportional representation electoral rules – possible




e hypotheses above have not been answered. One possible reason is that the standard manner of
framing coalition formation in presidential regimes has been to borrow theories from parliamentary
regimes, and it has therefore been impossible to understand particular dynamics. 
us, while
hypotheses are constantly generated, there is no framework to test them. 
is is a vicious circle, given
that the lack of a specific theory constrains research to case studies or descriptive method studies.
While both case studies and descriptive method studies have laid the foundations for understanding
why, how and when coalitions form, their resulting theories are yet to be tested. Using a large-N
approach to test these theories can significantly complement existing research. Furthermore, making
this transition is crucial for breaking the vicious circle, and building a specific theory of coalition
formation in presidential regimes.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e second section defines the concepts and
definitions used throughout the thesis. 
e third section describes the differences and similarities
between why, how and when coalitions form in  Latin American democracies. It particularly
focuses on the distinction between electoral and government coalitions. 
e fourth section presents
the data, focusing on some of the elements that may hinder comparability between countries, such
as the number of elections, term and tenure limits, and interrupted presidencies. 
e fifth section
describes patterns of coalitions that have risen across the region between -. 
e final section
assesses the precipitants and preconditions of coalition formation, according to three core approaches:
the office-seeking approach, the policy-driven approach and the vote-seeking approach.
.   

e type of regime matters. 
e incentives for coalition formation in parliamentary regimes differ
from the incentives for coalition formation in presidential regimes. In each regime, parties tend
to cooperate for different reasons, in different manners and at different times. For example, in
parliamentary regimes parties tend to form coalitions in order to reach a higher probability of forming
government. As mentioned above, this occurs mainly due to the specific laws that guide elections.
Because the requirement to form government is to win more seats, the largest party’s first objective
is to maximise its vote share. If this is not possible, the party must negotiate with a second – and
sometimes a third or fourth – party to form a government coalition. 
us, as the probability of hung
parliament increases, so too does the probability of a government coalition.
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Parties in presidential regimes do not face this institutional incentive. Instead, they operate under a
winner-takes-all logic, where in most cases parties without a significant proportion of votes can form
government if they simply have more votes than the other competing parties. Furthermore, because
governments can form with minority support, parties do not need to use their electoral support as
a means to obtain power. Large parties in simple majority systems are only required to obtain the
majority of votes to form government. Even large parties in absolute majority systems may attempt
to run alone. In contrast, smaller parties in simple majority systems often seek to bargain before
elections, when they have more influence. But a small party may also decide to endorse a large party
in absolute majority systems, between the first and second rounds, to help surpass the threshold.
Coalition formation may occur at any time. While it usually occurs after elections in parliamentary
regimes, it sometimes occurs before. Likewise, while it generally occurs before elections in presidential
regimes, it can also occur after. Coalition formation can thus be understood as the negotiation of
parties to form common platforms to face an election (electoral coalition) or to share cabinet posts in
government (government coalition). 
e strength of the resulting coalitions naturally varies. While
parties may form strong coalitions, enduring electoral cycles and governments’ terms, they may also
dissolve before they end. For example, while parties may decide to form government coalitions, they
may also decide to break-up shortly after inauguration. Alternatively, while they may decide to form
electoral coalitions, they may decide to break-up immediately following the election.
It is important to distinguish the difference between joining a coalition before an election and
joining one after. Sona Golder (b, pp. -) defines an electoral coalition as a collection of
parties that do not compete independently in an election; rather, they publicly agree to coordinate
their campaigns by running joint candidates/lists or agreeing to enter government together following
the election. Golder’s definition holds under three criteria. First, the coalition must be publicly
stated. If the coalition is not overtly disclosed, it is not strictly a coalition. Second, the parties cannot
compete in elections as independent entities. If the parties face each other in the election, it is not
strictly a coalition. 
ird, the coalition must form at the national level. A region-specific coalition is
not representative of substantive partisan cooperation.
In contrast, a government coalition is one in which two or more parties cooperate to form govern-
ment. A commonsense definition of a government coalition is one in which parties share cabinet posts.
If a party in a coalition does not hold a cabinet post, it is difficult to conceive it as a member. While
there is a higher correlation between government coalitions and parliamentary regimes (in which the
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cabinet is appointed by the legislature) than between government coalitions and presidential regimes
(in which the cabinet is appointed by the formateur), there are determinants other than regime type.

e type of the electoral system (whether majoritarian or proportional) has also been suggested as
an important independent variable. For example, PR systems tend to produce more parties than
majoritarian systems, and thus increase the probability of coalition formation among like-minded
parties.
. ,     
Why, how and when parties cooperate in parliamentary regimes is fairly well documented. But why,
how and when they form coalitions in presidential regimes is not. 
us, answering these questions is
crucial to developing a theory of coalition formation particular to presidentialism. 
e first step is
to describe the range of reasons, manners and timings of coalition formation in Latin America. 
e
remainder of this section provides examples from the party systems of Latin America, showing why
coalitions form, the different ways they form, and the specific times of their formation.
Coalitions form for different reasons in presidentialism; while in some countries they form for
sociological or institutional reasons, in others they form for strategic ones. In the former countries
coalitions tend to be stable, while in the latter countries coalitions tend to be ad-hoc. One factor that
may explain the difference between both types of countries is the number of parties. In multi-party
systems parties have more incentives to cooperate than in two-party systems. Another factor that may
explain the difference is the age of the democracy. Newer democracies tend to have complex party
systems that respond to recent cleavages and constitutions, while older democracies tend to have
simple party systems that are considered to operate under inertia. Coalition formation incentives are
bound to be higher in multi-party democracies than old two-party democracies.
In Chile, for example, coalitions are the predominant manner of party organisation. Since the
return of democracy in , the multi-party system has been dominated by two large coalitions.

e Democracia Cristiana (DC) and the Partido Socialista (PS) integrate the centre-left coalition
(Concertación), and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN)
integrate the centre-right coalition (Alianza). Some scholars have argued that these coalitions originally
formed because of the democratic-authoritarian divide (Tironi and Agüero, ): while parties
of the centre-left coalition built their constituency among those who opposed the authoritarian
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regime, parties of the centre-right coalition built their constituency among those who supported it.
Other scholars argue that these coalitions remained together because of the electoral rules (Siavelis,
b): the PR system with a low district magnitude for legislative elections, together with concurrent
presidential and legislative elections, generate incentives for like-minded parties to group together to
maximise their chances of winning.
In Costa Rica, in contrast, parties rarely form coalitions. 
e two major parties – the Partido
de Liberación Nacional (PLN) and the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) – have dominated
politics since the s. Of the eight presidential elections held since  (, , ,
, , , , and ), five were won by the PLN, and three by the PUSC. Likewise,
exclusively party militants of the PLN or of the PUSC have taken cabinet posts in their respective
governments (Schwindt-Bayer, ). Coalition formation only occurs among minor parties, which
strategically form ad-hoc coalitions to attempt to maximise their likelihood of ousting the larger
parties from power. Unlike Chile, Costa Rica does not have an authoritarian record. As one of the
longest standing democracies in the region, its party system is both fluid and stable. 
is has helped
political preferences disperse around two large parties, instead of into many small ones (Seligson,
).
Coalitions also form in different manners in presidentialism. 
e decision to join a coalition
ultimately rests with party elites. For example, while large parties often groom their own presidential
candidate to win an election, small parties may do the same, but for different reasons: either to win
the election or to influence post-electoral bargaining (Samuels, ; Colomer and Negretto, ).

e latter is more frequent than generally expected, since small parties usually stand a lower chance
of winning seats or influencing the agenda on their own. And because the elites of small parties
presumably understand this strategy, they tend to cooperate with parties that give them voice in the
political arena. Yet, this is also dependent on the party system. If there are many parties, the larger
parties will tend to bargain with parties that are ideologically more similar.
In Mexico, parties tend to compete alone. 
is is the norm, since large parties tend to have enough
support to win elections and govern alone. Yet, in some special cases temporary alliances between
one large party and one or many smaller parties form. However, this depends on the state of affairs.
For example, in the  presidential election the favourite, Felipe Calderón of the PAN competed
alone, while Manuel López Obrador (PRD) and Roberto Madrazo (PRI) had coalitions backing them.
While Calderón was the favourite, his party did not need to extend their programme to other parties

,     
in order to bid for a higher vote share. 
e PRD, in contrast, looked to cooperate with the Worker’s
Party (PT) and the Convergence Party (PC) to attempt to broaden their vote base. Likewise, the PRI
cooperated with the Ecological Green Party (PEV).
In Panama, coalitions tend to form with many parties. 
is has only been possible because
of the fragmentation of the party system, which has over ten legally registered parties. Since the
return of democracy in , the two major parties, the Partido Panamenista (PP) and the Partido
Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), have alternated in power. In each of their elections, both parties
were elected with the support of many other parties, with which they subsequently formed large
government coalitions (sharing cabinet posts). While the electoral rules have aimed to reduce the
number of parties, they have instead only raised the barrier of entry for smaller parties to compete
independently in national elections (Araúz, ). As a result, the smaller parties have systematically
been forced to bargain with the larger ones.
Finally, coalitions form at different times in presidential systems; while in some countries they tend
to form before elections, in others they tend to form after them. Although this difference is clear when
comparing between regimes, it is less so when comparing within a regime. For example, it is implicit
that in both electoral and government coalitions parties decide to bargain with ideologically similar
parties. However, too similar ideologies may dilute the probability of cooperation, since the ultimate
goal of an electoral coalition is to occupy a wider spectrum. It is also implicit that the parties have
similar policy preferences, though this is only relevant for government coalitions (Golder, b).
Even though two parties may be ideologically akin, they may only decide to commit if they have
similar policy priorities.
In Uruguay, for example, if coalitions form, they always do so after elections. 
is mainly occurs
because most parties are divided into internal factions, and thus coordination procedures take place
at an early tier within each party. In fact, the three largest parties, the Partido Colorado (PC), the
Partido Nacional (PN), and the Frente Amplio (FA) have never formed an electoral coalition. In every
election since the return of democracy in , they have each nominated their own presidential
candidate. Owing to Uruguay’s two-round elections, they can independently take their chances in
the first round. However, after elections it has been common to see them form government coalitions
in which they negotiate cabinet posts but ultimately aim to control congress. 
is was the case of the
governments of Sanguinetti (-), Lacalle (-), and Batlle (-).
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In Brazil, coalitions always form before elections. Given the size of the country, the decentralisation
of power has been a central element of democracy, and as such, has organised political competition in
multi-tier levels. Large national parties come from urban areas and small regional parties come from
rural regions. While the large parties have volatile national representation, the small parties have strong
local support. 
us, since the return of democracy in , all of the successful presidential candidates
(that have been militants of the larger parties) have sought to form strategic electoral coalitions will
the smaller parties to garner an important share of votes. While this has mainly benefited the larger




e dataset in this thesis spans over three decades ( to ), and the countries included in
the sample are exclusively democracies. In this vein, including data into the sample before 
would be futile, since most countries before that year were under authoritarian rule. To determine
which countries should be included in the sample, this thesis follows Schumpeter’s conception of
democracy, which is simply a system in which rulers are selected in competitive elections (Schumpeter,
). More specifically, it follows Przeworski’s electoralist definition of democracy, in which rulers are
selected through free and contested elections, and incumbents lose elections – and leave office if they
do (). Ergo, countries that do not have elections are automatically considered non-democracies
and excluded from the sample.

ough this seems like a fairly straightforward method to select democratic cases in the given
time frame, some authors have contested Przeworski’s definition, on the grounds that democracies
should meet higher criteria than just holding elections. To account for this issue, this thesis considers
all countries that had free and contested elections, yet were also considered democracies according
to two common indices. One indice is the Mainwaring classification (), and the other is the
Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski classification (). 
e sample includes all cases
coded as democracies or semi-democracies in Mainwaring’s classification but excludes cases coded as
authoritarian by Alvarez et al. Likewise, it includes all cases coded as democracies by Alvarez et al.,
but excludes cases coded as authoritarian by Mainwaring. 
ese classifications have been constantly
used as a guideline reference in scholarship since none of the countries in the region have reverted to
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dictatorship in the past decade.
According to this method,  countries can be considered a democracy at different moments
during the established time frame (see Table .). Excluding the authoritarian years – in which no
presidential elections took place, or if they did are not considered – the sample covers a total of 
elections over  years combined. For example, Cuba and Haiti were not classified as democracies at
any point during the - period, since they did not hold free and fair elections. Nicaragua is
also not considered a democracy until , the end of the Sandinista (FSLN) period. To control for
bias, countries that had a presidential election before , but had governments that ruled into the
s are excluded from the sample. Elections that occurred during  or  were also left out
of the dataset to prevent bias that may arise from incomplete governments.
Table ..: Latin American Countries and their Elections Included in the Study
Country Elections Years
Argentina  , , , , , 
Bolivia  , , , , , 
Brazil  , , , , , 
Chile  , , , 
Colombia  , , , , , , 
Costa Rica  , , , , , , 
Dominican Rep.  , , , , , , , 
Ecuador  , , , , , , , , 
El Salvador  , , , , 
Guatemala  , , , , , 
Honduras  , , , , , , 
Mexico  , 
Nicaragua  , , , 
Panama  , , , 
Paraguay  , , , 
Peru  , , , 
Uruguay  , , , , 
Venezuela  , , , , , 
References. Alvarez et al. () and Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán ().

e countries and number of elections taken into account in the sample are the following: Argentina
(), Bolivia (), Brazil (), Chile (), Colombia (), Costa Rica (), Dominican Republic (), Ecuador
(), El Salvador (), Guatemala (), Honduras (), Mexico (), Nicaragua (), Panama (), Paraguay
(), Peru (), Uruguay (), Venezuela (). 
e average number of democratic elections per country is
., and ranges from a minimum of  to a maximum of .


Since all of the countries – and their respective elections in the sample – are democratic, comparative
analysis is straightforward. If all presidents face the same rules of the game, we can expect that they
play it with similar strategies. However, two environmental features of the particular political systems
may contribute to a distortion of this basic comparability: the term and tenure limits of each country
and the cases that have interrupted presidencies. Because of these two environmental features parties
may face a different set of incentives during elections. In countries with long-term and flexible tenure
limits parties may decide to accordingly share long-term agreements. In countries with interrupted
presidencies parties may strategically realign according to contingent events, changing their strategic
approach.
.. Electoral Years
Taking into account countries with governments elected before  or inaugurated after  may
introduce bias. Table . shows that of the  presidents that governed at some point between 
and , seven were elected before  (Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela), and ten were inaugurated after  (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela).
Table ..: Number of Presidential Elections and Governments in Latin America, -
Country Elected Before  - Inaugurated After 
Argentina    ()
Bolivia    ()
Brazil   
Chile    ()
Colombia  ()   ()
Costa Rica  ()   ()
Dominican Rep.  ()  
Ecuador  ()   ()
El Salvador    ()
Guatemala  ()  
Honduras    ()
Mexico  ()  
Nicaragua   
Panama    ()
Paraguay   
Peru   
Uruguay    ()
Venezuela  ()  
Note. Presidents elected before  or inaugurated after  are excluded from the sample.


.. Term and Tenure Limits
Term and tenure limits vary. Table . shows four combinations. 
e first type of democracy allows
consecutive re-election, but limits it. In these democracies presidents can be elected to office once
and be consecutively re-elected a limited number of times during their lifetime. Most countries in the
dataset subscribe to this group. 
e second type of democracy allows consecutive re-election, but does
not limit it. In these cases presidents can be elected to office once and be consecutively elected to office
an unlimited number of times. 
is is the least popular group. 
e third type of democracy allows
non-consecutive re-election, but limits it. In these cases presidents can seek re-election every other
term a limited number of times. 
e fourth type of democracy allows non-consecutive re-election, but
does not limit it. 
is allows incumbent presidents to seek re-election every other term an unlimited
number of times.






Bolivia, - () Brazil, - ()
Brazil, - () Chile, - ()
Colombia, - () Colombia, - ()
Costa Rica, - ()
Dominican Rep., - ()




Costa Rica, - ()
Nicaragua, - () Dominican Rep., - ()
Nicaragua, - () Ecuador, - ()
Paraguay, - () El Salvador, - ()
Venezuela, - () Panama, - ()
Peru, - ()
Uruguay, - ()
Note. Only years in which the country had a democracy were included in the dataset. Term Limits are in parentheses.

ere were no re-election provisions in Ecuador in -, in Guatemala in -, in Honduras in -,
in Mexico in -, in Paraguay in -, or in Peru -.
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.. Interrupted Presidencies
Table . shows that of the  elections in the time frame,  presidents finished their term and 
did not. Half of the  countries registered in the dataset had an unfinished presidency sometime
between  and : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru,
and Venezuela. Of these nine countries, the majority of the presidents that did not finish their term
resigned because of internal political instability or upon the threat of being impeached (this was the
case of Fernando Collor de Mello, Jorge Serrano, Raúl Cubas, Jamil Mahuad, Fernando de la Rúa,
and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada). 
e second-largest group of presidents that did not finish their
term comprised those dismissed by congress (Carlos Andrés Pérez, Abdalá Bucaram, Alberto Fujimori,
Lucio Gutiérrez, and Manuel Zelaya). Only two of the presidents that did not finish their term died
whilst in power (Jaime Roldos and Hugo Banzer).
Table ..: Interrupted Presidencies in Latin America, -
President Country Inauguration Interruption Cause
Jaime Roldos Ecuador   Death
Fernando Collor de Mello Brazil   Resignation
Carlos Andrés Pérez Venezuela   Resignation
Jorge Serrano Guatemala   Dismissal
Abdalá Bucaram Ecuador   Dismissal
Hugo Banzer Bolivia   Death
Raúl Cubas Paraguay   Resignation
Jamil Mahuad Ecuador   Resignation
Fernando de la Rúa Argentina   Resignation
Alberto Fujimori Peru   Dismissal
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Bolivia   Resignation
Lucio Gutiérrez Ecuador   Dismissal
Manuel Zelaya Honduras   Dismissal
Note. Annex A shows how the presidential line of succession for each country defined the successor upon death,
resignation, or dismissal from office.
.    

e following section reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of electoral and government
coalitions in  Latin American countries between  and . 
ough parties may rally behind
one or more candidates for any given election, they are only registered in the dataset as an electoral
coalition when they rally behind the winning candidate. For example, in the  Ecuador presidential

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election, the coalition behind Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP/MUPP-NP) triumphed over the party behind
Álvaro Noboa (PRIAN). For this election, the dataset only registers one electoral coalition given that
Gutiérrez was elected. Had Noboa won the election, the data would have not registered the coalition
behind Gutiérrez since he would have lost the election.
Not registering an electoral coalition that loses an election is a methodological judgment. On the
one hand, it may introduce bias, because it does not distinguish between one democracy that holds
a presidential election in which all major candidates are backed by long-standing coalitions, and
another democracy that holds a presidential election in which only the winning candidate is backed
by a circumstantial coalition. For example, in Chile’s  election all of the major candidates were
backed by long-standing coalitions. In Peru’s  election, only the election-winner was backed by a
coalition. In this example, the data would not distinguish between coalition formation in Chile and
Peru.
On the other hand, not registering a losing electoral coalition helps rule out distortions that
circumstantial short-lived coalitions may introduce. For example, in the / election in Chile,
three of the six candidates were backed by circumstantial coalitions, which promptly dissolved after
the election. If each country were to register every coalition that backed a candidate in each election,
each country could potentially have numerous coalitions in which only a few were effective. In this
sense the data only reflects coalitions that are able to win elections. And in the final analysis, what
matters is measuring a country’s potential for politically relevant coalitions. In fact, a country is more
likely to have at least two coalitions than only one. In essence, this means that coalitions do not
randomly form. Coalitions form for structural reasons.
Government coalitions are registered when two or more parties agree to share cabinet posts. 
e
dataset reflects changes in the government coalition during its term in government. Any given
government may have more than one government coalition. For example, the administration of
Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua - had two government coalitions. While the first (Unión
Nacional Opositora, UNO) was a continuation of Chamorro’s electoral coalition (), the second
(Alianza Liberal, AL) was substantially different (). For her administration, the dataset registers
two different government coalitions. While the former (UNO) is registered as an electoral coalition
that evolved into a government one, the latter coalition (AL) is simply registered as an independent
government coalition.

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Table . shows the distribution of electoral and government coalitions in Latin America for
the period -. Of the  countries in the sample,  either had an electoral coalition,
a government coalition, or both at some point during the time frame. Also noted in Table .
are governments and coalitions that dissolved before the end of the constitutional term. Of the 
interrupted presidencies registered in the series, only four had previously been elected with the support
of a coalition (De la Rúa in , Collor de Mello in , Fujimori in , and Gutiérrez in ).
Of the four interrupted presidencies with an electoral coalition, all went on to form government
coalitions, of which all dissolved before the end of the constitutional term.
.. Electoral Coalitions
Of the  countries in the dataset,  countries had at least one winning electoral coalition compete
in at least one election. Of the  elections in the dataset, in  elections, the winning president was
backed by an electoral coalition.

e distribution of winning electoral coalitions is as follows: Argentina (five electoral coalitions:
, , , , ), Bolivia (four electoral coalitions: , , , ), Brazil
(six electoral coalitions: , , , , , ), Chile (four electoral coalitions: ,
, , ), Colombia (two electoral coalitions: , ), Ecuador (six electoral coalitions:
, , , , , ), Guatemala (two electoral coalitions: , ), Nicaragua
(two electoral coalitions: , ), Panama (four electoral coalitions: , , , ),
Paraguay (one electoral coalition: ), and Venezuela (three electoral coalitions: , , ).

e remaining six countries never had at least one electoral coalition (Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay).
.. Government Coalitions
Of the  countries in the dataset,  countries had at least one government coalition govern in
at least one administration. Of the  elections in the dataset, in  elections, the president-elect
governed with the support of a coalition.

e remaining seven countries never had at least one government coalition (Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela).

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Table ..: Electoral and Government Coalitions in Latin America, -








 (Paz Estenssoro) -
 (Paz Zamora) -
 (Sánchez de Lozada) - **
 (Banzer) -
— - (Sánchez de Lozada) **
Brazil
 (Neves/Sarney) -
 (Collor de Mello) * - **
 (Cardoso) -
 (Cardoso) -
 (Da Silva) -






Colombia  (Betancur) -
 (Pastrana) - **
Ecuador
 (Febres Cordero) -
 (Durán Ballén) -
 (Correa) —
Guatemala  (Berger) -
 (Colom) -
Nicaragua  (Chamorro) - **; -
 (Alemán) -
Panama














e full list of electoral coalitions, and their member parties, can be found in Annex B; the full list of government
coalitions, and their member parties, can be found in Annex C. Legend. * Government terminated before the end of
the constitutional term, ** Coalition terminated before the end of the constitutional term.
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Origin of Government Coalitions

e origin of government coalitions differs. Table . shows that at least four different types of
government coalitions can be identified in Latin America between  and . 
e first type is an
electoral coalition of at least three parties that participated in the immediately previous presidential
election, and after winning at least three member parties abandoned it or had at least three new parties
join it. 
e second type of government coalition is an electoral coalition of at least three parties
that participated in the immediately previous presidential election, and after winning between one
and three member parties abandoned it or had between one and three new parties join it. 
e third
type is a new coalition, where the party of the president did not contest the immediately previous
presidential election in a coalition, but had at least three new parties join it. 
e fourth type of
government coalition is an electoral coalition of only a few parties that contested the immediately
previous presidential election, and remained exactly the same.

e first type of government coalition is one that went through a major evolution after winning the
presidential election. 
ese are coalitions that had a high number of parties in the electoral coalition,
which once elected saw most of the parties exit while the remainder formed a government coalition.
Of the  elections in which the president-elect was later supported by a government coalition, two
represented a substantial evolution of the electoral coalition: the Bolivian administrations of Paz
Estenssoro - and Paz Zamora -. It is important to note that for both elections the
president and the vice-president were elected by popular vote in the first round, and by congress in
the second round.

e second type of government coalition is one that went through a minor evolution after winning
the presidential election. 
ese are coalitions that had a high number of parties in the electoral
coalition, which once elected saw some of the parties exit while the remainder formed a government
coalition. Of the  elections in which the president-elect was later supported by a government
coalition, eight occasions represented a minor evolution of an electoral coalition. 
is occurred in the
following administrations: Bolivia (Sánchez de Lozada -); Brazil (Neves/Sarney -,
Collor de Mello/Franco -, Cardoso -, Cardoso -, da Silva -,
da Silva -); and Nicaragua (Chamorro -).

e third type of government coalition is a new coalition. 
ese are coalitions which either did not
exist at the time of the presidential election or formed between the first and second round election

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(in run-off systems). Either way, once elected the president’s party formed a government coalition
with parties that did not support him in the first (or only) round of the presidential election. Of the
 elections in which the president-elect was later supported by a government coalition, on seven
occasions a new coalition formed. 
is occurred in the following administrations: Bolivia (Banzer
-); Colombia (Pastrana -); Ecuador (Febres-Cordero -, Durán Ballén
-); and Uruguay (Lacalle -, Sanguinetti -, Battle -).

e fourth type of government coalition is a transplant coalition. 
ese are government coalitions
that are identical to the electoral coalition that won the immediately previous presidential election. Of
the  elections in which the president-elect was later supported by a government coalition,  were
transplant coalitions. 
is occurred in the following administrations: Argentina (Menem, -,
Menem -, De la Rúa -, Kirchner -, Fernández -); Bolivia
(Sánchez de Lozada -, Banzer -); Chile (Aylwin -, Frei -, Lagos
-, Bachelet -); Colombia (Betancur -); Guatemala (Berger -);
Nicaragua (Chamorro -, Alemán -); Panama (Balladares -, Moscoso
-, Torrijos -, Martinelli -); and Paraguay (Lugo -).
Dissolution of Government Coalitions
Of the  government coalitions that formed,  finished at the end of the constitutional term, and
six dissolved before the end of them. 
is occurred for two reasons. First, the government dissolved
prematurely. 
is was the case in Argentina (de la Rúa in ; Bolivia, Sánchez de Lozada in ;
and Brazil, Collor de Mello in ). Second, the president willingly dissolved the coalition to either
govern alone (Bolivia, Sánchez de Lozada in ; and Colombia, Pastrana in ) or to form a
new coalition (Nicaragua, Chamorro in ).
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e evidence above provides a better insight into which countries had incentives for single party
systems and which countries had to groom preconditions and trigger precipitants for coalitions
to form. While the former countries are uniform in the way they compete in elections and run
governments, the latter countries have important differences among them. 
e preconditions and
precipitants vary in these systems. From a theoretical perspective, when forming coalitions, parties
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of different sizes and ideologies must consider the strengths and limitations of bargaining with each
other. 
e asymmetry of power and policy orientations distorts the way, shape and form parties
negotiate with each other to form coalitions. A deeper look into coalition formation in the countries
discussed above may help clarify these incentives.
Based on evidence gathered mainly from parliamentary regimes, Daniel Nagashima (, pp.
-) argues that the literature on coalition formation can be broadly categorised around three core
approaches. 
e first approach is the office and interest-based model, which follows the assumption
that rational political actors seek to maximise their self-interests of gaining office. For example,
Anthony Downs () argues that voters evaluate candidates based on their ideological proximity
to their ideal point. Based on an economic model of competition, Downs argues that political
actors situate themselves along a multidimensional spectrum to maximise their odds of winning.
Generally speaking, this approach argues that coalitions will form to control a small (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, , pp. -) or the smallest (Riker, ) winning majority inside the
respective legislature.
According to this description, parties have more incentives to form electoral coalitions than
government coalitions. Because this model holds that parties are more interested in gaining power
than actually exercising it, it assumes that they will prioritise strategies to maximise their probability of
winning cabinet posts, over what they actually intend to accomplish once in office. 
ese are usually
small parties that do not stand much chance of winning. In the presidential systems of Latin America,
we should expect political parties that fit the office-seeking approach to form electoral coalitions
over government coalitions. Moreover, we should expect that parties that form coalitions with the
intention of winning office posts do not evolve into government coalitions. Since parties are more
interested in strategic alliances than ideological ones they should choose to support candidates closer
to the median voter.
In Latin America, the electoral coalitions that supported the candidacy of Fujimori in Peru in 
and  are what most resemble parties behaving in an office-seeking rationale. 
e parties that
backed Fujimori were specifically designed to win the election and subsequently dismantle. On both
occasions ( and ) Peru held concurrent presidential and legislative elections to elect the
president and the entire unicameral chamber of deputies. Since Fujimori had been in office since
Peru is not considered a democracy in either of these elections. In the following inferential chapters, neither elections
nor years between elections are used as observations.
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, as the incumbent he had an incentive to expand his popularity to Congress in each election. To
do so, his party, Cambio ’ (C), looked to bargain with other parties to expand its campaign into
certain issues where Fujimori was expected to garner less support. 
e coalition partner party, Nueva
Mayoría (NM), was instrumental to this strategy.

e second approach is the vote-seeking model, which argues that while political actors are the
essential players of the game, the institutional framework is what ultimately constrains the strategies
available to them. For example, David Austen-Smith and Jeffery Banks () and David Baron
() highlight the role of the formateur party. Others emphasise the importance of incumbent
cabinets and presidents (Strøm and Swindle, ). De Winter () argues that the combination
of power, party strength, informal assumptions on policy distance and institutional constraints “could
very well be determine coalition formation in terms of composition, portfolio allocation and policy
formulation processes” (pp. -).
According to this description, parties have incentives to form government coalitions rather than
electoral coalitions. Because this model holds that parties are more interested in exercising power
than actually gaining it, it assumes that they have already come to power. It also assumes that once
they are in power they will attempt to bargain with other parties to maximise the leverage of their
administration. In presidential systems, we should expect political parties that fit the institutional-
based approach to tend to form government coalitions. If the incumbent party is small, it will not
have enough leverage to pass legislation in congress. 
us it will attempt to form coalitions that will
allow it to accomplish its policy programme.
In Latin America, this is the case for most government coalitions – they behave in a vote-seeking
rationale. 
ese strategic coalitions, which do not necessarily make sense on an ideological basis, are
instrumental to gaining legislative leverage. Among the more representative ones are the Sánchez
de Lozada administration (-) in Bolivia and the Pastrana administration (-) in
Colombia. On the one hand, Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) formed a government coalition with the
MBL, NFR, MIR and UCS (the last two parties were former members of the preceding coalition
headed by the right-wing dictator General Hugo Banzer). On the other hand, Pastrana (PC) formed
a government coalition with a faction of the traditional rival party (PLco). In both cases incumbent
parties were forced to negotiate and ultimately form coalitions with rival parties to pass legislation.

e third approach is the policy and ideology-based model, which follows the assumption that
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political actors form coalitions to maximise their policy interests once in office. For example, Robert
Axelrod () holds that coalitions are not only minimum winning, but also ideologically connected.

is is based on the idea that coalitions normally form adjacent to one another across a uni-dimensional
scale. Generally speaking, this approach argues that coalition formation is dependent on ideology;
thus, political parties with similar programmatic points of view are more likely to form a coalition
(De Swaan and Rapoport, ). Regardless of the size of the alliance, parties that share common
goals will unite to seek winning the election and if successful share cabinet posts (Laver and Shepsle,
, ).
According to this description, parties have incentives to form both electoral and government
coalitions. Because this model holds that parties are interested in cooperating with other parties
that share similar ideological values to gain power and exercise it together, it assumes that they
will prioritise both strategies to maximise their probability of winning office, but also maintaining
status quo once in power. In presidential systems, we should expect that political parties that fit the
policy-driven approach tend to form electoral coalitions that transplant into government coalitions.
Since the parties are interested in maintaining power, we should also expect that the coalitions be
more than circumstantial, and their cooperation last for more than only one election and a subsequent
government.
Naturally there are other means by which party leverage can be attained, which do not cleanly
fit the models mentioned above, such as the decision of a party to join a coalition in order to enjoy
the proceeds of corrupt arrangements, such as in the PRI-dominated Mexico. But these are cases in
which two or three of the models are equally useful, since parties do not necessarily follow only one
line of reasoning. However, the descriptive evidence explored in this chapter suggests that in Latin
America most coalitions follow the policy-driven rationale.
As the following chapters explain, the majority of parties decide to enter this type of coalition
because () when facing elections it is an easier way to come to power; and () once in government it
is an easier way to remain in power. An example of how this works is in Chile, where parties formed
long lasting multi-party joint electoral and government coalitions. In Chile’s case, parties originally
decided to form coalitions because it was an easier means to come to power – once in power, they
decided to remain in coalitions because it made retaining power easier. Since , the parties that
grouped into the two major coalitions have faced every major election together, and in the case of





is chapter aimed to describe the history of coalition formation in Latin America. In this vein, it
presented the data that will be analysed throughout the remainder of the thesis. While it focused
mainly on the frequency and format of coalitions in  countries in the - period, it has
also looked into some of the intervening variables. It has shown that term and tenure limits and
interrupted presidencies may introduce bias in the forthcoming inferential analysis. Section  shines
some light on the characteristics of coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America,
describing the difference between electoral and government coalitions in the region.
Section  speculates on why parties form coalitions. It suggests that the dynamics that occur in
presidential regimes can be approached with theories that stem from findings made in parliamentary
regimes. For example, the electoral coalitions of Fujimori in  and  can be neatly framed by
the office and interest-based model, the government coalitions of Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia and
Pastrana in Colombia by the vote-seeking model, and the post-authoritarian Chilean political system
that combines both electoral and government coalitions by the ideology-based model. However,
because these theories were groomed with evidence stemming from parliamentary systems, no model
on its own can accommodate all of these cases of coalitions, much less other instances of coalition
formation in the region.

e following chapters attempt to build a theory that can neatly frame most if not all cases of
coalition formation in the region. Because parliamentary regime parties have few incentives to form
electoral coalitions but many to form government coalitions, theories that stem from that body of
evidence can only partially explain why parties form electoral coalitions. A unique theory relative to
presidential systems is thus necessary to explain both electoral and government coalitions. 
e scope
of the theory is to identify the set of incentives that lead some countries, and not others, to form
coalitions. And, furthermore, to explain why parties in some countries form one type of coalition
(say, an electoral coalition) and not the other (say, a government coalition).

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E X P L A I N I N G E L E C TO R A L C OA L I T I O N
F O R M AT I O N I N L AT I N A M E R I C A

is chapter explains electoral coalition formation in Latin America. 
e lack of a theory
particularly pertaining to presidentialism, along with the absence of large-N studies, have
significantly narrowed the range of approaches that could be used to explain electoral coalition
formation in the region. 
e chapter emphasises the need for () a theory built on evidence
stemming from presidential rather than parliamentary systems; and () an overarching statistical
method to approach the reasons behind electoral coalition formation. 
e second section reviews
two theories that frame electoral coalition formation: the electoral institutions and electoral
systems theory and the party system theory. 
e third section elaborates the research questions
and hypotheses, while the fourth section presents the data and methods. 
e final section shows
that simple majority plurality for presidential elections, unicameralism, the use of proportional
representation electoral rules for legislative elections, larger legislatures, smaller district magnitudes
and a higher number of electoral parties are crucial predictors of electoral coalition formation.
It also shows that when an outsider presidential candidate is present the likelihood of electoral
coalition formation decreases.
. 
Case studies provide an in-depth understanding of coalition formation in Latin America (see Alemán
and Saiegh, ; Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich, ; Zucco, ). Findings show that
the determinants behind the decision of one party to cooperate with another party in anticipation of
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an election can be explained by (a) the specific circumstances surrounding the particular election;
or (b) the specific features of the political system. In some cases, coalition formation will depend
on issues such as the proximity of the election or presidential approval ratings (see Altman, ).
In other cases, coalition formation will depend on issues such as the number of parties with a legal
standing or the utility of forming a legislative majority after the election (see Huneeus, ). 
ese
studies concur that while parties in each country have their own reasons to form coalitions, they may
vary from one election to the next.

e literature does not explain why parties decide to form electoral coalitions in Latin America.
Even when the findings of each of the case studies are combined, they do not provide a coherent
account of why parties decide to cooperate with each another. 
e ultimate problem with case studies
is that while they reveal important information on how parties behave in one country, they are not
useful proxies for how parties behave in other countries. Because most of the research on coalition
formation has selected cases based on pre-existing traditions of coalition formation, the findings are
only representative in their given contexts. Evidence stemming from these studies cannot be used as a
regional reference, since it emerges from clusters of countries that share the same dependent variable.

is has restricted the possibility of comparing countries that do have coalitions with countries that
do not.

e dilemma with case studies is that while they appropriately answer questions of coalition
formation on a case-by-case basis, they completely undermine existing theories of political cooperation.
While parties in different democracies are likely to have specific manners of negotiating with one
another, they also share generic incentives that are determined by power structures. And if parties have
generic incentives, as the literature suggests, they can be compared. Yet, conducting case studies to
extend inferences to other cases entails severe methodological issues. At their best, specific cases may be
able to provide a comprehensive context in which parties negotiate, which is useful for understanding
particular elections and governments in given countries. However, specific cases cannot provide an
overarching explanation of why parties decide to negotiate in the first place, which is ultimately useful
for comparing strategies across countries.

e purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework and an answer to why parties form electoral
coalitions in the presidential systems of Latin America. It attempts to explain the causes of electoral
coalition formation in the period -. It uses evidence from  countries across the region:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El

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Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

is chapter only considers countries that meet minimum standards of democracy. One reason is that
the selection, often made in other regional studies, provides more and better quality data to conduct
comparisons. Less developed democracies provide fewer and lower quality data. 
is is especially true
of Latin America in the early s, when government institutions were significantly less trustworthy
than they are today.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e following section reviews two theories
that frame electoral coalition formation: the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory and
the party system theory. 
e first theory holds that electoral institutions and the electoral system
play a central role in electoral coalition formation. It argues that variables related to presidential and
legislative elections are crucial to understand why parties form electoral coalitions. 
e second theory
holds that the party system plays a central role in electoral coalition formation. It argues that variables
related to the number of parties that compete in elections, and the relative weight of the government
party in the legislature, are crucial to understand why parties form electoral coalitions. 
e third
section elaborates the research questions and hypotheses, the fourth section presents the data and
methods, and the fifth section discusses the findings. 
e final section draws the conclusions.
. 

is section presents two theories that have been suggested in previous literature as potential de-
terminants of electoral coalition formation. 
e first theory holds that electoral institutions and
the electoral system play a central role in electoral coalition formation. 
is theory suggests that
simple majority plurality in presidential elections, immediate re-election provisions in presidential
elections, presidential term length, concurrent presidential and legislative elections, unicameralism,
proportional representation electoral rules in legislative elections, electoral thresholds to gain legislative
representation, size of the legislature, and district magnitude in legislative elections are significant
determinants of electoral coalitions. 
e second theory holds that large party systems play a central
role in electoral coalition formation. 
is theory suggests that the number of electoral parties and the
government party’s legislative majority margin are significant determinants of electoral coalitions.

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.. Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems
Party elites cannot ignore electoral rules when it comes to designing campaign strategies. If the
objective of a party is to maximise its return in an election, its elites must proceed strategically. 
e
decision of party elites to compete alone or to bargain with other party elites and compete as a
coalition can drastically determine electoral results. 
is subsection explores some of the variables
related to presidential and legislative elections that have been linked to electoral coalition formation.
Presidential democracies that use simple majority plurality (SMP) in presidential elections should
be more likely to see electoral coalitions form. SMP presidential elections create an incentive for large
parties to seek the support of smaller ones. When the president is elected in the first and only round,
parties must secure the majority of the vote as soon as possible (Golder, a). In comparison, when
run-off provisions are available, large parties will wait until after the first round to seek the support of
smaller parties. Indeed, evidence from Latin America shows that majority run-off is associated with a
larger effective number of political parties (Jones, ; Mainwaring and Shugart, a; Shugart
and Carey, ) and presidential candidates (Carey, ).
Presidential democracies with incumbent presidential candidates should be more likely to see
electoral coalitions form. Immediate presidential re-election encourages opposition parties to seek the
support of the incumbent party. When the president can seek re-election, opposition parties that
have low chances of winning the election may decide to negotiate with the incumbent and join the
winning side (Dix, ). In contrast, when the president cannot seek re-election, opposition parties
will see a higher chance of winning the election. Evidence from Latin America shows that over 
per cent of presidential candidates that seek re-election are re-elected, making it extremely hard for
opposition parties (Zovatto, ).
Long presidential terms can also influence electoral coalition formation; they create incentives
for medium and small parties to negotiate with large parties. When the presidential term is long,
medium and small parties with a slight probability of winning an election may decide to bargain with
a large party in order to avoid missing out on the entire term (Maltz, ). In comparison, when
presidential terms are short, medium and small parties will attempt to build a powerful opposition
and take their chances in the forthcoming election.
Concurrent presidential and legislative elections have also been mentioned as a potential deter-
minant of electoral coalition formation. Concurrent elections encourage parties to cooperate with
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each other. When presidential and legislative elections take place at the same time, the party of the
presidential candidate may seek the support of like-minded parties to boost its legislative contingency
(Samuels, ). In contrast, when presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent, parties
will tend to independently design their strategies, reducing the likelihood of sharing common goals
with other parties. Evidence from Brazil suggests that concurrent elections have encouraged national
parties to cooperate with regional parties in an effort to pass legislation (Machado, ).
Presidential democracies with unicameral congresses should also be more likely to see electoral
coalitions form. Unicameralism creates incentives for parties to cooperate with each other. When
congress is designed in a single tier, the executive’s party may decide to create alliances with smaller
parties in order to eliminate possible veto-players (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting, ). In compar-
ison, bicameralism produces twice the number of veto-players, and party elites will normally seek to
share power to avoid stalemate. Formal evidence suggests that the executive will decide to negotiate
in unicameralism especially when congress can override a package by simple majority and no policies
can be further implemented unilaterally (Pérez-Liñán and Raga, ).
Proportional representation (PR) electoral rules for legislative elections are said to have an effect
over electoral coalition formation. PR encourages multi-party systems, which in turn mechanically
creates incentives for parties to cooperate with each other. When seats are allocated using PR, the
number of parties in competition will increase, and in turn increase the likelihood that like-minded
parties will bargain with each other (Ames, ). In contrast, when most seats are distributed by
First-Past-
e-Post (FPTP) electoral rules for legislative elections, the number of parties will tend
to be smaller, and in turn accentuate cleavages among the fewer parties. Evidence comparing PR
elections in Israel and the Netherlands to FPTP elections in the United States, Mexico, the United
Kingdom, and Israel shows that because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical
voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP (Abramson et al., ).
Electoral thresholds to gain legislative representation have also been singled out as an important
factor for electoral coalition formation. 
resholds create incentives for small parties to negotiate
with large parties. When parties are required to surpass a minimum threshold to gain legislative
representation, they may decide to bargain with a larger party rather than risk elimination (Rae, Hanby
and Loosemore, ). In comparison, when parties can gain legislative representation irrelevant of
their vote share, they will tend to take their chances. Evidence from Israel shows that after increasing
the threshold for legislative representation in the Knesset, an increase in winning electoral coalitions

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followed (Bueno de Mesquita, ).
Large legislatures can also boost the probability of electoral coalition formation. A large congress
encourages parties to cooperate with each other. When there are many seats available in congress, the
executive’s party may seek the support of smaller parties to eliminate possible veto-players (McGrath,
Rogowski and Ryan, ). In contrast, when the legislature is small, parties will tend to appeal to
predetermined electoral niches and thus prefer competing alone to sharing power. Indeed, formal
evidence suggests that an increase in the number of legislators reduces the “yolk” of the collective
veto-player, increasing the cohesion of congress and thus reducing the effective majority required to
alter the status-quo (Tsebelis, ).
Finally, presidential democracies with small district magnitudes should be more likely to see electoral
coalitions form. Small district magnitudes create incentives for large parties to negotiate with small
parties. When the mean district magnitude is small, national parties may decide to negotiate with
local parties to obtain support they would otherwise not have access to (Rae, ). In comparison,
large district magnitudes will tend to encourage small parties to bid for few seats. Evidence from
Hungary shows that parties tend to coalesce more in PR districts with smaller magnitudes since they
see greater potential for exclusion by coordinated large parties as the district magnitude rises (Benoit,
).
.. Party System
As above, party elites cannot ignore the party system when it comes to designing campaign strategies.
If the objective of a party is to maximise its profit in an election, its elites must behave strategically.

e decision of party elites to compete alone, or to bargain with other party elites and compete
together as a coalition, can take the party down substantially different roads. In this subsection I
explore some of the variables related to the partisan landscape that have been linked to electoral
coalition formation.
Presidential democracies with large party systems should be more likely to see electoral coalitions
form. A large party system sets the stage for like-minded parties to cooperate with each other. When
the party system is large, the probability parties will find common policy platforms increases (Browne
and Frendreis, ; Schofield, ). In contrast, in a small party system with dominant traditional
parties there will be no incentive for parties to cooperate. Evidence from Chile shows that the degree

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of the party system fractionalisation increases the incentive for coalition formation and maintenance
(Siavelis, ).

e government party’s legislative majority has also been mentioned as an electoral coalition
formation determinant. A high margin of support for the executive’s party creates incentives for
opposition parties to bargain. When the president’s party is the favourite by a large margin, other
parties may decide to negotiate rather than taking their chances in the election (Cheibub, Przeworski
and Saiegh, ). In comparison, a low margin of support for the executive’s party hinders the
incentive for opposition parties to bargain. When the president’s party is headed towards a small
legislative majority, other parties will see higher rewards to remain in the opposition. Formal evidence
suggests that in a multi-party setting electoral behaviour is a function of voters’ beliefs about how
parties will perform following the election, making it more likely that small parties will join a coalition
with another party if they think they will win the election (Austen-Smith and Banks, ).
.. Alternative Variables
In addition to the two theories above, some alternative variables may also be involved. For example,
presidential democracies with outsider candidates should be less likely to see electoral coalitions form.
An outsider candidate can be considered an indicator of a fragmented party system in which parties
are unwilling to cooperate with each other. When an outsider is present, traditional parties will most
likely find reasons not to bargain with each other (Bunker and Navia, ). Evidence from the 
Peruvian presidential election suggests that even when parties can benefit from joining forces in a
coalition, but an outsider is present in the race, they will choose not to do so (Lupu, ).
Young presidential democracies should also be more likely to see electoral coalitions form. New
democracies can reflect a political environment in which parties are willing to negotiate with each
other. When a democracy is young, parties will find larger rewards in sharing power, even when they
are unlikely to win elections (Horowitz, ). Evidence from the new democracies of East Central
Europe shows that coalition formation often takes place among new parties, since their first priority
after the democratic transition is to develop a consistent identity and a reputation that will allow
them to gain a steady electorate (Grzymala-Busse, ).
Other control variables include the size of the country and economic conditions. Specifically,
presidential democracies with large populations should be more likely to see electoral coalitions form.

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Large countries can be understood as environments with many different issues at stake. When the
population is large, national parties may face difficulties reaching local voters and thus seek the support
of local parties. It is also likely that presidential democracies going through economic turbulence will
be more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Dire economic conditions can reflect an environment
where parties are exceptionally willing to negotiate with each other. When growth is low and inflation
and inequality are high, parties may decide to form alliances to produce stability.
.    

is section presents the research question and hypotheses. Each of the theories mentioned above is
divided into a set of hypotheses:
Research Question : Why do parties form electoral coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin America?

eory  : Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems
(H) Presidential democracies with simple majority plurality are more likely to see
electoral coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with incumbent presidential candidates are more likely
to see electoral coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with long presidential terms are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative elections are
more likely to see electoral coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with unicameral congresses are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies in which most seats are distributed by proportional
representation electoral rules for legislative elections are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with electoral thresholds to gain legislative representation

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are more likely to see electoral coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with large legislatures are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with small district magnitudes are more likely to see
electoral coalitions form.

eory  : Party System
(H) Presidential democracies with large party systems are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies in which the government party has a large legislative
majority are more likely to see electoral coalitions form.
.   

is section presents the data and the methods used to test the hypotheses.
.. Data

e dependent variable for the following hypotheses is electoral coalition formation (Electoral
Coalition). It is a dichotomous variable, coded  if the winner of the presidential election is backed
by an electoral coalition, and coded  if the winner of the presidential election is not backed by an
electoral coalition.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is simple majority plurality (SMP) for presidential
elections. It is a dummy variable coded  if simple majority plurality is used to define presidential
elections, and coded  if simple majority plurality is not used to define presidential elections.

e source of Electoral Coalition is the dataset compiled by the author for this thesis.
Other formats of electoral coalitions were also coded, for testing purposes. 
ese alternative measures included situations
in which () the runner-up of the presidential election is backed by an electoral coalition; () the winner or the
runner-up of the presidential election is backed by an electoral coalition; and () the winner and the runner-up of
the presidential election are backed by an electoral coalition. 
e following indicators were also coded, for testing
purposes: () the number of candidacies backed by an electoral coalition competing in the presidential election; and ()
the percentage of candidacies backed by an electoral coalition competing in the presidential election.

e source of SMP is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics and
Reform in Latin America.

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In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Re-election Provisions (Reelection). It is a dummy
variable coded  if the incumbent president can bid for re-election, and coded  if the incumbent
president cannot bid for re-election.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Term Length (Term Length). 
is variable reflects
the fixed number of years the president is elected to serve.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Concurrent Legislative Elections (Concurrent). It is a
dummy variable coded  if presidential elections are concurrent to legislative elections, and coded  if
presidential elections are not concurrent to legislative elections.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Unicameral Congress (Unicameral). It is a dummy
variable coded  if congress is unicameral, and coded  if congress bicameral.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is House System (PR system). It is a dummy variable
coded  if the majority of votes are translated into seats by proportional representation electoral
rules, and coded  if the majority of votes are not translated into seats by proportional representation
electoral rules.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Legislative 
reshold (
reshold). It is a dummy
variable coded  if parties must meet a predetermined threshold of votes to gain legislative representa-
tion, and coded  if parties do not need to meet a predetermined threshold of votes to gain legislative
representation.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Total Seats (Total Seats). 
is variable reflects the
total number of seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total number of
seats in the lower house.

e source of Re-election is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics
and Reform in Latin America.

e source of Term Length is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development:
Politics and Reform in Latin America.

e source of Concurrent is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics
and Reform in Latin America.

e source of Unicameral is the dataset compiled by Cheibub () for the book Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, and
Democracy.

e source of PR system is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative Political
Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of 
reshold is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative Political
Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of Total Seats is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative Political
Economy: 
e Database of Political Institution”.

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In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Mean District Magnitude (MDMH). 
is variable
reflects the mean district magnitude in the largest chamber, which is generally the lower chamber, or
the only chamber.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP).

is variable reflects the number of parties that compete in legislative elections.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is the Government Party’s Legislative Majority (Legisla-
tive Majority). 
is variable reflects the number of government seats divided by the total number
of seats.
Some additional variables are also added to the hypotheses to control for external factors. One of
these variables is Outsider Presidential Candidate (Outsider). It is a dummy variable coded  if an
outsider presidential candidate competed in the election, and coded  if an outsider did not compete
in the election.
A second variable added to the hypotheses is Age of the Democracy (Age of the Democracy).

is variable reflects the number of years since transition to democracy.
A third variable added to the hypotheses is Population (Population). 
is variable reflects the
number of residents regardless of their legal status or citizenship – with the exception of refugees not
permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of
their country of origin.
Finally, three variables related to the state of the economy are added to the hypotheses. 
e first
is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
is variable reflects the yearly change in the cost to the average
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. 
e second variable is the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). 
is variable reflects the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices

e source of the independent variable is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in
Comparative Political Economy: 
e Database of Political Institution”.





e source of Government Party’s Legislative Majority is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New
Tools in Comparative Political Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of Outsider is the dataset compiled by Bunker and Navia () for the article “Latin American Political
Outsiders, Revisited: 
e Case of Marco Enríquez-Ominami in Chile”.

e source of Age of the Democracy is the dataset compiled by 
e World Bank ().

e source of Population is the dataset compiled by 
e World Bank ().
All of these variables are lagged one year. 





based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant  U.S. dollars. 
e third
variable is the Gini Index (GINI). 
is variable reflects the extent to which the distribution of income
or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a
perfectly equal distribution.
.. Methods
Logistic regressions are used to test the hypotheses. 
is technique is normally used for predicting
the outcome of a dichotomous dependent variable based on one or more predictor variables. 
e
probabilities describing the possible outcome of a single trial are modelled using a logit function
(logit). 
ese probabilities are described in odds ratios (or), which is a measure of effect size,
describing the strength of association or non-independence between binary data values for the
dependent variable, and binary or continuous data values for the independent variables. It is calculated
by dividing the odds in the treated or exposed group by the odds in the control group (Hosmer Jr
and Lemeshow, ): if the odds of an event are greater than one the event is more likely to happen
than not (the odds of an event that is certain to happen are infinite); if the odds are less than one the
lower the chances it will happen (the odds of an impossible event are zero).
Data are organized and tested to account for individual heterogeneity. In these models, observations
are treated as panel data to control for variables that could not be directly observed or measured.

us, data were treated as cross-sectional time series with a logit function (xtlogit). 
is statistical
technique has been regularly used in studies that use data with multiple observations in multiple
countries (see an example from Latin America, Jones, ). Data are tested with both random
effects (re) and fixed effects (fe) models (McCullagh and Nelder, ). 
e random effects models
assume that the error term is not correlated with the respective independent variables, which allows
for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. 
e fixed effects models do not
make an assumption between the error term and the respective independent variables, and thus ignore
the effect of time-invariant characteristics.
A Hausman (hausman) is applied to choose between the random effects and the fixed effects
models. In the Hausman test, the random effects model is compared to the fixed effects model to
test whether the error terms are correlated with the independent variables. 
e null hypothesis is
that the two estimation methods are equally appropriate, and the alternative hypothesis is that the

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fixed effects estimation is more appropriate (Hausman and McFadden, ). In the former case
there are no differences between the two sets of coefficients; in the latter case, there are significant
differences. 
e Hausman test is used as a pre-test in all of the following models. In every case it
shows a small and non-significant Hausman statistic, which indicates that null hypothesis cannot be
rejected. 
is indicates that the random effects models are a more appropriate method. Only random
effects models are shown below.
Robust variance estimates are used to eliminate influence from possible outliers. An observed
information matrix (oim) was used as the variance controller. Also known as the Fisher information, it
allows measuring the amount of data that an observable random variable χ carries about an unknown
parameter θ upon which the probability of χ depends (Lehmann and Casella, ). 
e maximum
likelihood estimators are standard errors based on variance estimates given by the inverse of the
negative Hessian (second derivative) matrix. Formally, it is the variance of the score, or the expected
value of the observed information. In what follows, standard errors are clustered between countries.
Data is also tested with bootstrap (boot) and Jackknife (jack) variance estimators. All three variations
show consistent results. Only OIM models are shown below.

e specification for all of the models is the following:
yit = β1χ1it + β2χ2it + β3χ3it + zit + ni + εit (.)
where yit is the value of the dependent variable for the ith case (country) in the sample at the
tth time period (election); β1 is the coefficient corresponding to each of the variables in the first
vector (in this case, the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory variables), χ1it is the
value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the first vector; β2 is the coefficient
corresponding to each of the variables in the second vector (in this case, the party system theory
variables); χ2it is the value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the second vector;
β3 is the coefficient corresponding to each of the variables in the third vector (in this case, the control
variables); χ3it is the value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the third vector; zi







is subsection shows descriptive findings for the variables discussed above. 
e data filtering process
is as follows. First, data from  to  is collected to reflect every year a country appears (
observations). Second, data is sorted in the short form to reflect every year a country has a presidential
election ( observations). 
ird, data is trimmed to reflect every year a country has a free and fair
presidential election ( observations).
Table . reports the main descriptive statistics for each of the variables. Since some of the variables
are dichotomous, the mean can be interpreted as the proportion of observations coded as  (in these
cases the standard deviation can be ignored). Table . shows that in  per cent of the elections the
winner was backed by an electoral coalition.

e first group of independent variables in Table . refers to the electoral institutions and electoral
systems theory. It shows that  per cent of the presidential elections in the sample use simple
majority plurality electoral rules. It shows that  per cent of the presidential elections in the sample
have re-election provisions. It shows that the average presidential term length is . years, that the
minimum term length is four years and that the maximum term length is six years. It shows that
 per cent of the presidential elections in the sample have concurrent presidential and legislative
elections. It shows that  per cent of the democracies in the sample have a unicameral congress. It
shows that  per cent of the legislative elections in the sample use PR rules to translate votes into
seats. It shows that  per cent of the legislative elections in the sample use an electoral threshold. It
shows that the average number of seats in congress is ., that the minimum number of seats
is  and that the maximum number of seats is . It also shows that the average mean district
magnitude is ., that the minimum mean district magnitude is  and that the maximum mean
district magnitude is .

e second group of independent variables in Table . refers to the party system theory. It shows
that the average effective number of electoral parties is ., that the minimum average effective
number of electoral parties is . and that the maximum average effective number of electoral parties

e nine elections that are excluded from the final sample are the following: Bolivia (), Mexico (, , ),
Nicaragua (), Panama (), Paraguay (), Peru (, ).

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is .. It also shows that the average legislative support for the government party is  per cent, that
the minimum legislative support for the government party is nine per cent and that the maximum
legislative support for the government party is  per cent.

e third group of variables in Table . refers to the control variables. It shows that  per cent of
presidential elections in the sample had an outsider. It shows that the average age of a democracy at
the time of an election in the sample is . years, that the minimum age of a democracy at the
time of an election is one year and that the maximum age of a democracy at the time of an election is
 years. It shows that the average population is  million people, that the minimum population
at the time of an election is . million people and that the maximum population at the time of an
election is  million people.
Table . also shows that the average inflation in the year prior to the year of an election in the
sample is . per cent, that the minimum inflation in the year prior to the year of an election is
-. per cent and that the maximum inflation in the year prior to the year of an election is .
per cent. It shows that the average growth in the year prior to the year of an election in the sample is
. per cent, that the minimum growth in the year prior to the year of an election is -. per cent
and that the maximum growth in the year prior to the year of an election is . per cent. It also
shows that the average Gini coefficient in the year prior to the year of an election in the sample is
., that the minimum Gini coefficient in the year prior to the year of an election is . and that




is subsection shows some of the inferential findings for the variables discussed above. 
e following
models test univariate hypotheses for each of the two theories. Table . refers to the first theory,
that individual variables related to electoral institutions and the electoral system play a central role in
electoral coalition formation. Table . refers to the second theory, that individual variables related to
the party system play a central role in electoral coalition formation.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with SMP rules for presidential elections
(rather than those with run-off elections) are less likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table .

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Table ..: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Coalition Formation
Electoral Coalition  . .  
Electoral Institutions
and Electoral System
SMP  . .  
Re-election  . .  
Term Length  . .  
Concurrent  . .  
Unicameral  . .  
PR system  . .  

reshold  . .  
Total Seats  . .  
MDMH  . .  
Party System
ENEP  . . . .
Legislative Majority  . . . 
Control
Outsider  . .  
Age of Democracy  . .  
Population (in millions)    . 
CPI  .  -. .
GDP  . . -. .
GINI  . . . .
Note. Obs. is Observations; Std. Dev. is Standard Deviation; Min. is the minimum range observation; Max. is the
maximum range observation.
shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections decreases the likelihood of electoral coalition
formation. 
e odds of forming an electoral coalition in systems with SMP elections are . times
higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in a system without SMP. 
is finding is not
consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables
is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidential candidates (rather
than those without incumbent presidential candidates) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form.
Table . shows that the presence of an incumbent presidential candidate increases the likelihood of
electoral coalition formation. 
e odds of forming an electoral coalition in systems with an incumbent
presidential candidate are . times higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in a


system without an incumbent presidential candidate. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with short term lengths (rather than those
with long term lengths) are less likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the term
length increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in
term length (one year), the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not forming an electoral
coalition) increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative
elections (rather than those without concurrent elections) are more likely to see electoral coalitions
form. Table . shows that concurrent elections increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation.

e odds of forming an electoral coalition in systems with concurrent presidential and legislative
elections are . times higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in a system without
concurrent presidential and legislative elections. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with a unicameral congress (rather than
those with a bicameral congress) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that
unicameral congresses increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. 
e odds of forming
an electoral coalition in systems with a unicameral congress are . times higher than the odds of
forming an electoral coalition in system with a bicameral congress. 
is finding is consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies in which most seats are distributed by PR
electoral rules for legislative elections (rather than those in which most seats are not distributed by PR)
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that when most seats are distributed
by PR,the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. 
e odds of forming an electoral
coalition in PR systems are . times higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in
non-PR systems. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the
relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with electoral thresholds to gain legislative
representation (rather than those without electoral thresholds) are more likely to see electoral coalitions


form. Table . shows that legislative thresholds increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation.

e odds of forming an electoral coalition in systems with electoral thresholds to gain legislative
representation are . times higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in a system
without electoral thresholds to gain legislative representation. 
is finding is consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with
large legislatures) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation decreases. For a
one-unit increase in the total number of seats, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not
forming an electoral coalition) increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with small district magnitudes (rather than
those with large district magnitudes) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table .
shows that as the average district magnitude increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation
decreases. For a one-unit increase in average district magnitude, the odds of forming an electoral
coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is
finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with large party systems (rather than those
with small party systems) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as more
parties compete in elections, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit
increase in the effective number of electoral parties, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus
not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies in which the government party has a large
legislative majority (rather than those in which the government party does not have a large legislative
majority) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the executive’s party’s
legislative majority increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit
increase in the government party’s legislative majority, the odds of forming an electoral coalition
(versus not forming an electoral coalition) increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e dependent variable is: Electoral Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).
Multivariate Findings

is subsection shows more of the inferential findings for the variables discussed above. Since only a
few of the variables individually tested above had a consistent and significant effect, it is worth testing
if they have a combined effect. 
e following models test multivariate hypotheses for each of the two
theories. Table . refers to the first theory, that individual variables related to electoral institutions
and the electoral system play a central role in electoral coalition formation, and to the second theory,
that individual variables related to the party system play a central role in electoral coalition formation.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory. It


suggests that presidential democracies with a unicameral congress (rather than those with a bicameral
congress) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that unicameral congresses
increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. 
e odds of forming an electoral coalition in
systems with a unicameral congress are approximately , times higher than the odds of forming
an electoral coalition in a system with a bicameral congress. 
is finding is consistent with the theory
and hypothesis presented above.
M further suggests that presidential democracies in which most seats are distributed by PR
electoral rules for legislative elections (rather than those in which most seats are not distributed by PR)
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that when most seats are distributed
by PR, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation significantly increases. 
e odds of forming
an electoral coalition in PR systems are approximately  times higher than the odds of forming
an electoral coalition in non-PR systems. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies with large legislatures (rather than those with small
legislatures) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total number
of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation significantly increases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not forming
an electoral coalition) increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above.
Finally, M suggests that presidential democracies with small district magnitudes (rather than
those with large district magnitudes) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table .
shows that as the average district magnitude increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation
decreases. For a one-unit increase in average district magnitude, the odds of forming an electoral
coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is
finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory, but
excludes control variables related to the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies
with unicameral congresses (rather than those with bicameral congresses) are more likely to see electoral
coalitions form. Table . shows that unicameral congresses significantly increase the likelihood of
electoral coalition formation. 
e odds of forming an electoral coalition in systems with a unicameral


congress are approximately , times higher than the odds of forming an electoral coalition in a
system with a bicameral congress. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented
above.
Moreover, M suggests that presidential democracies in which most seats are distributed by PR
electoral rules for legislative elections (rather than those in which most seats are not distributed by PR)
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that when most seats are distributed
by PR, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation significantly increases. 
e odds of forming
an electoral coalition in PR systems are approximately  times higher than the odds of forming
an electoral coalition in non-PR systems. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M also suggests that presidential democracies with large legislatures (rather than those with
small legislatures) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation significantly
increases. For a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus
not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, it suggests that presidential democracies with small district magnitudes (rather than those
with large district magnitudes) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as
the average district magnitude increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in average district magnitude, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus
not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the party system theory. It suggests that presidential
democracies with large party systems (rather than those with small party systems) are more likely
to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as more parties compete in elections, the
likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in the effective number of
electoral parties, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the party system theory, but excludes control variables


related to the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies with large party systems
(rather than those with small party systems) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table
. shows that as more parties compete in elections, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation
increases. For a one-unit increase in the effective number of electoral parties, the odds of forming an
electoral coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of ..

is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies in which the government party has a large legislative
majority (rather than those in which the government party does not have a large legislative majority)
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the government party’s
legislative majority increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit
increase in the government party’s legislative majority, the odds of forming an electoral coalition
(versus not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is
consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Combinations of Multivariate Determinants

is subsection shows the final inferential findings for the variables discussed above. In an attempt
to test the relevance of each of the individual variables, it combines the two different theories. 
e
following models test combinations of multivariate hypotheses for each of the two theories. Table
. refers to both the first theory, that individual variables related to the electoral institutions and
electoral systems play a central role in electoral coalition formation, and to the second theory, that
individual variables related to the party systems play a central role in electoral coalition formation.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory
with those of the party system theory. It suggests that presidential democracies with large legislatures
(rather than those with small legislatures) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table .
shows that as the total number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition
formation increases. For a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming an electoral
coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is
finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies with large party systems (rather than those with small
party systems) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as more parties


Table ..: Multivariate Determinants of Electoral Coalition Formation

























Legislative Majority . .*
(.) (.)
Control
Outsider . .* . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Age of Democracy . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Population . .** . .







N    
likelihood -. -. -. -.
lnsigu . . . .
sigma_u . . . .
rho . . . .
Note. 
e dependent variable is: Electoral Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).

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compete in elections, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase
in the effective number of electoral parties, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not
forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory
and the party system theory, but excludes control variables related to the state of the economy. It
suggests that presidential democracies with large legislatures (rather than those with small legislatures)
are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total number of seats in
congress increases, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in
the total seats, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus not forming an electoral coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M also suggests that presidential democracies with large party systems (rather than those with
small party systems) are more likely to see electoral coalitions form. Table . shows that as more
parties compete in elections, the likelihood of electoral coalition formation increases. For a one-unit
increase in the effective number of electoral parties, the odds of forming an electoral coalition (versus
not forming an electoral coalition) significantly increase by a factor of ..
. -

e previous section identified the major determinants behind electoral coalition formation. 
is
section shows some post-estimation methods to aid the interpretation. It shows adjusted predictions
(predict) and marginal effects (margins), assuming that the random effect is zero. 
e adjusted
predictions show the probability of electoral coalition formation, taking into account one independent
variable at a time, while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean; the marginal
effects show the probability of electoral coalition formation, taking into account the interaction
between specific independent variables while holding the other independent variables constant at
their mean (Williams, ).

e following tables show the predicted probabilities of electoral coalition formation. 
ey use
M as the point of departure – given that it is the most complete model. As such, they use logistic
regressions with RE models to generate individual predictions. Dichotomous variables remain the

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e dependent variable is: Electoral Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).

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same, and continuous variables are split into four groups with an equal number of observations.
Table . shows that the probability an electoral coalition will form is . per cent if presidential
elections use SMP, and . per cent if they use run-off provisions. It shows that the probability
an electoral coalition will form is . per cent if the incumbent president can bid for re-election,
and . per cent if he cannot bid for re-election. It shows that the probability an electoral coalition
will form is . per cent if presidents are elected to four-year terms, . per cent if presidents are
elected to five-year terms, and  per cent if presidents are elected to six-year terms. It shows that the
probability an electoral coalition will form is  per cent if presidential and legislative elections are
concurrent, and . per cent if they are not concurrent. It shows that the probability an electoral
coalition will form is . per cent if legislative elections use PR rules, and . per cent if they do
not use PR rules. It shows that the probability an electoral coalition will form is . per cent if
legislative elections have a minimum threshold to obtain seats, and  per cent if they do not have a
minimum threshold to obtain seats.
Table . also shows the predicted probabilities of electoral coalition formation, according to the
size of the legislature. It shows that the probability of electoral coalition formation is . per cent in
democracies with small legislatures ( to  seats), . per cent in democracies with medium-small
legislatures ( to  seats), . per cent in democracies with medium-large legislatures ( to
 seats), and  per cent in democracies with large legislatures ( to  seats). It also shows that
the probability of electoral coalition formation is . per cent in democracies with small district
magnitudes (. to .), . per cent in democracies with small-medium district magnitudes (. to
.),  per cent in democracies with medium-large district magnitudes (. to .), and . per
cent in democracies with large district magnitudes (. to ).
Table . shows the predicted probabilities of electoral coalition formation according to variables
related to the party system. It shows that the probability of electoral coalition formation is . per
cent in democracies with small party systems (. to . parties), . per cent in democracies with
small-medium party systems (. to . parties), . per cent in democracies with medium-large
party systems (. to . parties), and . per cent in democracies with large party systems (.
to . parties). It also shows that the probability of electoral coalition formation is . per cent
in democracies with small majorities in congress ( to  per cent), . per cent in democracies
with small-medium majorities in congress ( to  per cent), . per cent in democracies with
medium-large majorities in congress ( to  per cent), and  per cent in democracies with large

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Table ..: Predicted Probability of Electoral Coalition Formation: Electoral Institutions and Electoral
Systems
Pred. Prob. Std. Err. P>|z|
SMP
 . . .
 . . .
Re-election
 . . .
 . . .
Term Length
 years . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
Concurrent
 . . .
 . . .
Unicameral
 . . .
 . . .
PR system
 . . .
 . . .

reshold
 . . .
 . . .
Total Seats
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
MDMH
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.- . . .




majorities in congress ( to  per cent).
Table ..: Predicted Probability of Electoral Coalition Formation: Party System
Pred. Prob. Std. Err. P>|z|
ENEP
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
Legislative Majority
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
Note. Pred. Prob. is the Predicted Probability; Std. Err. is the Delta-Method Standard Error; P>|z|. is the Significance
Level.
Figure . and Figure . show the marginal effect of electoral coalition formation, after considering
the interaction between the electoral system and the party system. 
ey also use M as the point of
departure. Yet, in contrast to the predicted probabilities shown above, they use logistic regressions
models to generate non-linear predictions.
Figure . shows the probability an electoral coalition will form, given the interaction between the
major variable related to presidential elections (SMP) and the effective number of electoral parties. It
shows that electoral coalition formation is significantly more likely in democracies that use SMP. 
is
is especially likely when the effective number of electoral parties is greater than three, and it is almost
certain when the ENEP is greater than seven.
Figure . shows the probability an electoral coalition will form, given the interaction between the
major variable related to legislative elections (PR) and the number of electoral parties. It shows that
electoral coalition formation is generally more likely in democracies that use PR. Yet, the slope for
democracies that do not use PR, and have more than seven effective electoral parties, is steeper (note
that it is rarely the case that democracies with majoritarian systems have more than seven parties).
. 

e univariate analysis shows a partial picture. When variables are individually added into the models,
only a few are both consistent with theory and have a significant effect. As expected, the results

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Figure ..: SMP and ENEP Figure ..: PR and ENEP
show that smaller district magnitudes and larger party systems favour electoral coalitions. 
e former
association makes theoretical sense, since lower district magnitudes are expected to reduce the number
of parties in competition. Evidence presented above shows that instead of parties losing their legal
status, they decide to join coalitions. 
e latter association makes theoretical sense, since larger party
systems are expected to produce more like-minded parties. Evidence presented above shows that as
the party system grows the likelihood that two or more parties will find common campaign platforms
also grows.

e multivariate analysis shows a more complete picture. When variables are collectively added
into the models, many more of them are both consistent with theory and have a significant effect.
Among these variables are simple majority plurality, unicameralism, proportional representation,
size of the legislature, district magnitude, effective number of electoral parties and government
party’s legislative majority. 
e results show that simple majority plurality for presidential elections,
single-tier congresses, PR rules for legislative elections, larger legislatures, smaller average district
magnitudes, larger party systems, and large legislative majorities for the government party favour
electoral coalitions.
In terms of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory, most of the variables tested were
found to have a consistent and significant effect on electoral coalition formation. 
eir consistency and
significance were boosted when the variables were collectively entered into the models. Some variables
that were expected to have a large and significant effect on electoral coalition formation included: when
the incumbent president can bid for re-election; when there are concurrent presidential and legislative
elections; and when there is a minimum threshold to gain legislative representation. Instead, models

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show that none of these variables have an effect on the decision of party elites to form coalitions.
In terms of the party system theory, both of the variables tested were found to have a consistent
and significant effect on electoral coalition formation. 
eir consistency and significance increased
when they were collectively entered into the models. While the number of parties has a robust effect
on electoral coalitions, the margin of legislative support for the government party was found to be
significantly more sensitive. In essence, while the number of parties is an important predictor, the
legislative power of the party that finally wins the election is the determinant factor.
In addition to these findings, results show that population does not have an effect on electoral
coalitions, and that when outsider presidential candidates are present the likelihood of electoral
coalition formation will decrease. Results also show that the age of the democracy does not have
an effect on electoral coalition formation. Parties decide to form electoral coalitions regardless of
the distance between the election and the transition to democracy. Furthermore, results show that
variables related to the economy are not relevant predictors. All of the models show that inflation,
growth and inequality do not influence the decision of parties to form electoral coalitions.
. 

e contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it organised the literature around two core theories
that have recurrently been mentioned as determinants of electoral coalition formation in individual
case studies, but have hitherto not been empirically proven. While most case studies have accepted
that electoral institutions,the electoral system and the party system have some sort of effect on the
willingness of parties to form coalitions before elections, they have not used empirical evidence to
illustrate the direction and magnitude of the relationship. By discussing each of the theories in detail,
this chapter may prove a cornerstone for future literature; it provides a reference point to further
explore electoral coalition formation in the region.

e second contribution of this chapter has been to test hypotheses with a cross-national quantitative
method. Of the  variables tested, seven were found to be significant. Findings showed that simple
majority plurality for presidential elections, unicameralism, proportional representation, size of the
legislature, district magnitude, effective number of electoral parties and government party’s legislative
majority are crucial predictors of electoral coalition formation. Another finding was that the presence
of outsiders hinders electoral coalition formation. Findings also suggest that population does not

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have an effect on electoral coalitions and that when an outsider presidential candidate is present the
likelihood of electoral coalition formation will decrease. Finally, findings showed that variables related
to the economy do not have an effect on electoral coalition formation.


E X P L A I N I N G G O V E R N M E N T C OA L I T I O N
F O R M AT I O N I N L AT I N A M E R I C A

is chapter explains government coalition formation in Latin America. 
e lack of a theory
particularly pertaining to presidentialism and the absence of large-N studies have significantly
narrowed the range of approaches that could be used to explain government coalition formation
in the region. It emphasises the need for () a theory built on evidence stemming from presidential
systems rather than from parliamentary systems; and () an overarching statistical method to
approach the reasons for coalition formation. 
e second section reviews three theories that frame
government coalition formation: the presidential power theory, the electoral institutions and
electoral systems theory, and the party system theory. 
e third section elaborates the research
questions and hypotheses, while the fourth section presents the data and methods. 
e final
section shows that as the incumbent president’s power and vote share increase, the likelihood
of forming a government coalition decreases. It also shows that simple majority plurality for
presidential elections, longer term lengths, unicameralism, smaller legislatures, fewer legislative
parties, and the government party’s legislative majority are crucial predictors of government
coalition formation. Finally, it shows that when the incumbent president is backed by an





Case studies provide an in-depth understanding of coalition formation in the presidential regimes of
Latin America (see Alemán and Saiegh, ; Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich, ; Zucco,
). Findings show that the determinants behind the decision of one party to cooperate with
another can be explained by (a) the specific circumstances surrounding the particular government; or
(b) the specific features of the political system. In some cases, coalition formation depends on issues
such as the proximity of the coming election or presidential approval ratings (see Altman, ). In
other cases, government coalition formation depends on issues such as the number of parties with
legislative representation or the utility of forming a legislative majority (see Huneeus, ). Research
concurs that while each country has different reasons for forming coalitions, these may vary from one
election to the next.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the literature does not provide an explanation as to why
parties decide to form government coalitions across the region. Even when combining the findings of
each of the case studies into one theory, they cannot provide a satisfactory account of why parties
decide to cooperate with each other. 
e previous chapter also mentioned that the ultimate problem
with case studies is that while they reveal important information on how parties behave in one
country, they are only representative of their own countries, in their given contexts. As such, evidence
stemming from these studies cannot be used as a regional reference, since it emerges from clusters of
countries that share the same dependent variable. 
is has restricted the possibility of comparing
countries that do have coalitions with countries that do not.

e ultimate dilemma with case studies is that while they are able to answer questions of coalition
formation on a case-by-case basis, they completely undermine existing theories of political cooperation.
While parties in different democracies are likely to have specific manners of negotiating with one
another, they also share generic incentives that are determined by power structures. And if parties
have generic incentives, as the literature suggests, they can be compared. However, a comparison is
not methodologically correct. At best, specific cases can provide a comprehensive context in which
parties negotiate, which is useful for understanding particular elections and governments in given
countries. However, specific cases cannot provide an overarching explanation of why parties decide to
negotiate in the first place, which is useful for comparing elections and governments across countries.

is chapter complements the previous chapter in bridging this gap, insofar as answering why

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parties form government coalitions in the presidential systems of Latin America. It attempts to identify
the causes of government coalitions in - in  countries across the region: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In line with Chapter
, it only considers the most developed democracies. One reason is that the selection, often made in
other regional studies, provides more and better quality data to conduct comparisons. Less developed
countries provide fewer and lower quality data, given that in the chosen time-frame their democracies
were often irregular and thus their government institutions were less trustworthy.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e following section reviews three theories
that frame government coalition formation: the presidential power theory, the electoral institutions
and electoral systems theory and the party system theory. 
e first theory holds that presidential
power plays a central role in government coalition formation. It argues that variables related to the
president’s power and electoral performance are crucial to understanding why parties form government
coalitions. 
e second theory holds that electoral institutions and the electoral system play a central
role in electoral government formation. It argues that variables related to presidential and legislative
elections are crucial to understanding why parties form government coalitions. 
e third theory holds
that the party system plays a central role in government coalition formation. It argues that variables
related to the number of parties that compete in elections, and the relative weight of the government
party in congress, are crucial to understanding why parties form government coalitions. 
e third
section elaborates the research questions and hypotheses. 
e fourth section presents the data and
methods, and the fifth section discusses the findings. 
e final section draws the conclusions.
. 

is section presents three theories that have been suggested in previous literature as potential
determinants of government coalition formation. 
e first holds that presidential power plays a
central role in government coalition formation. 
is theory suggests that the president’s policy-making
power, the president’s power in areas other than policy-making, and the president’s vote share in
the first round are significant predictors of government coalitions. 
e second theory holds that the
electoral institutions and electoral systems play a central role in government coalition formation. 
is
theory suggests that simple majority plurality in presidential elections, presidential incumbency status,

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presidential term length, concurrent presidential and legislative elections, unicameralism and the size
of the legislature are significant determinants of government coalitions. 
e third theory holds that
the party system plays a central role in government coalition formation. 
is theory suggests that the
number of legislative parties and the government party’s legislative majority margin are significant
predictors of government coalitions.
.. Presidential Power
It is normally understood that cooperation among parties is a function of the utility they can receive
in elections, and the policy leverage they can attain once in power. Octavio Amorim Neto ()
argues that governing parties normally adopt one of two strategies. One is the legislative strategy,
where the party decides to cooperate with other parties to maintain a majority in congress. 
e other
is the administrative strategy, where the emphasis is placed on the faculties of the president to pass
legislation through extraordinary measures. Initially, the strategy adopted depends on the legislative
support of the party. If the party has low support in congress it will choose to form a coalition with
other parties. 
is decision is reinforced if the electoral laws do not favour the incumbent.
It has often been argued that the weaker the president’s power, the higher the probability he will
pursue coalition formation. In some cases incumbent parties choose to join coalitions with other
parties to avoid constitutional crisis (Valenzuela, ). In other cases they choose to join coalitions
because it was the only means to pass legislation (
orson, ). In contrast, when power is highly
concentrated in the executive there is little need for the incumbent party to join a coalition. 
ese are
both extreme examples, which have been signalled as potential obstacles to democratic consolidation
and governance. It is not surprising, then, that electoral reforms have tended to create incentives for
the incumbent party to seek cooperation with other parties, yet still be provided with extraordinary
powers to govern alone in the case of legislative stalemate.
According to this theory, hyper-presidential democracies – systems in which powers (both de jure
and de facto) are heavily concentrated in the executive branch, even though three branches exist –
are less likely to form government coalitions. On the one hand, de jure powers include most of the
common faculties discussed above, such as the ability to pass decree laws, veto legislative projects and
have budgetary initiative, among others. On the other hand, de facto powers refer to the leadership
style or behaviour of presidents that frequently speak of the need to amend or rewrite the constitution,
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commonly attempt to control the media, and normally place themselves above political parties.

e combination of both these powers provides the president’s party with enough independence to
dispense of other parties.
While the de jure and de facto powers are important to understanding coalition formation, the
president’s electoral performance also figures largely. As the president’s vote share increases, his relative
influence increases. 
is logic is counterintuitive, since one would expect that a popular president
would not reach out to other parties. Yet the crux of the matter is that a president elected with a high
vote share is more attractive than one elected with a low vote share. Smaller parties will seek to form
government coalitions with presidents that have more power rather than those that have less power,
since they have higher chances of passing their own policy if they are rewarded with cabinet portfolios
in government.
.. Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems

e incumbent president’s party’s decision to form a government coalition with other parties depends
on the characteristics of the political system. While the incumbent president’s ability to pass legislation
hinges on his constitutional and non-constitutional power as explained above, it also depends on
how he is elected and how much legislative support he has in congress. Electoral rules may favour
the president, in which case he will not need to seek support from other parties, or electoral rules
may hinder the president, in which case he will need to seek additional support from other parties.

is subsection explores how some of the variables related to presidential and legislative elections
may favour or hinder the president, and how they are linked to government coalition formation.
Simple majority plurality (SMP) in presidential elections can persuade parties to form government
coalitions. SMP presidential elections create an incentive for large parties to seek the support of
smaller parties in elections. When a presidential candidate can be elected in the first round, his party
will tend to secure the majority of the vote as early in the campaign as possible (Golder, a). In
comparison, when run-off provisions are available, the front-running party will wait until after the
first round to seek the support of other parties. Evidence from Latin America suggests that presidential
run-off elections contribute to the proliferation of presidential candidates (Carey, ).
Incumbent presidents are also more likely to seek a government coalition. Incumbency encourages
presidents to seek partisan alliances to increase the chance of passing legislation. When the president
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is in his second term, opposition parties may attempt to associate themselves with the government’s
popularity (Dix, ). In contrast, when the president is in his first term, parties will see a higher
reward in positioning themselves as a future electoral alternative. Evidence from Brazil shows that
the number of parties that supported Fernando Henrique Cardoso increased in the beginning of
his second government, after they saw the opportunity to share the benefits of his successful first
administration (Power, ).
Democracies with long presidential terms should be more likely to see government coalitions form.
Long terms create incentives for medium and small parties to negotiate with large ones. When the
presidential term is long, medium and small parties with a slight probability of winning an election
may decide to bargain with a large party in order to avoid missing out on the entire term (Maltz,
). In comparison, when presidential terms are short, medium and small parties will attempt to
build a powerful opposition and simply take their chances in the next election.
Presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative elections should be more
likely to see government coalitions form. Concurrent elections encourage parties to cooperate with
each other. When presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, the party of the presidential
candidate may seek the support of like-minded parties to obtain a significant legislative alliance
(Samuels, ). In contrast, when presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent, parties
will tend to design their strategies independently, reducing the likelihood of sharing common goals
with other parties. Evidence from Brazil suggests that concurrent elections have encouraged national
parties to cooperate with regional parties in an effort to pass legislation (Machado, ).
Democracies with unicameral congresses should be more likely to see government coalitions form.
Unicameralism creates incentives for parties to cooperate with each other. When congress has a
single tier, the government party may decide to create alliances with smaller parties to eliminate
possible veto-players (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting, ). In comparison, bicameralism produces
twice the number of veto-players, and party elites will abandon negotiating power sharing when it is
more difficult. Formal evidence suggests that the executive will decide to negotiate because in many
cases unicameral congresses can override a package by simple majority and no policies can be further
implemented unilaterally (Pérez-Liñán and Raga, ).
Large legislatures should also be more likely to see government coalitions form. A large congress
encourages parties to cooperate with each other. When there are many seats available in congress, the
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government party may seek the support of smaller parties to eliminate possible veto-players (McGrath,
Rogowski and Ryan, ). In contrast, when the legislature is small, parties will tend to appeal
to predetermined electoral niches and thus stand alone rather than share power. Formal evidence
suggests that an increase in the number of legislators reduces the “yolk” of the collective veto-player,
increasing its cohesion and thus constraining policy change as well as reducing the effective majority
required to alter the status-quo (Tsebelis, ).
.. Party System
As above, the incumbent president’s party cannot ignore the configuration of the party system when it
comes to ruling. If the objective of a president is to pass legislation, his elites must behave strategically.

e decision of the president’s party to rule alone or to rule in cooperation with other parties as a
government coalition can take the government down substantially different roads. 
is subsection
explores some of the variables related to the partisan landscape that have been linked to government
coalition formation.
Presidential democracies with large party systems should be more likely to see government coalitions
form. A large party system sets the stage for like-minded parties to cooperate with each other. When
the party system is large, the probability parties will find common policy platforms increases (Schofield,
; Browne and Frendreis, ). In contrast, in a small party system with dominant parties there
will be no incentive for parties to cooperate. Evidence from Chile shows that the degree of party
system fractionalisation increases the incentives for coalition formation and maintenance (Siavelis,
).

e government party’s legislative majority should also have an effect on government coalition
formation. A high margin of support for the government party creates incentives for opposition
parties to join government. When the executive’s party is the favourite by a large margin, opposition
parties may decide to negotiate rather than risk losing power (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, ).
In comparison, when the executive’s party has a small legislative majority, other parties will see higher
rewards to remain in the opposition. Formal evidence suggests that in a multi-party setting, electoral
behaviour is a function of voters’ beliefs about how parties will perform following an election, making
it more likely that small parties will form a coalition with another party if they think that party will




In addition to the three theories above, some alternative variables may also be involved. For example,
presidential democracies with electoral coalitions should be more likely to see government coalitions
form. Descriptive evidence from Chapter  shows that most presidential candidates that face an
election backed by an electoral coalition, and win the election, uphold the coalition in their govern-
ment. Bargaining before elections often occurs since parties design a strategy to win and subsequently
govern.
Presidential democracies that go through constitutional crisis should also be more likely to see
government coalitions form. When a president resigns, is impeached or is removed from power
the political system often risks producing instability. In these cases parties may decide to form a
government coalition in order to prevent the country from spiralling out of control.
Left-wing governments may also be more likely to see government coalitions form. Since the multi-
party systems of Latin America are more fractionalised to the left of centre, there is a larger chance
that like-minded left-wing parties will negotiate. 
is is also true for party systems in which there
are more right-wing than left-wing parties. Outsider candidates present in the immediately previous
presidential election can also force parties to form government coalitions. An outsider candidate can
be understood as a symptom of a fragmented party system in which parties are unwilling to cooperate
with each other. When an outsider is present, traditional parties are reluctant to bargain with each
other (Bunker and Navia, ).
Young presidential democracies should be more likely to see government coalitions form. New
democracies can reflect a political environment where parties are willing to negotiate with each other.
When a democracy is young, parties will find larger rewards in sharing power, even when they are
unlikely to win elections (Horowitz, ). Evidence from the new democracies of East Central
Europe shows that coalition formation often takes place among new parties, since their first priority
after the democratic transition is to develop a consistent identity and a reputation that will allow
them to gain a steady electorate (Grzymala-Busse, ).
Other control variables include the size of the country and economic issues. Specifically, presidential
democracies with large populations should be more likely to see government coalitions form. Large
countries can be understood as environments where there are many different issues at stake. When the
population is large, national parties may face difficulties reaching local voters and thus seek the support

   
of local parties. It is also likely that presidential democracies going through economic turbulence
should be more likely to see government coalitions form. Dire economic conditions can reflect an
environment where parties are exceptionally willing to negotiate with each other. When growth is
low and inflation and inequality are high, parties may decide to form alliances to show unity.
.    

is section presents the research question and hypotheses. Each of the theories mentioned above is
divided into a set of hypotheses:
Research Question : Why do parties form government coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin
America?

eory : Presidential Power
(H) Presidential democracies with presidents that have a high concentration of policy-
making power (such as veto power, decree power, and budgetary power) are less likely to
see government coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with presidents that have a high concentration of power
in areas different from policy-making (such as appointment power, emergency power,
and inter-branch conflict power) are less likely to see government coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a high percentage
of votes are less likely to see government coalitions form.

eory  : Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems
(H) Presidential democracies with simple majority plurality are more likely to see
government coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with incumbent presidents are more likely to see govern-
ment coalitions form.




(H) Presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative elections are
more likely to see government coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with unicameral congresses are more likely to see govern-
ment coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies with large legislatures are more likely to see government
coalitions form.

eory  : Party System
(H) Presidential democracies with large party systems are more likely to see government
coalitions form.
(H) Presidential democracies in which the government party has a large legislative
majority are more likely to see government coalitions form.
.   

is section presents the data and methods used to test the hypotheses.
.. Data

e dependent variable for all the forthcoming hypotheses is government coalition formation (Govern-
ment Coalition). It is a dichotomous variable, coded  if two or more parties formed a government
coalition in the given year, and coded  if two or more parties did not form a government coalition in
the given year.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Concentration of Policy-making Power in the Executive
(Formal Powers). It is an index derived from a categorical component analysis in which the values
continuously range from  (lowest possible level of power) to  (highest possible level of power).
It includes variables such as the president’s veto powers, the president’s urgency powers, and the
president’s budget spending powers.

e source of the dependent variable is the dataset compiled by the author for this thesis.

e source of Formal Powers is the dataset compiled by Negretto () for the book Making Constitutions: Presidents,
Parties and Institutional Choice in Latin America.

e full list of variables related to the president’s formal powers can be found in Annex C.
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In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Concentration of Power in areas different from Policy-
Making (Non-Formal Powers). It is an index derived from a categorical component analysis in which
the values continuously range from  (lowest possible level of power) to  (highest possible level
of power). It includes variables such as the president’s government and appointment powers, the
president’s emergency powers, and the president’s inter-branch conflict powers.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Percentage of Votes for the Incumbent President (Vote
Percent). 
is variable reflects the valid percentage of votes cast for the incumbent president in the
immediately previous first (or only) round of voting.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is simple majority plurality (SMP) for presidential
elections. It is a dummy variable coded  if simple majority plurality is used to define presidential
elections, and coded  if simple majority plurality is not used to define presidential elections.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Effective Re-election (Re-elected). It is a dummy
variable coded  if the president is serving in his second consecutive term, and coded  if the incumbent
president is serving in his first term.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Term Length (Term Length). 
is variable reflects
the fixed number of years the president is elected to serve.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Concurrent Legislative Elections (Concurrent). It is
a dummy variable coded  if presidential elections are concurrent to legislative elections, and coded 
if presidential elections are not concurrent to legislative elections.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Unicameral Congress (Unicameral). It is a dummy
variable coded  if congress is unicameral, and coded  if congress is bicameral.

e source of Non-Formal Powers is the dataset compiled by Negretto () for the book Making Constitutions:
Presidents, Parties and Institutional Choice in Latin America.

e full list of variables related to the president’s non-formal powers can be found in Annex C.

e source of Vote Percent is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative
Political Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of SMP is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics and
Reform in Latin America.

e source of Re-elected is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics
and Reform in Latin America.

e source of Term Length is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development:
Politics and Reform in Latin America.

e source of Concurrent is the dataset compiled by Payne et al. () for the book Democracies in Development: Politics
and Reform in Latin America.





In Hypothesis  the independent variable is Total Seats (Total Seats). 
is variable reflects the
total number of seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total number of
seats in the lower house.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is the Effective Number of Legislative Parties (ENLP).

is variable reflects the number of parties that have legislative representation.
In Hypothesis  the independent variable is the Government Party’s Legislative Majority (Legisla-
tive Majority). 
is variable reflects the number of government seats divided by the total number
of seats.
Some additional variables are also added to the hypotheses to control for external factors. One is
Electoral Coalition (Electoral Coalition): this is a dichotomous variable, coded  if the winner of the
presidential election is backed by an electoral coalition, and coded  if the winner of the presidential
election is not backed by an electoral coalition.
A second variable added to the hypotheses is Presidential Crisis (Crisis). 
is is a dummy variable
coded  if the democracy was going through a presidential crisis, and coded  if not. A third variable
added to the hypotheses is Left-Wing Government (Left). 
is variable is a dummy variable coded 
if the president was elected on a left-wing platform, and coded  if it was not.
A fourth variable added to the hypotheses is Outsider Presidential Candidate (Outsider). It is a
dummy variable coded  if an outsider presidential candidate competed in the immediately previous
election, and coded  if an outsider did not compete in the immediately previous election.
A fifth variable added to the hypotheses is Age of the Democracy (Age of the Democracy). 
is
variable reflects the number of years since the transition to democracy.
A sixth variable added to the hypotheses is Population (Population). 
is variable reflects the
number of residents regardless of their legal status or citizenship – with the exception of refugees not

e source of Total Seats is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative Political
Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of ENLP is the dataset compiled by Gallagher and Mitchell () for the book 
e Politics of Electoral
Systems.

e source of Legislative Majority is the dataset compiled by Beck et al. () for the article “New Tools in Comparative
Political Economy: 
e Database of Political Institutions”.

e source of Outsider is the dataset compiled by Bunker and Navia () for the article “Latin American Political
Outsiders, Revisited: 
e Case of Marco Enríquez-Ominami in Chile”.

e source of Age of the Democracy is the dataset compiled by 
e World Bank ().

e source of Population is the dataset compiled by 
e World Bank ().

  
permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of
their country of origin.
Finally, three variables related to the state of the economy are added to the hypotheses. 
e first
is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
is variable reflects the yearly change in the cost to the average
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. 
e second variable is the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). 
is variable reflects the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant  U.S. dollars. 
e third
variable is the Gini Index (GINI). 
is variable reflects the extent to which the distribution of income
or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a
perfectly equal distribution.
.. Methods
Logistic regressions are used to test the hypotheses. 
is technique is normally used for predicting
the outcome of a dichotomous dependent variable based on one or more predictor variables. 
e
probabilities describing the possible outcome of a single trial are modelled using a logit function
(logit). 
ese probabilities are described in odds ratios (or), which are a measure of effect size,
describing the strength of association or non-independence between binary data values for the
dependent variable, and binary or continuous data values for the independent variables. 
ey are
calculated by dividing the odds in the treated or exposed group by the odds in the control group
(Hosmer Jr and Lemeshow, ): if the odds of an event are greater than one the event is more
likely to happen than not (the odds of an event that is certain to happen are infinite); if the odds are
less than one the lower the chances it will happen (the odds of an impossible event are zero).
Data are organized and tested to account for individual heterogeneity. In these models, observations
are treated as panel data to control for variables that could not be directly observed or measured.

us, data are treated as cross-sectional time series with a logit function (xtlogit). 
is statistical
technique has been regularly used in studies that use data with multiple observations in multiple
countries (see an example from Latin America, Jones, ). Data is tested with both random effects
(re) and fixed effects (fe) models (McCullagh and Nelder, ). 
e random effects models assume
that the error term is not correlated with the respective independent variables, which allows for
All of these variables are lagged one year. 





time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. 
e fixed effects models do not make
an assumption between the error term and the respective independent variables, and thus ignore the
effect of time-invariant characteristics.
A Hausman (hausman) test is applied to choose between the random effects and the fixed effects
models. In the Hausman test, the random effects model is compared to the fixed effects model to test
whether the error terms are correlated with the independent variables. 
e null hypothesis is that
the two estimation methods are equally appropriate, and the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed
effects estimation is more appropriate (Hausman and McFadden, ). In the former case there are
no differences between the two sets of coefficients; in the latter case, there are significant differences.

e Hausman test is used as a pre-test in all of the following models. In every case it shows a small
and non-significant Hausman statistic, which indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

is indicates that the random effects models are a more appropriate method. Only random effects
models are shown below.
Robust variance estimates are used to eliminate influence from possible outliers. An observed
information matrix (oim) is used as the variance controller. Also known as the Fisher information, it
allows measuring the amount of data that an observable random variable χ carries about an unknown
parameter θ upon which the probability of χ depends (Lehmann and Casella, ). 
e maximum
likelihood estimators are standard errors based on variance estimates given by the inverse of the
negative Hessian (second derivative) matrix. Formally, it is the variance of the score, or the expected
value of the observed information. In what follows, standard errors are clustered between countries.
Data is also tested with bootstrap (boot) and Jackknife (jack) variance estimators. All three variations
show consistent results. Only OIM models are shown below.

e specification for all of the models is the following:
yit = β1χ1it + β2χ2it + β3χ3it + β4χ4it + zit + ni + εit (.)
where yit is the value of the dependent variable for the ith case (country) in the sample at the
tth time period (year); β1 is the coefficient corresponding to each of the variables in the first vector
(in this case, the presidential power theory variables); χ1it is the value corresponding to each of the


time-varying covariates in the first vector; β2 is the coefficient corresponding to each of the variables
in the second vector (in this case, the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory variables);
χ2it is the value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the second vector; β3 is the
coefficient corresponding to each of the variables in the third vector (in this case, the party system
theory variables); χ3it is the value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the third
vector; β4 is the coefficient corresponding to each of the variables in the fourth vector (in this case,
the control variables); χ4it is the value corresponding to each of the time-varying covariates in the





is subsection shows descriptive findings for the variables discussed above. 
e data filtering process
is as follows. First, data from the period  to  is collected to reflect every year a country
appears ( observations). Second, data is sorted in the long form to reflect every year a country has
a free and fair presidential election ( observations).
Table . reports the main descriptive statistics for each of the variables. Since some of the variables
are dichotomous, the mean can be interpreted as the proportion of observations coded as  (in these
cases the standard deviation can be ignored). For example, Table . shows that in  per cent of the
years analysed, the incumbent president was backed by a government coalition.

e first group of independent variables in Table . refers to the presidential power theory
(Negretto, ). It shows that the average formal power in the executive is . per cent, the
minimum is . per cent and the maximum is  per cent. It shows that the average non-formal
power is . per cent, the minimum is  per cent and the maximum is . per cent. It also shows
that the average percentage of votes casted for the incumbent president in the immediately previous
first round presidential election is . per cent, that the minimum percentage of votes is . per
cent and that the maximum percentage of votes is . per cent.

e second group of independent variables in Table . refers to the electoral institutions and
electoral systems theory. It shows that  per cent of the presidential elections in the sample have


simple majority plurality. It shows that seven per cent of the incumbent presidents in the sample are
serving in their second term. It shows that the average presidential term length is . years, that
the minimum term length is four years and that the maximum term length is six years. It shows that
 per cent of the presidential elections in the sample have concurrent presidential and legislative
elections. It shows that  per cent of the democracies in the sample have a unicameral congress. It
also shows that the average number of seats in congress is ., that the minimum number of seats
is  and that the maximum number of seats is .

e third group of independent variables in Table . refers to the party system theory. It shows
that: the average effective number of legislative parties is ., the minimum effective number of
legislative parties is . and the maximum effective number of legislative parties is .. It also
shows that the average legislative support for the government party is  per cent, that the minimum
legislative support for the government party is nine per cent and that the maximum legislative support
for the government party is  per cent.

e final group of variables in Table . refers to control variables. It shows that in  per cent
of the years analysed in the sample the incumbent president was backed by an electoral coalition. It
shows that three per cent of the years presented a constitutional crisis. It shows that in  per cent of
the years government was ruled by a left of centre president. It shows that  per cent of presidential
elections in the sample had an outsider. It shows that the average age of a democracy at the time of
an election in the sample is . years, the minimum age is one year and the maximum age is 
years. It shows that the average population at the time of an election is  million people, that the
minimum population is . million people and that the maximum population is  million people.
Table . also shows that the average inflation in the year prior to the year of an election in the
sample is . per cent, the minimum is -. per cent and the maximum inflation is .
per cent. It shows that the average growth in the year prior to the year of an election in the sample is
. per cent, the minimum is -. per cent and the maximum growth is . per cent. It also
shows that the average Gini coefficient in the year prior to the year of an election in the sample is
., the minimum is . and the maximum Gini coefficient is . per cent.


Table ..: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Coalition Formation
Government Coalition  . .  
Presidential Power
Formal  . . . 
Non-Formal  . .  .
Vote Percent (st round)  . . . .
Electoral Institutions
and Electoral System
SMP  . .  
Re-elected  . .  
Term Length  . .  
Concurrent  . .  
Unicameral  . .  
Total Seats  . .  
Party System
ENLP  . . . .
Legislative Majority  . . . 
Control
Electoral Coalition  . .  
Crisis  . .  
Left  . .  
Outsider  . .  
Age of Democracy  . .  
Population (in millions)   . . 
CPI  . . -. .
GDP  . . -. .
GINI  . . . .





is subsection shows some of the inferential findings for the variables discussed above. 
e following
models test univariate hypotheses for each of the three theories. Table . refers to the first theory,
that individual variables related to the presidential power theory play a central role in government
coalition formation. Table . refers to the second theory, that individual variables related to electoral


institutions and the electoral system play a central role in government coalition formation. Table .
refers to the third theory, that individual variables related to the party system play a central role in
government coalition formation. Yet, the relationship between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of formal power in
the executive (rather than those with a low concentration of formal power in the executive) are less
likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the president’s policy-making power
increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the
president’s policy-making power, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a
government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of non-formal power
(rather than those with a low concentration of non-formal power) are less likely to see government
coalitions form. Table . shows that as the president’s non-policy-making power increases, the
likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s non-
policy-making power, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government
coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a
high percentage of votes (rather than incumbent presidents elected with a low percentage of votes)
are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the percentage of votes for
the president increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit
increase in the president’s share of votes, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with SMP rules for presidential elections
(rather than those with run-off elections) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table
. shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections significantly increases the likelihood of
government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a government coalition in systems with SMP
elections are approximately  times higher than the odds of forming a government coalition in a
system without SMP. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypotheses presented above.









Vote Percent (st round) .**
(.)
Control
Electoral Coalition .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Crisis .** .* .*
(.) (.) (.)
Left . .* .
(.) (.) (.)
Outsider . . .
(.) (.) (.)
Age of Democracy .*** .*** .*
(.) (.) (.)
Population . .** .
(.) (.) (.)
CPI . . .
(.) (.) (.)
GDP . . .
(.) (.) (.)
GINI . . .
(.) (.) (.)
N   
likelihood -. -. -.
lnsigu . . .
sigma_u . . .
rho . . .
Note. 
e dependent variable is Government Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with an incumbent president (rather than
those without an incumbent president) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table .
shows that the presence of an incumbent president significantly increases the likelihood of government
coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a government coalition in systems with an incumbent
president are approximately five times higher than the odds of forming a government coalition in a


system without an incumbent president. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with longer term lengths (rather than those
with shorter term lengths) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as
the term length increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-unit
increase in term length, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government
coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative
elections (rather than those without concurrent elections) are more likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative elections increase
the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a government coalition in
systems with concurrent presidential and legislative elections are . times higher than the odds of
forming a government coalition in a system without concurrent presidential and legislative elections.

is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship
between the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with a unicameral congress (rather than those
with a bicameral congress) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that
democracies with unicameral congresses decrease the likelihood of government coalition formation.

e odds of forming a government coalition in systems with a unicameral congress are . times
lower than the odds of forming a government coalition in a system with a bicameral congress. 
is
finding is not consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above. Yet, the relationship between
the variables is not significant.
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with
large legislatures) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming
a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with
the theory and hypothesis presented above.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with large party systems) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as
fewer parties are represented in congress, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases.
For a one-unit increase in the effective number of legislative parties, the odds of forming a government
coalition (versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of ..
Model  (M) suggests that presidential democracies in which the government party has a
large legislative majority (rather than those in which the government party does not have a large
legislative majority) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the
government party’s legislative majority increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation
increases. For a one-unit increase in the government party’s legislative majority, the odds of forming a




is subsection shows more of the inferential findings for the variables discussed above. 
e following
models test multivariate hypotheses for each of the three theories. Table . refers to the first theory,
that individual variables related to the president’s power play a central role in government coalition
formation, to the second theory, that individual variables related to electoral institutions and the
electoral system play a central role in government coalition formation, and to the third theory, that
individual variables related to the party system play a central role in government coalition formation.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the presidential power system theory. It suggests that
presidential democracies with a high concentration of formal power in the executive (rather than
those with a low concentration of formal power in the executive) are less likely to see government
coalitions form. Table . shows that as the president’s policy-making power increases, the likelihood
of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s policy-making
power, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of non-formal power (rather
than those with a low concentration of non-formal power) are less likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that as the president’s power in areas other than policy-making increases, the


































e dependent variable is Government Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).
likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s
power in areas other than policy-making, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, M suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a high
percentage of votes (rather than incumbent presidents elected with a low percentage of votes) are


less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the percentage of votes for
the president increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit
increase in the president’s share of votes, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the presidential power system theory, but excludes
the control variables related to the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies
with a high concentration of policy-making power in the executive (rather than those with a low
concentration of policy-making power in the executive) are less likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that as the president’s policy-making power increases, the likelihood of
government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s policy-making
power, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M also suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of power in areas other
than policy-making (rather than those with a low concentration of power in areas other than policy-
making) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the president’s
non-policy-making power increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the president’s non-policy-making power, the odds of forming a government
coalition (versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is
finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, it suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a high
percentage of votes (rather than incumbent presidents elected with a low percentage of votes) are
less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the percentage of votes for
the president increase, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit
increase in the president’s share of votes, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory.
It suggests that presidential democracies with simple majority plurality rules for presidential elections


(rather than those without simple majority plurality rules for presidential elections) are more likely to
see government coalitions form. Table . shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections
significantly increases the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a
government coalition in systems with SMP elections are . times higher than the odds of forming
a government coalition in a system without SMP. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above.
It suggests that presidential democracies with longer term lengths (rather than those with shorter
term lengths) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the term
length increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in
term length, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M further suggests that presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative
elections (rather than those without concurrent presidential and legislative elections) are more likely
to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that concurrent presidential and legislative
elections significantly increase the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming
a government coalition in systems with concurrent presidential and legislative elections are . times
higher than the odds of forming a government coalition in a system without concurrent presidential
and legislative elections. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies with a unicameral congress (rather than those with a
bicameral congress) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that unicameral
congresses significantly decrease the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of
forming a government coalition in systems with a unicameral congress are . times lower than the
odds of forming a government coalition in a system with a bicameral congress. 
is finding is not
consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, M suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with
large legislatures) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming
a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with


the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory, but
excludes control variables related to the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies
with SMP rules for presidential elections (rather than those with run-off elections) are more likely to
see government coalitions form. Table . shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections
significantly increases the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a
government coalition in systems with SMP elections are approximately  times higher than the
odds of forming a government coalition in a system without SMP. 
is finding is consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above.
It suggests that presidential democracies with longer term lengths (rather than those with shorter
term lengths) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the term
length increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in
term length, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M further suggests that presidential democracies with concurrent presidential and legislative
elections (rather than those without concurrent presidential and legislative elections) are more likely
to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that democracies with concurrent presidential and
legislative elections significantly increase the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds
of forming a government coalition in systems with concurrent presidential and legislative elections are
. times higher than the odds of forming a government coalition in a system without concurrent
presidential and legislative elections. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M also suggests that presidential democracies with a unicameral congress (rather than those
with a bicameral congress) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that
unicameral congresses significantly decrease the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e
odds of forming a government coalition in systems with a unicameral congress are . times lower
than the odds of forming a government coalition in a system with a bicameral congress. 
is finding
is not consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, it suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with


large legislatures) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming
a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with
the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the party system theory. It suggests that presidential
democracies with small party systems (rather than those with large party systems) are more likely to
see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as fewer parties are represented in congress,
the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in the effective
number of legislative parties, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a
government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of ..
It also suggests that presidential democracies in which the government party has a large legislative
majority (rather than those in which the government party does not have a large legislative majority)
are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the government party’s
legislative majority increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-
unit increase in the government party’s legislative majority, the odds of forming a government coalition
(versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of approximately .
Model  (M) combines the variables of the party system theory, but excludes control variables
related to the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies with small party systems
(rather than those with large party systems) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table
. shows that as fewer parties are represented in congress, the likelihood of government coalition
formation increases. For a one-unit increase in the effective number of legislative parties, the odds of
forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by
a factor of ..
It also suggests that presidential democracies in which the government party has a large legislative
majority (rather than those in which the government party does not have a large legislative majority)
are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the government party’s
legislative majority increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-
unit increase in the government party’s legislative majority, the odds of forming a government coalition
(versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of approximately .


Table ..: Multivariate Determinants of Government Coalition Formation

























Legislative Majority .*** .***
(.) (.)
Control
Electoral Coalition .*** .*** . *** .*** .**** .***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Crisis .** .** .** .* . .*
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Left .* .* . . .* .*
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Outsider .* . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Age of Democracy .*** .*** .*** . .*** .***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Population . . .*** .*** . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CPI . . .
(.) (.) (.)
GDP . . .
(.) (.) (.)
GINI . . .
(.) (.) (.)
N      
likelihood -. -. -. -. -. -.
lnsigu . . . . . .
sigma_u . . . . . .
rho . . . . . .
Note. 
e dependent variable is Government Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. * significant at
the  (.) level, ** significant at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).


Combinations of Multivariate Determinants

is subsection shows the final inferential findings for the variables discussed above. 
e following
models test combinations of multivariate hypotheses for each of the three theories. Table . refers
to the first theory, that individual variables related to the president’s power play a central role in
government coalition formation, to the second theory, that electoral institutions and the electoral
system play a central role in government coalition formation, and to the third theory, that individual
variables related to the party system play a central role in government coalition formation.
Model  (M) combines variables of the presidential power theory, of the electoral institutions
and electoral systems theory and of the party system theory. It suggests that presidential democracies
with a high concentration of policy-making power in the executive (rather than those with a low
concentration of policy-making power in the executive) are less likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that as the president’s formal power increases, the likelihood of government
coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s formal power, the odds of
forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by
a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of non-formal power (rather
than those with a low concentration of non-formal power) are less likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that as the president’s power in areas other than policy-making increases, the
likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s
power in areas other than policy-making, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
M further suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a high
percentage of votes (rather than incumbent presidents elected with a low percentage of votes) are
less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the percentage of votes for
the president increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit
increase in the president’s share of votes, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not
forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Moreover, M suggests that presidential democracies with simple majority plurality rules for


presidential elections (rather than those with run-off elections) are more likely to see government
coalitions form. Table . shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections significantly
increases the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a government
coalition in systems with SMP elections are approximately , times higher than the odds of
forming a government coalition in a system without SMP. 
is finding is consistent with the theory
and hypothesis presented above.
M suggests that presidential democracies with longer term lengths (rather than those with shorter
term lengths) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the term
length increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a one-unit increase in
term length, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government coalition)
significantly increase by a factor of approximately ,. 
is finding is consistent with the theory
and hypothesis presented above.
It further suggests that presidential democracies with unicameral congresses (rather than those
with bicameral congresses) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that
unicameral congresses significantly decrease the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e
odds of forming a government coalition in systems with a unicameral congress are . times lower
than the odds of forming a government coalition in a system with a bicameral congress (simbolising
the unlikely occurrence of the event). 
is finding is not consistent with the theory and hypothesis
presented above.
M also suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with
large legislatures) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming
a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with
the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, it suggests that presidential democracies with small party systems (rather than those with
large party systems) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as fewer
parties are represented in congress, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a
one-unit increase in the effective number of legislative parties, the odds of forming a government




finding is not consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Model  (M) combines the variables of the presidential power theory, of the electoral institutions
and electoral systems theory and the party system theory, but excludes control variables related to
the state of the economy. It suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of
formal power in the executive (rather than those with a low concentration of formal power in the
executive) are less likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the president’s
policy-making power increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a
one-unit increase in the president’s policy-making power, the odds of forming a government coalition
(versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is
consistent with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It suggests that presidential democracies with a high concentration of non-formal power (rather
than those with a low concentration of non-formal power) are less likely to see government coalitions
form. Table . shows that as the president’s non-policy-making power increases, the likelihood
of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in the president’s non-policy-
making power, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a government
coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the theory and
hypothesis presented above.
M suggests that presidential democracies with incumbent presidents elected with a high percent-
age of votes (rather than incumbent presidents elected with a low percentage of votes) are less likely
to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the percentage of votes for the president
increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For a one-unit increase in
the president’s share of votes, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a
government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is consistent with the
theory and hypothesis presented above.
It suggests that presidential democracies with simple majority plurality rules for presidential elections
(rather than those without simple majority plurality rules for presidential elections) are more likely to
see government coalitions form. Table . shows that the presence of SMP in presidential elections
significantly increases the likelihood of government coalition formation. 
e odds of forming a
government coalition in systems with SMP elections are approximately , times higher than the
odds of forming a government coalition in a system with run-off elections. 
is finding is consistent

-
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Furthermore, M suggests that presidential democracies with longer term lengths (rather than
those with shorter term lengths) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows
that as the term length increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. For a
one-unit increase in term length, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming a
government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of approximately . 
is finding is consistent
with the theory and hypothesis presented above.
It also suggests that presidential democracies with small legislatures (rather than those with large
legislatures) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as the total
number of seats in congress increases, the likelihood of government coalition formation decreases. For
a one-unit increase in the total seats, the odds of forming a government coalition (versus not forming
a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of .. 
is finding is not consistent with
the theory and hypothesis presented above.
Finally, M suggests that presidential democracies with small party systems (rather than those
with large party systems) are more likely to see government coalitions form. Table . shows that as
fewer parties are represented in congress, the likelihood of government coalition formation increases.
For a one-unit increase in the effective number of legislative parties, the odds of forming a government
coalition (versus not forming a government coalition) significantly increase by a factor of ..
. -

e previous section identified the major determinants behind government coalition formation.

is section shows some post-estimation methods to aid the interpretation. It shows adjusted
predictions (predict) and marginal effects (margins), assuming that the random effect is zero. 
e
adjusted predictions show the probability of government coalition formation, taking into account one
independent variable at a time, while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean;
the marginal effects show the probability of government coalition formation taking into account the
interaction between specific independent variables, while holding the other independent variables
constant at their mean (Williams, ).
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e dependent variable is Government Coalition. 
e results are expressed as maximum likelihood estimates of
logistic regression coefficients (odds ratios). Robust standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Legend. ** significant
at the  (.) level, *** significant at the . level (.).

-
use M as the point of departure – given that it is the most complete model. As such, they use
logistic regressions with random effects models to generate individual predictions. Dichotomous
variables remain the same, and continuous variables are divided into four groups with equal numbers
of observations.
Table . shows the probability of government coalition formation according to the president’s
formal powers. It shows that the probability is . per cent in democracies with weak presidents,
. per cent in democracies with average-weak presidents, . per cent in democracies with average-
strong presidents, and . per cent in democracies with strong presidents. 
e logic behind this
distribution is that parties are more likely to form coalitions as they approach significant legislative
thresholds. Parties seek to form coalitions when the president is close to having at least half of all
possible powers.
It also shows the probability of government coalition formation according to the president’s non-
formal powers. It shows that the probability is . per cent in democracies with weak presidents,
. per cent in democracies with average-weak presidents, . per cent in democracies with average-
strong presidents, and . per cent in democracies with strong presidents. As above, the probability
increases as the president approaches significant levels of strength. Parties see more benefits when the
president can do something useful (like pass legislation) with his power.
Finally, Table . shows the probability of government coalition formation according to the
president’s vote per cent in the first (or only) round of voting in the immediately previous presidential
election. It shows that the probability is . per cent when he has a low vote share, . per cent
when he has an average-low vote share, . per cent when he has an average-high vote share, and
. per cent when he has a high vote share. 
is corroborates the trend shown with presidential
power. 
e president’s party is more likely to form a coalition when it is short of obtaining significant
majorities, and will bargain with other parties, especially when the president is just short of the 
per cent threshold.
Table . shows that the probability a government coalition will form is  per cent in democracies
that use SMP for presidential elections, and . per cent in democracies that use run-off provisions.
It shows that the probability a government coalition will form is . per cent if the president is in
his second term, and . per cent is he is in his first term. It further shows that the probability a
government coalition will form is  per cent if the president is elected to a four-year term, .

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Table ..: Predicted Probability of Government Coalition Formation: Presidential Power
Pred. Prob. Std. Err. P>|z|
Formal
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.- . . .
Non-Formal
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.- . . .
Vote Percent
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.- . . .
Note. Pred. Prob. is the Predicted Probability; Std. Err. is the Delta-Method Standard Error; P>|z|. is the Significance
Level.
per cent if he is elected to a five-year term, and . per cent if he is elected to a six-year term. It
shows that the probability a government coalition will form is . per cent in democracies in which
presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, and . per cent if they are not. It shows that
the probability a government coalition will form is . per cent in unicameral democracies, and
. per cent in bicameral democracies.
Table . also shows the predicted probabilities of government coalition formation, according to the
size of the legislature. It shows that the probability of government coalition formation is . per cent
in democracies with small legislatures ( to  seats),  per cent in democracies with small-medium
legislatures ( to  seats), . per cent in democracies with medium-large legislatures ( to
 seats), and . per cent in democracies with large legislatures ( to  seats).
Table . shows the predicted probabilities of government coalition formation according to variables
related to the party system. It shows that the probability of government coalition formation is . per
cent in democracies with small party systems (. to . parties), . per cent in democracies with
small-medium party systems (. to . parties), . per cent in democracies with medium-large
party systems (. to . parties), and . per cent in democracies with large party systems (.
to . parties). It also shows that the probability of government coalition formation is . per cent

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Table ..: Predicted Probability of Government Coalition Formation: Electoral Institutions and
Electoral Systems
Pred. Probab. Std. Err. P>|z|
SMP
 . . .
 . . .
Re-elected
 . . .
 . . .
Term Length
 years . . .
 years . . .
 years . . .
Concurrent
 . . .
 . . .
Unicameral
 . . .
 . . .
Total Seats
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
Note. Pred. Prob. is the Predicted Probability; Std. Err. is the Delta-Method Standard Error; P>|z|. is the Significance
Level.
in democracies with small majorities in congress ( to  per cent), . per cent in democracies
with medium-small majorities in congress ( to  per cent), . per cent in democracies with
medium-large majorities in congress ( to  per cent), and . per cent in democracies with large
majorities in congress ( to  per cent).
Figure . and Figure . show the marginal effect of government coalition formation, after
considering the interaction between the electoral system and the party system. As above, they also use
M as the point of departure. Yet, in contrast to the predicted probabilities shown above, marginal
effects use logistic regressions models to generate non-linear predictions.
Figure . shows the probability a government coalition will form, given the interaction between

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Table ..: Predicted Probability of Government Coalition Formation: Party System
Pred. Prob. Std. Err. P>|z|
ENLP
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
.-. . . .
Legislative Majority
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
- . . .
Note. Pred. Prob. is the Predicted Probability; Std. Err. is the Delta-Method Standard Error; P>|z|. is the Significance
Level.
the major variable related to presidential elections (SMP) and the effective number of legislative
parties. It shows that government coalition formation is significantly more likely in democracies that
use SMP. Yet, in both SMP and non-SMP systems, the probability of government coalition formation
decreases as the number of legislative parties increases.
Figure . shows the probability a government coalition will form, given the interaction between
presidential term length and the effective number of legislative parties. It shows a negative slope
for countries in which the president is elected to four-year terms, and a positive slope for countries
in which the president is elected to five and six-year terms. 
is is consistent with the findings
above, since small parties will see more benefits in joining coalitions when they risk being left out of
government for longer periods of time.





e univariate analysis shows a partial picture. When variables are individually added into the models,
most of them are both consistent with theory and have a significant effect. As expected, the results
show that presidential policy-making power, presidential power in areas other than policy-making,
percentage of votes for the incumbent president in the first round of the immediately previous
presidential election, simple majority plurality for presidential elections, second term presidents,
smaller legislatures, a lower effective number of legislative parties, and the government party’s legislative
majority favour government coalitions.

e multivariate analysis reaffirms these findings. When variables are collectively added into
the models, they retain their consistency with theory and their significant effect. 
is is the case
when the variables of the presidential power theory are simultaneously tested: presidential policy-
making power, presidential power in areas other than policy-making, and percentage of votes for
the incumbent president remain as significant predictors. 
is is also the case when the variables
of the electoral institutions and electoral systems theory are simultaneously tested: simple majority
plurality, concurrent elections, unicameralism, and size of the legislature have a positive effect on
government coalition formation. And this is the case when the variables of the party system theory are
simultaneously tested: the effective number of legislative parties and the government party’s legislative
majority have a direct and significant effect on government coalition formation.
When the variables of the presidential power theory, electoral institutions and electoral systems
theory, and party system theory are all added into a model together (presidential policy-making power,
presidential power in areas other than policy-making, percentage of votes, simple majority plurality,
concurrent elections, unicameralism, size of the legislature, and effective number of legislative parties)
they also have a large and significant effect. 
is is the most complete of the models, and that with
the largest impact on government coalition formation.
In addition to these findings, results show that when the incumbent president is backed by an
electoral coalition the likelihood of government coalition formation increases. 
ey further show that
when a democracy is going through a constitutional crisis the likelihood of government coalitions
also increases. An additional finding is that parties are more likely to form government coalitions
when the age of democracy is smaller. Finally, results show that variables related to the economy are
not relevant predictors. All of the models suggest that the state of inflation, growth and inequality do

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not influence the decision of parties to form government coalitions.
. 

e contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it organised the literature around three core theories
that have often been mentioned as determinants of government coalition formation in individual
case studies, but have not yet been empirically proven. While most case studies have accepted that
presidential power, electoral institutions, the electoral system, and the party system have some sort
of effect on the willingness of parties to form coalitions during government, they have not used
empirical evidence to illustrate the direction and magnitude of the relationship. By discussing each of
the theories in detail, this chapter may prove a cornerstone for future literature; it provides a reference
point to further explore government coalition formation in the region.

e second contribution of this chapter has been to test hypotheses with a cross-national quantitative
method. Of the  variables tested, eight were found to be significant. Findings showed that
presidential policy-making power, presidential power in areas other than policy-making, percentage
of votes for the incumbent president in the first round, simple majority plurality for presidential
elections, term length, unicameralism, size of the legislature, effective number of legislative parties, and
the government party’s legislative majority are crucial predictors of government coalition formation.
Findings also suggest that electoral coalitions, constitutional crises, and the age of the democracy are
important variables. Finally, findings showed that variables related to the economy do not have an
effect on government coalition formation.


C OA L I T I O N F O R M AT I O N I N C H I L E , E C U A D O R ,
A N D M E X I C O

is chapter identifies the causal mechanisms behind coalition formation. 
e second section
describes the political context in which coalitions form in Chile and Ecuador, and the political
context in which they do not form in Ecuador and Mexico. 
e third section describes how
presidential power, electoral institutions and the electoral system, and the party system have
evolved over the past three decades in each of the three countries. 
e fourth section suggests
some inconsistencies between the findings in the previous chapters and the descriptive evidence
presented in this chapter, given that parties form coalitions even when the independent variables
suggest that they should not form, and vice versa. 
e fifth section explains that two of the three
sets of variables are sufficient to explain why parties form coalitions, and that political culture
and critical junctures play an important role in exacerbating or ameliorating the structural
incentives of coalition formation.
. 
Coalitions are on the rise in Latin America. Chapter  shows that since the return of democracy to the
region, the probability of coalition formation has increased twofold. Countries that have traditionally
seen coalitions form are being joined by countries that have never seen coalitions form. In ,
around  per cent of the elections had at least one electoral coalition, and around  per cent of
the elected presidents formed a government coalition. In , over  per cent of the elections had




Chapter  and Chapter  show that some of the major determinants behind this upward trend are
variables related to the president’s legislative and non-legislative powers, the president’s vote share in
the first round of elections, variables related to electoral institutions and the electoral system (also
refered to as electoral arrangments), and variables related to the party system. Evidence in both of
these chapters shows that as the president’s power decreases, as electoral institutions and the electoral
system become more restrictive, and as the party system becomes more fragmented, the likelihood of
coalition formation increases.
For example, Chapter  shows that simple majority plurality for presidential elections (SMP), uni-
cameral legislatures (Unicameral), the use of proportional representation electoral rules for legislative
elections (PR system), larger legislatures (Total Seats), small average district magnitudes (MDMH),
a higher number of electoral parties (ENEP), and a higher government party’s legislative majority
(Legislative Majority) are crucial predictors of electoral coalition formation. Chapter  also shows
that when an outsider presidential candidate is present in an election, the likelihood of forming an
electoral coalition decreases.
Similarly, Chapter  shows that as the president’s constitutional power and his vote share in the first
round increase, the likelihood of forming a government coalition decreases. It also shows that SMP,
longer terms (Term Length), unicamerlism, smaller legislatures, a lower number of legislative parties
(ENLP), and a higher government party’s legislative majority are crucial predictors of government
coalition formation. It also shows that when a winning presidential candidate is backed by an electoral
coalition, and when the country is going through political turmoil, the likelihood of forming a
government coalition increases.
While presidential power, electoral institutions and the electoral system, and the party system are
crucial determinants of coalition formation, they do not always parsimoniously explain why coalitions
form in some countries and not in others. A quick glance at some countries in the region shows that
in some cases the combination of the three independent variables predicts coalition formation, but
coalitions do not form, while in other cases the combination of the three independent variables does
not predict coalition formation, but coalitions form anyway.

is inconsistency is problematic. One way to understand if it is troublesome for establishing
a particular theory of coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America is to take a


deeper look at the independent variables that seek to explain why parties form coalitions in the first
place. In this vein, it is particularly important to explore the evolution of these independent variables
over the years. 
is comprehensive perspective can help clarify the difference between how coalitions
form in theory and how coalitions form in practice.

is chapter uses an in-depth qualitative method to approach this inconsistency and identify
causal mechanisms. It attempts to explain why parties decide to form coalitions – or not to – when
the combination of independent variables suggests that the contrary should occur. It looks at three
democracies that represent the full range of possible outcomes: a country that permanently undergoes
coalition formation (Chile); a country that intermittently sees coalition formation (Ecuador); and a
country that never experiences coalition formation (Mexico).
In each of these three democracies, coalition formation – or the lack thereof – cannot be perfectly
explained by the combination of the independent variables (see Table .). For example, Chile
and Ecuador’s constitutions grant their respective presidents significant power, which suggests that
coalitions should never form – but in practice coalitions always form in Chile and intermittently
form in Ecuador. Similarly, Mexico’s constitution grants its presidents little power; this suggests that
coalitions should always form, but in practice they never do.
Table ..: Incentives for Coalition Formation in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico
Country Presidential Electoral Institutions Party Electoral Government
Power and Electoral System System Coalition? Coalition?
Chile ∅ F F Permanently Permanently
Ecuador ∅ ∅ F Intermittently Intermittently
Mexico F ∅ ∅ Never Never
Legend. F=strong incentives for coalition formation; ∅=weak incentives for coalition formation.
By looking at each of these three countries, the variables can be held constant and toggled to explore
the nature of the relationship between the outcome and its determinants. If coalition formation
occurs only when all of the variables are aligned, then they are all essential variables. Instead, if
it coalition formation occurs only when some of the variables are aligned, then only these are the
essential determinants. 
e different outcomes of the dependent variables is what allows us to make
this inference, but the range and combinations of the independent variables is ultimately what will
lead us to male valid conclusions.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e second section describes the political

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context in which coalitions form in Chile and Ecuador, and in which they do not form in Ecuador and
Mexico. 
e third section reviews three independent variables that were found to explain coalition
formation in previous chapters: presidential power, electoral institutions and the electoral system, and
the party system. 
e fourth section suggests explanations as to why parties form coalitions when the
independent variables suggest that they should not form, and why parties do not form coalitions when
the independent variables suggest that they should form. 
e final section draws the conclusions.
.    , ,  
Since the return of democracy, Chile has permanently seen coalitions form (see Table .). In  –
the first presidential election since  – parties joined forces to support centre-left wing presidential
candidate Patricio Aylwin. Known as the Concertación, the coalition was composed of six parties:
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (DC), Partido por la Democracia (PPD), Partido Radical de Chile
(PRCH), Partido Social Demócrata Chileno (PSDCH), Partido Humanista (PHCH), and Partido
Los Verdes (PVCH).
In addition to the Concertación, four other coalitions supported a presidential candidate that
year. Among them was a centre-right wing coalition composed of two parties: Unión Demócrata
Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN). 
e Concertación and the Alianza were the
two largest coalitions in the  election. While the Concertación campaigned on a pro-democracy
agenda, the Alianza campaigned on a pro-military government one. 
e Concertación won the
election and went on to form a government coalition for the duration of the Aylwin administration
(-).
In the  presidential election the Concertación supported DC presidential candidate Eduardo
Frei. 
e centre-left wing coalition won its second consecutive presidential election, following a
minor change in the member parties. 
e number of parties in the Concertación dropped to five
from six. Four parties remained in the coalition: DC, PPD, PRCH, and the PSDCH; two parties
left: the PHCH and the PVCH; and one party joined: the Partido Socialista (PS).
In addition to the Concertación, three other coalitions supported a presidential candidate that
year. 
is included the Alianza, which was again represented by the same two parties – UDI and RN.
Once again the Concertación won the election, consolidating as a joint electoral and government
coalition – the strongest form of coalition possible, since all member parties were represented in the

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cabinet and voted in the same direction in the legislature for the duration of the Frei administration
(-).
In the  presidential election the Concertación supported PS presidential candidate Ricardo
Lagos. 
e incumbent coalition faced the election with a new line-up. 
e number of parties in
the coalition dropped to four, after two of the parties (the PRCH and the PSDCH) merged into
one (the Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD)). In addition to the Concertación, five other
coalitions supported a presidential candidate that year, including the Alianza. Lagos won the election,
maintaining the parties in the coalition for the duration of his administration (-).
In the  presidential election the Concertación supported PS presidential candidate Michelle
Bachelet, without changes to the parties that formed part of the coalition in the previous election.
In addition to the Concertación, three other coalitions supported a presidential candidate that year,
including the Alianza as the main contender. Bachelet eventually won the election, and the four
Concertación parties once again shared posts in the government and voted as a coalition in Congress
for the duration of the Bachelet administration (-).
In  the Concertación lost its first presidential election. Having been the major opposition
to the Concertación since transition, the Alianza was finally able to turn the tables. Its presidential
candidate Sebastián Piñera was supported by three parties: UDI, RN, and Chile Primero (CH). In
addition to the Alianza, four other coalitions supported a presidential candidate that year, including
the Concertación. Once in power, the Alianza member parties shared posts in the cabinet as well as
seats in the legislature for the duration of the Piñera administration (-).
Table ..: Electoral and Government Coalition Formation in Chile, -






In contrast to Chile, Ecuador only intermittently sees coalitions form (see Table .). In the 
presidential election, an electoral coalition formed for the first time since the  transition to
democracy. Known as the Frente de Reconstrucción Nacional, the coalition was composed of six
parties that joined forces to support centre-right wing presidential candidate León Febres-Cordero.
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e coalition included the Partido Social Cristiano (PSCE), the Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano
(PCEC), the Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano (PLRE), the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario
(PNRE), the Coalición Institucionalista Demócrata (CIDE), and the Federación Nacional Velasquista
(FNVE). After winning the election, the six parties went on to form a government coalition for the
duration of the Febres-Cordero administration (-).
In the  presidential election, ten candidates competed for the presidency, of which only three
were supported by coalitions. 
e two front-runners were backed by their own parties. Rodrigo Borja
was backed by the Izquierda Democrática (ID), and Abdalá Bucaram was backed by the Partido
Roldista Ecuatoriano (PRE). Both candidates – considered mass leaders at the time – were founders
of their political parties, and over their careers competed for the presidency several times. Borja
competed in , , , and ; Bucaram competed in , , and . Borja won
the  election, and governed with the sole support of his party.
In the  presidential election an electoral coalition formed for the second time since the
transition to democracy. 
e coalition was composed of two parties, which joined forces to support
centre-right wing presidential candidate Sixto Durán-Ballén: the PSCE and the Partido Unidad
Republicana (PURE). After winning the election, the two parties went on to form a government
coalition for the duration of the Durán-Ballén administration (-). It was the second time
an electoral coalition transmuted into a government coalition.
In the following three presidential elections (, , and ) the main contenders were
all supported by single parties. In  Bucaram won the election with the support of his party
(PRE). His government was composed almost exclusively of PRE members and independents, and
lasted for two years until he was impeached. In  Jamil Mahuad won the election supported
by Democracia Popular (DPE). Like his predecessor, his government was also composed almost
exclusively of members of his party and independents. And like Bucaram, Mahuad was forced to
resign two years into his term. In , Lucio Gutiérrez won the presidential election supported by
the Partido Sociedad Patriótica  de Enero (PSP). Like the two previous administrations, Gutiérrez’s
cabinet was composed almost exclusively of members of his party and independents.
In the  presidential election an electoral coalition formed for the third time. 
e Alianza PAIS
coalition was composed of over  parties and social movements that joined forces to support inde-
pendent presidential candidate Rafael Correa. Among the most prominent parties were: Movimiento
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PAIS (PAISE), Nuevo País (NPE), Acción Democrática Nacional (ADNE), Iniciativa Ciudadana
(ICE), Movimiento Ciudadano por la Nueva Democracia (MCDNE), Amauta Jatari (AJE), Alianza
Bolivariana Alfarista (ABAE), Poder Ciudadano (PCE), Partido de los Trabajadores del Ecuador
(PTE), Alternativa Democrática (ADE), and Ruptura de los  (R). Just days after the election the
coalition dissolved when only some of the parties secured cabinet posts for their members.
Correa’s government only lasted three years. Following the approval of a new constitution in a
referendum held in , early elections were called for. 
e elections were held in , and Correa
was elected to the presidency for the second time. However, according to the new constitution, this
would be his first formal term in power. By this time Alianza PAIS had evolved from a coalition with
multiple parties into a party with multiple factions. As such, Correa was elected to power with the
support of his party alone, and formed his cabinet exclusively with members of his party.
Table ..: Electoral and Government Coalition Formation in Ecuador, -









In contrast to both Chile and Ecuador, Mexico never sees coalitions form among electorally relevant
parties (see Table .). In the  election Vicente Fox was elected with the support of the large
Partido de Acción Nacional (PANM) and the small Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM).
While he was formally supported by a coalition, the PVEM did not have a significant role in the
campaign. In the concurrent legislative election the PVEM garnered less than  per cent of the total
seats. Furthermore, the coalition dissolved soon after Fox’s inauguration. 
is is looser than the
weakest form of coalition defined in Chapter .
In the  election Felipe Calderón was elected to the presidency with the support of the PAN.

is time, the party stood alone in the election, and Calderón nominated only party members and
independents to his cabinet once he took power.
One factor that may explain this pattern is the electoral domination of the Partido Revolucionario
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Institucional (PRI). From  until  the PRI was declared the winner in every single election it
competed in (Philip, ). As a result of this hegemonic system, it has been argued that Mexico
can only be considered a democracy from the  presidential election onwards, after the PRI
relinquished power (Eisenstadt, ). 
e electoral dominance of the PRI not only served as a
deterrent for democracy, but also as an indirect mechanism to distort electoral strategies – such as
coalition formation – that probably would have been used otherwise.
A secondary factor that may explain the absence of coalition formation in Mexico is that in the
time since transition only three parties dominated presidential, legislative and local elections. 
e
PRI along with the PANM and the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRDM) took over  per
cent of the votes combined in each of these elections. 
is pattern implies that the small party system
serves as a deterrent to coalition formation, since it does not provide incentives for two of the largest
parties to form an alliance against the third. In practice, parties would rather take their chances alone
than share power with another similar-sized party. 
is was the case in , when then PANM
candidate, Vicente Fox, offered the rival party PRDM a formal coalition but was promptly rejected.
Occasionally, one or more of the three largest parties have been joined by a smaller party in the wake
of an election. Yet, in every one of these events the larger party substantially dominated campaign
strategies – from designating presidential candidates to nominating legislative candidates. 
is was
the case in the  election, when the Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM) joined the
PANM, and in the  election when it joined the PRI. In the former case, the government’s cabinet
was almost exclusively filled with members of the PANM – and the PVEM abandoned the coalition
after only one year. In the latter case, the PRI was unable to win the election, promptly sending the
coalition into turmoil. 
ese pseudo-alliances do not technically count as proper coalitions, according
to the definition used in this thesis.
Table ..: Electoral and Government Coalitions in Mexico, -
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Chapter  and Chapter  show that presidential power, electoral institutions and the electoral system,
and party systems frame the decision of party elites to form electoral and government coalitions. 
is
section takes a deeper look at the body of literature that supports those findings, and applies it to
each of the cases – Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. 
e evolution of each of these variables is bound to
provide crucial insight into how and why parties adopt their strategies. Initially, one would expect
that when the rules of the game and the partisan landscape are stable, party strategies will also hold
stable. Similarly, one would expect that when the rules and the landscape change, party strategies will
also change.

e first subsection looks at presidential power. It assesses the origin of constitutions and how their
evolution has an effect on how power is distributed between the executive and legislative branches. 
e
second subsection looks at electoral institutions and electoral systems. It focuses on the origin of the
rules, differentiating between electoral systems that were designed with a specific objective and those
that evolved naturally. 
e third subsection looks at party systems. It reviews the practical tension
between sociological cleavages and institutional incentives, concentrating on how they determine
the number of parties that compete in elections and the number of parties that obtain seats in the
legislature.
.. Presidential Power
Some of the first comparative presidentialist studies in Latin America focused on the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branches. Matthew Shugart and John Carey (), and
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart (c), were among the first to show that constitutions in
the region historically favour the executive over the legislative in the distribution of power. In their
respective contributions, both Shugart and Carey and Mainwaring and Shugart argue that presidents
tend to have significant leverage over the entire legislative process, while congresses are practically
secondary institutions (also referred to as rubber stamp legislatures).

is initial line of literature significantly biased forthcoming research towards studying constitu-
tional presidential power. Shugart and Carey () and Mainwaring and Shugart (c) disaggregate
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presidential power into proactive and reactive powers. 
ey define proactive powers as the set of
faculties that allows a president to unilaterally change status-quo regardless of the legislature’s will.

ese faculties include the power to rule by decree, to set the agenda, and to dominate the budgetary
process. Similarly, they define reactive power as the set of faculties that allows a president to unilaterally
maintain status-quo regardless of the legislature’s will. Among these faculties: the power to initiate
legislation, to veto bills passed in congress, and to summon plebiscites.
Scott Morgenstern () argues that while this binomial classification (proactive/reactive) signifi-
cantly contributed to classifying presidentialism in the region, it incorrectly situated both types of
power on the same level. According to Morgenstern, the classification falls short of explaining the
complex interaction between the president and the legislature. For example, the binomial classification
suggests that a president with agenda setting powers can unilaterally change the status-quo. However,
it overlooks the fact that legislatures often require high quorums to pass policy. 
e binomial classifi-
cation also suggests that a president with decree power can easily use congress as a rubber stamp. Yet,
it does not take into account that a president also needs a disciplined partisan alignment to do so.
In a recent contribution, Gabriel Negretto () builds on Morgenstern’s critique, constructing
a new classification of presidential power – de-segregating it into formal and informal powers. He
argues that this classification is more applicable in the regional setting. Negretto defines formal powers
as the concentration of policy-making power in the executive, comprehending both proactive and
reactive powers. In contrast, he defines informal powers as the concentration of power in areas other
than policy-making. Among these faculties are the powers to appoint the court, the attorney general
and the comptroller, as well as to declare emergencies, to be impeachable, and to have censorship
vote.
In practice, it is constitutions that grant presidents formal and informal powers. As constitutions
evolve, presidential power evolves. When new constitutions are inaugurated, or old constitutions
are reformed, the power granted to presidents is often modified (Negretto, ). Table . shows
the evolution of presidential power in the constitutions of Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico, using major
breaking points in their democracies as the point of departure. For Chile it is the transition from
parliamentary to presidential democracy in , for Ecuador the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy in , and for Mexico the Mexican Revolution in .
In Chile, constitutions have normally granted their presidents strong formal and informal powers,
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in Ecuador constitutions have normally granted their presidents strong formal powers but weak
informal powers, and in Mexico constitutions have granted their presidents weak formal and informal
powers. Table . shows that constitutions in Chile have gradually tended to strengthen presidents in
formal power but weaken them in informal power. It shows the same tendency in Ecuador, and it
shows that constitutions in Mexico have been stable over time – they have hardly modified presidential
power.
Table . shows the evolution of presidential power in Chile. As mentioned above, it suggests
that it has its roots in the mid-s, when the  Constitution came into effect (Faúndez, ).

e new constitution put a presidential regime in place, replacing the parliamentary regime that had
endured for nearly  years (-). It was drafted with the objective of putting an end to the
political instability that had shaken the country in the past decades (Stanton, ). In comparison to
the previous constitution (), the new constitution () provided the president with significant
formal and informal powers.
Among other things, the  Constitution granted the president with a series of unprecedented
faculties that allowed him to control the agenda and have more power than Congress for the first time
in the history of the republic (Guerra, ). 
e  Constitution provided that the president
be elected by popular vote for a single six-year term by a majority of the popular vote. 
e new
constitution also gave the president the exclusive faculty to appoint secretaries of state (which could
also be removed at his discretion), and the power to appoint judges in the Courts of Justice, including
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Between  and  there were numerous reforms to this Constitution, yet none significantly
modified the power invested in the president (Faúndez, ). 
e first major reform to the president’s
power occurred in , the year Salvador Allende was elected to the presidency. 
e constitutional
reform of  gave the president decree power (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley), further strengthening
the executive and weakening the legislative. 
e newly amended constitution was short-lived, however,
since democracy broke down just a few years later, in .
A new constitution was inaugurated under dictatorship in . However, it would not be
recognised until the transition to democracy in  (Angell and Pollack, ). In comparison to
the  Constitution, the  Constitution increased the president’s formal powers and reduced
his informal ones (Aninat, ). It gave the president exclusive power to initiate legislation in issues
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regarding the budget, the administrative division, taxation, social security, and the contracting of
public debt. 
e legislature could only approve or reject these bills (except in the case of the budget,
which it could suggest increasing).
In addition to the above, the  Constitution gave the president power to request an urgency
motion for any legislative bill, and force Congress to legislate over any matter in , ten or three
days, depending on the government’s strategy. 
is constitution preserved the president’s ability to
govern by decree in specific constitutional matters, yet he would now need to have approval from the
majority of Congress.

e  Constitution also gave the president power to absolutely or partially veto a legislative
bill. However, as an element of balance it gave Congress the power to accept the veto or override it.
Should congress accept the veto, status-quo would prevail; but if Congress were to override the veto,
it would have to do so with at least two thirds of the members of each house. In the case of deadlock,
the constitution gave the president the ability to convene a referendum.
Since the transition to democracy, the  Constitution has been amended twice to modify
presidential power: once in  and once in . While neither amendment modified the
president’s formal powers, both amendments reduced the president’s informal powers. In  the
president received further faculties to appoint the members of the courts, and in  the president
received unprecedented power to remove members of the armed forces.
According to Negretto (), the current Constitution of Chile (last reformed in ) grants
the president with approximately  per cent of all formal powers possible and approximately  per
cent of all informal powers possible.
Table . also shows the evolution of presidential power in Ecuador. It suggests that the current
distribution of power has its roots in the mid-s, when the  Constitution was inaugurated. It
became the th constitution since independence, and marks the turn of Ecuador towards democracy
(Verdesoto, ). Between  and , the political system was held together mainly by informal
institutions. 
e  Constitution was inaugurated with the objective to pave the road towards a
stable democracy. It strengthened the president’s formal powers and diminished his informal powers.
In  and  two new constitutions were inaugurated – yet neither of them modified the
power invested in the president. 
e first major reform to the president’s power occurred in ,
under the government of Osvaldo Hurtado. 
e  reforms weakened the president – significantly
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stripping him of formal power while marginally increasing his informal power.
According to the  Constitution the president could absolutely or partially veto a legislative
bill passed by Congress, and the legislature would have to wait one year to reconsider it. 
e 
constitutional reforms eliminated this phase, allowing congress to swiftly reinstate vetoed bills.
In  a new constitution was inaugurated. It included a considerable increase in the president’s
formal powers. 
e  Constitution significantly enhanced the president’s power over the economic
and political agenda. It restricted the power of congress over the national budget and gave the president
the power to appoint secretaries of state. It also decreased the power of the legislature by regulating
informal institutions that fostered corruption.

e latest constitution was inaugurated in . 
is constitution followed in the footsteps of
its predecessor, and further increased the president’s formal and informal powers. Among other
things, the  Constitution strengthened the president’s veto power. Like the  Constitution, it
reinstated the one year phase to reassess the bill if the president used an absolute veto, and  days if
the president used a partial veto. While Congress can override the veto, it needs the support of two
thirds of its members.

e  Constitution granted the president with further legislative powers, allowing him to
initiate legislation in matters beyond budgetary laws and trade policies. It also provided that bills
initiated by the president be automatically approved if Congress does not legislate before the given
urgency deadline. 
is constitution also gave the president the power to rule by decree. Until this
reform, the President of Ecuador could not rule by decree, only declare some bills urgent.
According to Negretto (), the current Constitution () grants the President of Ecuador
with approximately  per cent of all formal powers possible and approximately one per cent of all
informal powers possible.
Finally, Table . shows the evolution of presidential powers in Mexico. It suggests that the current
constitution has its roots in the early twentieth century, following the  Mexican revolution. As
a result of the revolt, a new constitution was drafted and inaugurated in  (Aguirre, ). It
established free and fair elections and a clear separation among the three branches of government.
However, neither of these two features were to be enacted for years to come (Levy, Bruhn and
Zebadúa, ). 
e following seven decades were dominated by a single party, which relied heavily
on corruption to preserve power.
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is  Constitution granted the president power to absolutely or partially veto laws and decrees
that originate in Congress. However, it gave him no power to veto laws, which are considered the
exclusive province of Congress. Were the president to use his veto power, he could be overridden
with two thirds of the legislature. 
e president was also granted the ability to initiate legislation in
Congress. However, he shares this competence with the legislature (except for budgetary issues, in
which Congress takes precedence).

e constitution also gave the president the power to rule by decree in emergency situations (Article
), in health-related issues (Article ), and in some special cases specified by the constitution, such
as international taxation (Article ) and trade issues (Article ). In comparison, informal powers
were stronger. 
e president was granted power to appoint the Attorney General, Supreme Court
justices, the Chief of Police of the Federal District, as well as supreme power over the army, navy, and
air force, and exclusive power to negotiate foreign treaties.
Since its enactment, the  Constitution has not been amended to increase or reduce the formal
powers of the president. However, in  and  constitutional reforms reduced the president’s
informal powers. Both amendments aimed at a gradual shift from a federal to a local government.
Among other things, the reform package resulted in the president formally relinquishing his power to
appoint the mayor of Mexico City (Aguirre, ).
According to Negretto (), the current constitution (last reformed in ) grants the President
of Mexico with approximately  per cent of all formal powers possible and approximately  per
cent of all informal powers possible.
.. Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems
Like presidential power, electoral institutions and electoral systems differ across countries; they vary
according to the combination of features they use. José Antonio Cheibub () outlines two major
types of electoral system, considering that they each represent different institutional paths to enhance
“governability”. One type of electoral system limits the variety of views that can enter the political
process (restrictive electoral systems), and the other allows for a larger variety (permissive electoral
systems).
Cheibub () argues that restrictive electoral systems adopt, for instance, single-member dis-
tricts (which tend to induce fewer parties than a PR system); relatively high thresholds for partisan
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representation (e.g., by establishing that no party with, say, less than five per cent of the national vote
will obtain representation in the assembly); legal hurdles for the establishment of political parties; or
a combination of these features. 
e result, it is believed, is a party system with relatively few political
parties and a more stable government (i.e., a government supported by one or a few parties capable of
passing its legislation in the assembly).
In contrast, permissive electoral systems adopt, for instance, multi-member districts (which tend to
induce more parties than a FPTP system); relatively low thresholds for partisan representation (e.g.,
allowing parties that obtain, say, less than five per cent of the national vote to obtain representation
in the assembly); flexible legal hurdles for the establishment of political parties; or a combination
of these features. 
e result, it is believed, is a party system with relatively many political parties
and a less stable government (i.e., a government supported by many parties incapable of passing its
legislation in the assembly).
Karen Remmer () argues that Latin American democracies with fragmented party systems tend
to foster permissive electoral rules, while those with fewer parties tend to foster restrictive electoral rules.
She shows that increments in party system fragmentation lead to the adoption of permissive electoral
rules, indicating that as the effective number of parties increases, there is a higher probability that
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smaller parties will push for more inclusive pieces of legislation. Similarly, she shows that reductions
in party system fragmentation lead to the adoption of restrictive electoral rules, indicating that as the
effective number of parties declines, winners attempt to consolidate their gains with status-quo.
Table . shows some of the most prominent features of the electoral institutions and electoral
systems in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. It shows the differences in the major indicators for each of
the three countries. According to the indicators, Cheibub and Remmer’s definitions classify Chile
as a democracy with restrictive electoral institutions and electoral rules, Ecuador as a democracy
with permissive electoral institutions and electoral rules, and Mexico as a democracy with mid-range
electoral institutions and electoral rules.
In Chile, electoral institutions and the electoral system rules were first drafted in the  Constitu-
tion. In an attempt to prevent the instability of the multi-party system that led to the  breakdown
of democracy, the electoral designer (commissioned by the military government) purposely aimed to
create electoral institutions and an electoral system that would restrict smaller parties from competing
in elections and hopefully prevent them from gaining power (Pastor, ).
In the new electoral system, the president was set to serve four years with no immediate re-election
provisions. Presidents were to be elected with an absolute majority threshold and run-off provisions.
If no candidate were to receive more than  per cent of the vote, a second round would be held to
decide the winner. 
e purpose behind these rules was to generate incentives for smaller parties to
either forfeit their electoral ambitions (and expire as political parties) or negotiate with one of the
larger parties (and join a coalition) (Siavelis, a).
Congress was founded as a bicameral legislature comprised of the Chamber of Deputies (lower
house), formed by  deputies, and the Senate (upper house), formed by  senators. Legislators were
to be elected with a PR system with an across-the-board district magnitude of two. Like presidential
elections, the combination of the PR system with the small district magnitude in legislative elections
generated an incentive for small parties to either dissolve or negotiate with other parties (Magar,
Rosenblum and Samuels, ).
In addition to the above, presidential and legislative elections were set to be held concurrently every
four years. However, because of the electoral reforms described below, only the , , 
and  elections were held concurrently – the  and  legislative elections, and the 
presidential election, were held independently.
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As mentioned above, the electoral institutions and electoral system of Chile have only been modified
twice since their enactment (Remmer, ). In , the presidential term was augmented from
four to six years, and in  the presidential term was shortened back to four years.
In comparison to Chile, Ecuador has seen its electoral institutions and electoral system evolve
naturally. A series of political crises set in motion an extraordinary amount of constitutional assemblies,
each ending in the enactment of a new constitution. In the process, electoral institutions and electoral
systems were modified (Marsteintredet and Berntzen, ). 
e current electoral institutions and
electoral system of Ecuador can be traced back to the  Constitution. While major reforms have
occurred, the fundamental aspects remain the same.
Originally, presidents were set to serve five years with no immediate re-election provisions. 
ey
were to be elected with an absolute majority of the popular vote. If no candidate were to receive more
than  per cent of the vote, a second round would be held to decide the winner. 
ese rules were in
part enacted to foster stability, since parties would see larger rewards in cooperating (Isaacs, ).
Congress was founded as a unicameral legislature comprising  national deputies and  provincial
deputies. 
e former legislators were to be elected from one large national district through PR, and the
latter legislators were to be elected in many small provincial districts, also through PR. 
e combination
of these rules aimed to boost representation throughout the country, since the party system was highly
fragmented in different ethnic, cultural and political factions. In addition, presidential elections and
legislative elections were set to be held concurrently every four years.

ese electoral institutions and electoral rules have been modified four times since their enactment
(Remmer, ). 
e first major reform occurred in , with the introduction of interim elections
for provincial deputies, transforming the system to semi-concurrent elections.

e second major reform occurred in , when absolute majority run-off rules for presidential
elections were replaced with run-off rules with a reduced threshold ( per cent plus one, or  per cent
with a margin of ten per cent). 
at year, there were also significant changes to legislative elections,
when the total number of national deputies increased to  and the total number of provincial
deputies increased to . Legislative elections for provincial deputies evolved from PR elections in
small national districts to plurality elections in multi-member districts, and fully concurrent elections
were reinstated.

e third major reform occurred in , when national deputies were eliminated (lowering the
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total number of Deputies to ), and the distribution of seats for legislative elections using the
D’Hondt method was introduced. 
e fourth and final reform occurred in , following the
enactment of the new constitution, when the total number of deputies was increased to .
In comparison to Chile and Ecuador, the Constitution of Mexico is much older and has been
amended far fewer times. In practice, the continuity of the political system has resulted in the
status-quo of electoral institutions and the electoral system.
In the  Constitution presidents were set to serve four years, but in  tenure was expanded
to six years. 
ere were no re-election provisions. According to the electoral rules, presidents were to
be elected through simple majority plurality. While these rules naturally encouraged a large number
of candidates to compete, the size and scope of the party system (described in detail in the following
subsection) only favoured candidates from the three largest parties.
Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress was founded as a bicameral legislature. 
e upper chamber was
represented by the Senate, in which the majority of the members were to be elected through first-
past-the-post for six-year terms, while the rest of the seats were to be allocated through proportional
representation. 
e lower chamber was represented by the Chamber of Deputies, in which the
majority of the seats were to be elected through FPTP for three-year terms, with the rest of the seats
to be allocated through PR. Like presidential elections, most parties have incentives to compete, yet
only candidates from the three largest parties actually stand chances of winning. Presidential and
legislative elections were set to be held concurrently every six years. Yet, lower chamber elections were
set to be held, once in between on their own, every three years.

ese rules have been amended four times since their enactment (Remmer, ). 
e first
constitutional amendment occurred following the  reforms, when the number of members
elected to the lower chamber was increased. In elections between  and , the lower chamber
was comprised of  deputies. After the  reforms, the number increased to  ( of which
were set to be elected by FPTP to three-year terms, and  of which were set to be elected by PR to
three-year terms).

e second amendment occurred in , when the number of members elected to the Senate
increased. In elections between  and , the Senate was comprised of  senators. After the
 reforms, the number of senators doubled, to  ( of which were set to be elected by FPTP
to six-year terms, and  of which were set to be elected by PR to six-year terms).
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e final two amendments occurred in . 
e first of them increased the threshold for legislative
representation in the Chamber of Deputies from . to two per cent. 
e second amendment modified
the total number of seats allocated through the PR system so it could not exceed eight per cent of the
total national vote.
Table ..: Electoral Institutions and Electoral Systems in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico
Feature Chile Ecuador Mexico
Simple Majority Plurality No No Yes
Presidential Re-election No Yes No
Presidential Term Length   
Unicameral Congress No Yes No
Total Seats in Congress   
PR System Yes Yes Semi
District Magnitude  . <
Concurrent Elections Yes Semi Yes
Overall Restrictive Permissive Mixed
References. Carey and Hix (); Gallagher and Mitchell (); Payne et al. ().
.. Party System
Electoral institutions and electoral systems are directly linked to party systems. In fact, the association
between electoral rules and political parties is one of the most studied topics in comparative politics.
One of the first scholars to suggest such a relationship was Maurice Duverger (), who argued
that single member districts naturally lead to two-party systems. In response to Duverger, Seymour
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan () suggested that it was not the electoral system that defined
the party system, but instead social cleavages. In a more recent contribution, Gary W. Cox ()
suggested that rather than being two mutually exclusive theories, electoral systems and social cleavages
simultaneously determine the dynamics that take place within the party system.

e conventional wisdom today is that both institutions and social cleavages determine the size
and scope of the party system. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera () suggest that party systems
should be typified according to the number of parties with a legal standing, taking into account their
relative strength. Taagepera and Shugart () suggest making a distinction between the effective
number of electoral parties (ENEP) and the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) – where
the former is a measure of the number of parties that compete in elections, and the latter is a measure
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of the number of parties that obtain legislative representation.
It is often the case that many parties receive votes in elections but only some obtain seats in the
legislature. Kenneth Benoit () attributes this difference to the mechanical and psychological
effects of electoral systems. Since parties can be excluded from parliament even if they obtain a
significant number of votes (mechanical effect), they will frequently decide not to compete at all
(psychological effect). 
e mechanical and psychological effects are often intentional; the electoral
system designer purposely seeks to create distortions in the translation of votes to seats. For example,
a designer may seek to create a restrictive electoral system with the objective of reducing the number
of parties, or a permissive electoral system with the objective of increasing the number of parties.
Table . shows the size of the party systems in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. It shows the maximum
and the minimum ENEP and ENLP in each of the three countries. It shows that Chile has a
moderate party system; although the number of parties that compete in elections and gain legislative
representation is higher than six, every one of those parties is part of one of the two major coalitions.
It shows that Ecuador has a large party system; despite having one of the smallest populations in
the region, it has a party system similar to the party system of Brazil, the country with the largest
population in the region. And it shows that Mexico has a small party system; paradoxically, it is the
second largest country in Latin America but the one with the smallest party system.
In Chile the electoral system designer purposely sought to create distortions in the translation
of votes to seats – he intentionally sought to reduce the size of the party system (Pastor, ). As
explained above, facing the threat of retreating to the unstable multi-party system that led to the
breakdown of democracy in , the designer sought to reduce the number of parties. He designed
the restrictive electoral system described above. As a consequence, the large multi-party system
dropped to an ENEP of seven and to an ENLP of six. While these numbers seem high, Peter Siavelis
() suggests that Chile has a de facto two-party system, since all of the relevant parties group
together in two large coalitions which combined take more than  per cent of the votes and seats.
Ecuador’s electoral institutions and electoral system can also be considered successful, yet in a
different manner – since there is no identifiable electoral system designer, instead just a natural
evolution. At any rate, the rules were in fact capable of producing a diverse cultural and geographical
representation of the population in the Assembly – precisely their purpose according to the constitution.
In line with what Arend Lijphart () describes as a consociative democracy, the electoral system of

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Ecuador allows many different parties to compete in elections without the threat of losing, and in
most cases gain legislative representation. Often cited as an effect of the electoral system, the party
system in Ecuador is one of the largest in the region (Mainwaring and Torcal, ). Between 
and  the lowest ENEP was six, and the highest was . Similarly, the lowest ENLP was five and
the highest was eight.
In comparison to Chile and Ecuador, Mexico is in the middle of the road. 
e absence of electoral
reforms makes it difficult to identify the purpose of the electoral system designer. In contrast to Chile
and Ecuador, which recently made changes to their electoral systems with specific objectives in mind,
Mexico has practically had the same electoral system since  (Gibson, ). In fact, the only
change to the party system did not occur following a change to the electoral system. Instead, it was
fueled by a social cleavage, after the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, in which the PANM
and the PRI competed in the north and the PRD and the PRI competed in the south (Klesner, ).

e current electoral system perpetuates the three-party arrangement. Indeed, both the ENEP and
the ENLP average three.
Table ..: Party Systems in Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico
Effective Number of Parties Chile Ecuador Mexico
Electoral Parties
Min. . . .
Max. . . .
Legislative Parties
Min. . . .
Max. . . .
References. Carey and Hix (); Gallagher and Mitchell (); Payne et al. ().
. 

e previous section suggests that the effect of some of the independent variables is contradictory in
theory and in practice. Chapter  and Chapter  argued that when the combination of independent
variables line up, coalitions will form. Yet the description above suggests that this is not always the case.
Even when the combination of independent variables does not line up, parties still form coalitions.
While the theory is robust for electoral coalition formation, it encounters some inconsistencies for
government coalition formation. For example, the high concentration of presidential power in Chile

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suggests that coalitions should not form, yet they do. In contrast, the low concentration of presidential
power in Mexico suggests that coalitions should form, yet they do not.

e revision of the three sets of variables above aimed to prove that the causal mechanism behind
coalition formation suggested in previous chapters could hold up well in different types of presidential
democracies. However, as mentioned above, this was not the case across the board. 
e causal
mechanism was particularly problematic when it came down to the association between presidential
power and government coalition formation. Indeed, shifts in both formal and informal powers of the
president were not always accompanied by a shift in parties’ strategies to form government coalitions.
Overall tendencies to increase the president’s power in Chile and Ecuador through constitutional
reform should have shown a decrease in government coalitions, and the overall tendency to reduce
the president’s power in Mexico should have shown an increase. Neither was the case.

is stands in contrast with findings in the previous chapter, which showed that as presidential
power increases, the probability of coalition formation decreases, and vice-versa. 
e logic behind
this finding was that when the president has enough legislative power he can govern alone without
the support of additional parties. In essence, the president does not need to form alliances with other
parties to pass legislation, since he could legislate with the support of his party alone. But if Chile
and Ecuador have some of the most powerful presidents in Latin America, why do political parties
permanently form coalitions in Chile, and intermittently in Ecuador? Similarly, if Mexico has some
of the least powerful presidents in Latin America, why do parties not permanently form coalitions?
Before going deeper into each of these questions, it is important to mention that the findings in the
previous chapters correctly predict electoral and government coalition formation in the grand majority
of the countries included in the study. 
e three variables used to predict coalition formation in the
previous chapters (presidential power, electoral institutions and electoral systems, and party system)
explain, to a large and significant extent, the reasons why parties form electoral and government
coalitions. Indeed, they make sense both in theory and in practice, as well as being consistent with
findings that stem from parliamentary regimes. 
us, the two questions raised above only refer to a
small non-explained portion.

e non-explained portion of any research question is normally considered the sum of two factors:
standard error (SE) and omitted variable bias (OVB). In line with this, the inconsistencies suggested
by the two questions raised above can be considered a product of either the margin of error (the

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portion of error due to random variance) or a product of omitted variables (the portion of error due to
omitting an essential independent variable). Since the former is intrinsic to the statistical method, it
is more important to focus on the latter. Accordingly, the following section focuses on identifying the
omitted variable, which in the case of the three countries reviewed in this study seems to be related to
political culture and critical junctures.
.  

e first part of this chapter showed that in all three countries presidential power varied significantly,
while electoral arrangments and the party systems did not. If presidential power were a necessary
condition, we would have seen coalitions appear or dissolve as the president’s power varied. However,
this did not occur. Instead, coalition only formed or dissolved as a reaction to variations in electoral
arrangments or the party system. 
is is evidence that the former variable is not as important as the
latter two. In addtion to the interaction of these variables, circumstantial situations in each country
were also found to play an important role.
In the case of Chile, two of the three variables suggest that coalition formation should occur (electoral
institutions and the electoral system, and the party system), while the third variable suggests that
coalition formation should not occur (presidential power). In the tension between these conflicting
incentives, a fourth, unmeasurable variable takes relevance, exacerbating the effects of electoral
institutions and the electoral system, and the party system, and ameliorating the effect of presidential
power. 
is omitted variable, as explained below, is the cultural divide between the supporters of
democracy and the supporters of the military government.
It is important to note that it is the interaction between the electoral system and the party system,
and not each variable individually, that provides the main incentives for parties to form coalitions.

is goes back to the restrictive electoral system that was specifically designed to reduce the size of
the party system. Indeed, the electoral designer was aware that the two-round system for presidential
elections together with the particular PR system for legislative elections would force parties to bargain
with each other; the electoral designer also knew that the magnitude of the incentives of these two
variables would almost certainly render any other intervening variable futile.

e above explains why presidential power is not relevant in deterring coalition formation. 
e
electoral system designer sought to provide more incentives for coalition formation than against it.

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Presidential power is a secondary determinant when it comes to explaining partisan patterns. In the
counter-factual scenario in which the electoral institutions and the electoral system were designed
with a more permissive slant, it is likely that parties would not have had the same incentives to form
coalitions. In this latter case, it is also likely that the president’s constitutional attributions would
have played a more important role in deterring coalition formation.
While this reasoning is implicit in the findings of the previous chapters, the evolution of the three
sets of variables suggests the presence of a fourth unmeasurable variable, related to the recent history
of the country. Indeed, partisan alignments cannot be fully understood without considering the
non-institutional legacy of the military government. While the authoritarian government left its mark
on partisan alignment through the authoritarian constitution, it also left a cultural legacy. 
e divide
between supporters of democracy (centre-left) and supporters of the dictatorship (centre-right) is
what ultimately explains why only two coalitions dominate the entire political spectrum.
In Ecuador, a similar situation occurs. Two of the three variables suggest that coalition formation
should not occur (presidential power and electoral institutions and the electoral system), while the
third variable suggests that coalition formation should occur (the party system). In the tension
between these conflicting incentives, a fourth, unmeasurable variable emerges, forcing parties to
have clashing incentives when deciding whether to form coalitions with other parties. 
is omitted
variable, as argued below, is the instability that has frequently led the country into political turmoil
and crisis.
Since the electoral system and the party system provide conflicting incentives, coalition formation
hinges on the political context at the time of the election. While smaller parties normally attempt to
use electoral rules to their advantage and form coalitions, if they receive an attractive offer from a
larger party they are often willing to join a coalition. 
is is especially common in the legislature.
Similarly, while larger parties tend to have enough support to compete on their own, their size varies
from one election to the next, making them unable or unwilling to make attractive offers (usually
long-term agreements) to other parties.
In line with the above, the constant evolution of the constitution provides a perfect political context
for parties to change their strategies. Under some constitutions they have more incentives to form
coalitions than under other constitutions. Under constitutions in which presidents have been granted
relatively more power, larger parties have decided to stand alone, and under constitutions in which

 
presidents have been granted relatively less power, they have been more open to share power with
other parties. Similarly, changes towards more restrictive electoral rules have also generated an increase
in the total number of coalitions.
Evidently the unstable political system has contributed to unpredictable partisan strategies. In any
case, the three sets of variables seem to line up to predict the situations in which parties decide to
cooperate. 
is seems to suggest that a fourth variable is necessary to complete the reasons why parties
form coalitions. Indeed, coalition formation in Ecuador could not be fully explained without taking
into account the constant political turmoil and crises that frequently hit the country. Understanding
the chain of events that take place after a crisis is crucial to explaining coalition formation. Almost
every time a new constitution is inaugurated, a critical juncture surfaces and a new partisan alignment
occurs.
In Mexico, while one of the three variables provides reason to believe that coalition formation
should occur (presidential power), the other two variables suggest that coalition formation should not
occur (electoral institutions and the electoral system, and the party system). In the tension between
these conflicting incentives, a fourth, unmeasurable variable seems to take relevance, ameliorating the
effect of presidential power and exacerbating the effect of the electoral and party systems. 
is omitted
variable, as shown below, is the partisan discipline and patronage patterns that slowly emerged and
settled in the country as a consequence of the PRI’s ruling style.
Since two of the three variables provide strong incentives for parties to compete alone, coalitions
do not normally form. Indeed, the effect of the electoral and party systems is already strong. Since
the electoral system favours large parties, and the large parties are significantly more powerful than
the smaller ones, there are no strong incentives for negotiation. In every election since the transition
to democracy the three larger parties have taken more than  per cent of the votes in presidential
and legislative elections, and as such have seen no reasons to share power with smaller parties that
they do not see as a threat.
In line with the above, presidential power is not relevant for encouraging coalition formation.
Given that large parties are the only ones that win elections, they usually have enough support in
Congress to pass legislation. 
ey do not need to depend on other parties. Plus, small parties that
are able to win seats in the legislature usually do not have enough support to pass their own policy,
and simply vote in-line with one of the larger parties. 
us, while presidential power is weak, and


supports the notion that the president should seek support from other parties to enact his campaign
programme, he will normally choose between negotiating with other parties on a bill-to-bill basis and
simply facing legislative gridlock.

is suggests that it all comes down to the support of the president in Congress. In a scenario in
which the president has a majority, he will do without the support of other large parties. Indeed, he
will prefer to govern with his party alone, or with the confidence and support of smaller parties. In a
scenario in which the president does not have a majority, he will tend to prefer legislative gridlock
rather than seek the support of other large parties. Both of these scenarios suggest that large parties
will rarely form coalitions. 
e long-standing partisan discipline, enforced via patronage, assures the




e contribution of this chapter is twofold. 
e first has been to account for apparent inconsistencies
between the findings made in previous chapters (using a large-N approach) and the findings made
in this chapter (using a case study approach). While Chapter  suggested that it was both necessary
and sufficient for all three variables to line up perfectly in order to explain coalition formation, the
first part of this chapter referred to historical patterns of institutions and the partisan landscape from
Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico to show that the three variables do not necessarily have to line up to
predict the outcome.

e second part of this chapter provides an explanation for this inconsistency. It suggests that
only two out of the three variables are necessary and sufficient to explain coalition formation. In
the three cases studied here, these variables were related to the electoral system and the party system.

e interaction between the electoral and party systems provides enough incentives for parties to
form coalitions. In comparison, presidential power is not as important. In all three cases, presidential
power theoretically pointed at a certain outcome, yet in practice, that outcome did not occur. 
e
electoral system and the party system took precedence over presidential power.
In Chile, the interaction between the electoral and party systems explains coalition formation. 
is
is because the electoral system designer purposely created a formula which would almost certainly
transform the multi-party system into a two/bloc system. In Ecuador, the constant tension between


the electoral system and the party system explains intermittent coalition formation. While the party
system provides a perfect setting for coalition formation, the electoral system does not. In Mexico,
the electoral system and the party system individually explain why coalitions do not form. 
e
combination of restrictive electoral and few parties serve to consolidate a system where no large party
is willing to share power.

e second contribution of this chapter has been to unpack the reason why only two of the
independent variables take such precedence over the whole set of independent variables. 
e answer
suggested above is that a fourth omitted variable becomes relevant in consolidating the influence
of the electoral system and the party system. 
is variable, not included in the study because of
its unmeasurable nature, is related to the political culture and critical junctures of each country. It
exacerbates the effect of the electoral system and the party system and ameliorates the incentives of
presidential power.
In Chile, the cultural divide between those who support the military government and those who
oppose it shape the manner in which coalitions form. While the electoral system and the party system
set the backdrop for a coalition system, it is ultimately the dictatorship/democracy cleavage that
makes only two of the many coalitions relevant when it comes to winning elections. It would be
impossible to explain the intricacies of the coalition system without taking into account that parties
and voters are significantly divided for historical reasons. It is likely that power would be distributed
across more than two coalitions in the absence of the authoritarian cleavage.
In Ecuador, frequent political crises determine coalition formation. With the constant tension
between the incentives of the permissive electoral system and the large multi-party system, political
crises are what ultimately tilt the balance for parties in the process of designing electoral strategies.
While parties sometimes decide to stand alone, it is often the case that a political crisis will create
more incentives for parties to extraordinarily form coalitions. It would be difficult to understand why
parties decide to form coalitions without the democracy’s frequent critical junctures.
In Mexico, the partisan discipline of the large parties serves to reinforce their incentives to stand
alone in elections and govern by themselves if they are elected to the presidency. While two of the
three variables point at this arrangement, it is ultimately the top-down political culture that sways
the decisions of party elites to steer clear from a coalition system. In a way, parties already function
as coalitions, since they are divided into multiple internal factions. In this sense, partisan discipline


enforced with patronage is the causal mechanism responsible for keeping parties aligned from within.


C O N C L U S I O N : C OA L I T I O N F O R M AT I O N I N
L AT I N A M E R I C A

is chapter brings together the findings made in previous chapters and discusses their implica-
tions. 
e first section restates the research questions, while the second section summarises the
major empirical and qualitative findings. 
e third section discusses the implications of these
findings, particularly focusing on how they are original and relevant. 
e fourth section includes
recommendations for future research, and the fifth section identifies some of the limitations
encountered during production. 
e final section contains the concluding remarks.
. 

esis explains coalition formation in the presidential regimes of Latin America. It has shown that
between  and  the number of elections and governments in which parties formed coalitions
significantly increased both within and across countries. 
e reason behind this upward trend has not
been explained in previous literature.
In an attempt to provide an explanation, two research questions were advanced. First, why do
parties form electoral coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin America?, and second, why do parties
form government coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin America?
Both research questions took into account all democratic elections and governments between 
and . In this time frame,  presidential elections and  years of government were observed.
Logistic regressions with random effects, robust standard errors and an observed information matrix
as the variance controller were used to test different hypotheses.


An additional research question, aimed to settle any inconsistencies left behind by the first two
research questions, was also advanced: why do parties form coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin
America when crucial variables suggest that they should not, and why do parties not form coalitions when
crucial variables suggest that they should?

is final research question took into account all democratic elections and governments in Chile,
Ecuador and Mexico between  and . In this time frame, a total of  elections and 
years of government were observed. Major constitutional reforms, as well as electoral and partisan
landscape variations, were traced to identify any underlying patterns behind coalition formation.
All three research questions are original, since there are no studies that have previously attempted
to provide comprehensive answers. With the exception of the work of José Antonio Cheibub (see
), no scholars have ventured into explaining why parties form coalitions in presidential regimes.
As such, the answers to the research questions yield critical insight into partisan strategies in elections
and governments, and offer crucial context to how political parties behave as democracy evolves.
All three research questions are also relevant, since they contribute to the development of a theory
particular to coalition formation in presidential regimes. With little research on the topic, it has been
extremely hard for scholars to frame coalition formation in presidentialism. As such, the answers to
the research questions provide them with a framework and evidence to develop further research on
this topic, and with a baseline to test the same hypotheses in other presidential regimes beyond the
region.

e answers to these questions are useful for both academics, and policy-makers. 
ey function in
chain reaction, since electoral coalitions have an impact on government coalitions, and government
coalitions have an impact on general welfare and democracy. Naturally, electoral coalitions have an
impact on government composition and policies, as well as an impact on the government program. It
follows that government coalitions have an impact on the functioning of government, and the quality
of democracy.

e remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. 
e second section summarises the empirical
and qualitative findings. 
e third section discusses the implications of these findings, particularly
focusing on how they are original and relevant. 
e fourth section includes recommendations
for future research, while the fifth section identifies some of the limitations encountered during
production. 
e final section contains the concluding remarks.

   
.    

e main empirical and qualitative findings are chapter specific and were summarised within the
respective empirical chapters. 
e empirical findings can be found in Chapter : Explaining Electoral
Coalition Formation in Latin America and Chapter : Explaining Government Coalition Formation
in Latin America, and the qualitative findings can be found in Chapter : Coalition Formation in
Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. 
is section will synthesise all major findings related to the three research
questions.

e first research question was why do parties form electoral coalitions in the presidential regimes of
Latin America?

e answer is that democracies with both restrictive electoral arrangements and large multi-party
systems favour electoral coalition formation. While restrictive electoral arrangements provide natural
incentives for parties to group together, large party systems provide the perfect setting for parties to
find common platforms. 
e interaction between the two variables provides the highest incentive
for parties to form coalitions. In democracies with highly restrictive electoral rules and an extremely
fragmented party system, it is natural for front-running presidential candidates to be supported by
one or more of the largest parties in the system.
Democracies with simple majority plurality for presidential elections provided more incentives for
parties to form electoral coalitions than democracies with run-off provisions for presidential elections.

e logic behind this finding is that when parties faced only one shot at winning an election (rather
than two) they attempted to maximise their chances of winning by grouping together to meet the
threshold. Panama is a good example – the largest parties group into coalitions to boost their chances
of winning. While the PRD and the PLRN are by far the largest parties in the system, they still
choose to form coalitions with smaller parties to avoid any chance of losing.
Something similar occurs in democracies with unicameralism. Legislative systems with one chamber
provide more incentives for parties to form electoral coalitions than legislative systems with two
chambers. 
e logic behind this finding is that when parties only see one shot at passing legislation
(instead of two), the front running candidate’s party decides to create alliances with smaller parties
in order to boost the chances of passing legislation if elected. 
is is the case in Ecuador. In the
single tier system, presidential candidates often see the need to form coalitions (especially when going

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through political turmoil) before elections to avoid stalemate in the assembly.
Democracies that use proportional representation for legislative elections also provide high incen-
tives for electoral coalition formation. In comparison to legislative elections with first-past-the-post
rules, proportional representation generates mechanical and psychological incentives for large party
systems. And since parties in large party systems are more likely to find like-minded parties to bargain
with, proportional representation indirectly creates incentives for electoral coalition formation. 
is
is the case in Brazil. 
e proportional representation rules to elect deputies and senators serve as an
incentive for parties to seek strategic alliances in order to win elections.
Similarly, smaller district magnitudes increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation.
Evidence shows that small district magnitudes have a direct effect on the party system. As the number
of seats available in a given district increases, the number of parties interested in contesting in that
district also increases. And since it is natural for parties to find common platforms in crowded party
systems, it is normally the case that some parties will strategically cooperate. 
is is how it works in
Brazil; the extremely large districts increase the chance parties will find strategic partners.
Large legislatures also boost the probability of electoral coalition formation. Findings showed that
large congresses encourage parties to cooperate with each other. When there were many seats available
in Congress, the front-running candidate’s party sought the support of smaller parties to eliminate
possible veto-players. In contrast, when the legislature was small, parties preferred to compete alone
rather than share power. In Argentina, one of the largest legislatures in the region, parties cooperate
before elections to boost their national vote share. Large urban parties see more benefits when they
cooperate with small rural parties.
From the findings above, it can also be inferred that large party systems also create incentives for
coalition formation. Indeed, evidence shows that as the number of parties increases, so too does the
number of coalitions. 
e logic is plain and simple. In two party systems, large parties do not have
incentives to cooperate with each other, since they usually win elections anyway. As more parties enter
the system, the chance that at least two parties will negotiate increases. For example, the two-party
system in Colombia during the s and s provided no incentives for the major parties to
negotiate with other parties. In contrast, the large multi-party system in Chile did.

e second research question was why do parties form government coalitions in the presidential regimes
of Latin America?

   

e answer is that democracies with weak presidents, restrictive electoral arrangements and large
multi-party systems favour government coalition formation. Weak presidents attempt to maximise
their chances of passing legislation by forming coalitions. And like the determinants for electoral
coalitions, restrictive electoral arrangements provide natural incentives for parties to group together,
while large multi-party systems provide the perfect setting. 
e interaction between the three variables
provides the highest incentive for parties to form government coalitions. In democracies with weak
presidents, restrictive electoral rules and highly fragmented party systems, it is normally the case that
the president will seek the support of some of the largest parties in the system.

e most important finding on this front was that when the incumbent president’s power and
vote share increase, the likelihood of forming a government coalition decreases. While this has been
insinuated in previous literature, and as such taken as a given, these empirical findings prove the
magnitude of the correlation. 
e logic behind this finding is that when presidents did not have a
large enough coalition to pass legislation in the legislature they sought support from other parties.

is is the case in Uruguay. While parties do not normally form electoral coalitions, they do form
government coalitions to maximise their probability of executing their campaign programmes.

e findings also showed that some of the variables that explain electoral coalitions also explain
government coalitions. 
is is the case when it comes to simple majority plurality for presidential
elections, and large multi-party systems. When both are present, parties have higher chances of
forming government coalitions. 
is can be illustrated with Nicaragua. In , Chamorro was
elected president with the support of a coalition. She upheld that coalition until political turmoil
struck in , when she dissolved the coalition to form a new one. 
e large multi-party system
allowed her to cherry-pick the parties that would continue to support her.

e length of the president’s term in power also has an effect on government coalition formation.
Longer term lengths increase the probability a government coalition will form. After elections, when
parties are forced to choose between supporting the government and joining the opposition, they
look at their prospects. When the term length is long, they have higher chances of supporting the
government (provided there is ideological affinity with the president’s party), since they will have a
higher chance of influencing the direction of policy. In contrast, when term lengths are short, they
will tend to wait the term out in the opposition.

e size of the legislature is also an important predictor for government coalition formation. In

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contrast to what happens before elections, small legislatures favour coalition formation. 
is hinges
on the fact that small legislatures are normally more divided than large ones. In small legislatures,
parties are more entrenched, and thus there tends to be less leeway for negotiation. In anticipation of
facing legislative deadlock, the president’s party will often choose to form coalitions beforehand. If
the executive does not form a coalition, it is likely the opposition will overcome him ion the floor.
While these findings constitute a major development for existing literature, they also suggest some
inconsistencies. When comparing the empirical evidence to the actual behaviour of parties, it was
noted that all of the variables do not necessarily have to line up to predict the correct outcome. For
example, some democracies provided presidents with strong legislative power, yet coalitions formed
anyway. Similarly, some democracies provided presidents with weak legislative power, yet coalitions
did not form. 
is observation led to a third research question.

e third research question was why do parties form coalitions in the presidential regimes of Latin
America when crucial variables suggest that they should not, and why do parties not form coalitions when
crucial variables suggest that they should?

e answer is that electoral institutions, electoral systems and the party system take precedence
over presidential power. Even though evidence suggests that weak presidents should form coalitions,
this is not always the case. For example, presidents may choose to not make use of their limited power,
and only pass legislation that requires lower quorums. Or, presidents may choose to not make use
of their power, and not pass any legislation at all. Weak presidents do not necessarily have to form
coalitions to rule – even though it is the most favourable setting in which coalitions can form.

e above suggests that, because coalitions form anyway, there must be additional variables at play.
In the three cases (Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico) selected to look deeper into the inconsistency, the
interaction between electoral systems and party systems was indeed the major driving point behind
coalition formation. 
e interaction between the two sets of variables was always consistent with the
empirical findings. In other words, in the face of restrictive electoral systems and large party systems,
coalitions always formed. Likewise, in permissive electoral systems and small party systems, coalitions
never formed.
Presidential power is a sufficient variable to explain coalition formation. Indeed, the president may
be weak or strong and coalitions will form. In contrast, the electoral system and the party system
are both sufficient and necessary variables to explain coalition formation. It is rarely the case that

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when the electoral system is permissive or when the party system is small – and especially when both
are true – that coalitions will form. Constitutional changes across the years observed showed that
coalitions are even more likely to form when electoral rules become more restrictive or when the
number of parties increases.
A third finding linked to this third research question was that the interaction between the electoral
system and the party system is moderated by cultural factors inherent to each country. While coalition
formation is conceptually generic, it is also different in each country. When and how coalitions form is
defined by the political history of each country; critical junctures play an important role. For example,
in Chile two coalitions are dominant because of its authoritarian legacy, while in Ecuador, coalitions
only appear in the face of dire political turmoil. And in Mexico, parties do not form coalitions because
of the party discipline forged after many years of a single party’s electoral domination.
One final note, referring to all three questions, is worth making here. 
is is related to the similar
nature of electoral and government coalitions. In general, with the exception of some minor variations,
the same variables explain the origin of both types of coalition. 
is is no surprise, since literature
has taught us that constitutional framework, as well as both electoral and party institutions explain
electoral strategies. 
e important contribution here has been to identify the direction and the
intensity of these relatioships.
.  

e answers to the research questions are both original and relevant. While some work has been
advanced for government coalitions in presidentialism, there is virtually none for electoral coalitions.

is is important insofar as yielding critical insight into partisan strategies in both elections and
governments, and bestowing scholars with both a framework and evidence to further advance research
on this topic. 
e findings in this thesis offer crucial context as to how political parties behave as
democracy evolves, and provide a baseline to test the same hypotheses in other presidential regimes
outside the region.
Since the work of José Antonio Cheibub (), no scholars have further ventured into explaining
why parties form coalitions in presidential regimes. Initially, it was thought that coalitions did not
form in presidentialism. Later, they were only considered a rare occurrence. Today, at least one third
of Latin American countries see coalitions form. In the light of this trend, it is especially imperative

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to explain why partisan strategies have shifted in recent years. 
is thesis provides evidence stemming
from  years of democratic elections and governments in the region.

e findings made in this thesis suggest how presidential power, electoral institutions and electoral
systems, and party systems determine coalition formation. 
e findings bridge the gap that has existed
in the literature since the first debates of presidentialism. 
ey serve as evidence for democracies
looking to build more cooperative political systems. At the very root, they suggest that presidential
power is not as important as electoral systems and party systems. 
ese findings can be used in
political science as a reference for the development of future theories, as well as policy-making as a
guide for the development of democracy.
With virtually no research on the topic, it has been extremely hard for scholars to frame coalition
formation in presidentialism. Normally, theories from parliamentary systems were used to frame
particular occurrences in presidential systems. 
is obviously had severe methodological shortcomings,
since the rules of the game are essentially different. Transposing theories from one system to another
inevitably induces bias, since parties have different objectives and face different challenges. 
is thesis
provides a baseline reference to develop a theory sensitive to the rules of the game in presidentialism.

e methods in this thesis suggest that presidential power is not as important as originally expected.

is is a major breakthrough, since governments that set out to create more cooperative political
systems would instinctively think that taking power away from the president would naturally create
incentives for a coalition system. Yet, as shown in this study, this is not necessarily true. 
is finding
alone paves the way for a body of literature that can explain coalition formation without the need to
refer to evidence stemming from parliamentary systems. Along with the other findings, this finding
provides an essential reference to any study focused on studying coalitions in presidential systems.
.    
Future research should explore the role of other variables. In this study, only variables from presidential
power, electoral institutions and the electoral system, and the party system were considered as major
variables. As such, it is likely that some important indicators were omitted. For example, legislative
quorums for important pieces of legislation, the percentage of votes for legislative lists, and the years
of parties’ legal standings were not tested here but may also influence coalition formation. 
ough
some control variables relative to local politics and the economy were also tested, it may be important

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to add additional controls. 
e same goes for ideology, which should take a centre role in forthcoming
studies.
Future research should look at a wider time frame. In this study, the years observed had a lower
bound given by the transition to democracy; this will be difficult to bypass in forthcoming research.
However, data should be included as years go by. New elections and governments will provide more
evidence to test. New evidence can corroborate the findings made in this thesis, or provide evidence
against them. In any case, adding more observations can show variations in coalition formation
trends as countries become more democratic. In this vein, an important question to answer is whether
coalition formation becomes more likely as democracy consolidates.
Future research should also incorporate the role of political culture. In this study, culture was defined
as the small non-explained portion of coalition formation. While it is difficult to operationalise, it is
well worth attempting. 
e findings in this thesis suggest that political junctures are crucial to explain
how and when coalitions form. In this sense, future work should further explore how particular
junctures have ameliorated or strengthened the incentives that parties already have to form coalitions.
As in this study, qualitative case studies focused on cultural factors can complement large-N studies
that naturally omit such variables.
Another interesting addition to this work could be done by expanding the statistical methods used
in Chapter  and Chapter . For example, future literature could explore the nature of the relation-
ship between electoral and government coalitions and presidential power. It would be particularly
interesting to explore non-linear relationships between both variables, in which coalitions could be
more or less likely depending on the degree of presidential power.
Finally, future studies should also focus on other regions. 
e blooming presidential democracies
of sub-Saharan Africa may provide crucial insight into how parties form coalitions. On the one hand,
they resemble the first years of democratic transition in Latin America, and as such may present some
of the same patterns. On the other hand, the findings made here can serve as a reference to predict
future partisan arrangements in the years to come. A large sample of all presidential democracies in




One limitation of this study refers to the multiple sources of data. Naturally, there was no readily
available machine-readable data set to test the hypotheses set forward in this thesis. 
us, multiple
sources were used as input. Yet, when large portions of data were available they were used entirely to
avoid referring to multiple sources. In some cases, particular years were missing in the sources used
and had to be calculated independently. While this may have introduced bias, it was done carefully,
respecting the compilation methods used by the original source.
A second limitation of this study refers to the different political and cultural contexts in the countries
included in the sample. For example, presidential power and electoral rules vary from one democracy
to the next. Veto power is not used equally in all democracies, much as simple majority plurality does
not have the same minimum threshold. 
ere is no way around this, which is problematic for any
large-N study. To avoid introducing bias, fixed and random effects were introduced to account for
individual heterogeneity. While this may not be the optimum scenario, it is the best known method
to deal with differences across datasets with such heterogeneity.
. 

is thesis has shown that contrary to conventional wisdom, electoral and government coalitions
normally form in Latin America. It has shown that presidential power, electoral institutions, electoral
systems, and party systems all play a key in role in coalition formation. It has also shown that
presidential power is not as important as the interaction between electoral systems and party systems.

ese findings are original, and as such set a precedent in the existing body of literature. 
ese
findings are also relevant, and may serve as a framework for future studies related to coalitions in
presidentialism.
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A
L I N E O F S U C C E S S I O N I N L AT I N A M E R I C A

e line of succession in the cases in which the president did not finish his term is described below:
. León Roldos (Ecuador) was inaugurated in  and died in ; he was succeeded by his
vice-President Oslvado Hurtado who served until the end of the term in .
. Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was
succeeded by his vice-President Itamar Franco who served until the end of the term in .
. Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela) was inaugurated in  and was dismissed by Congress in
; he was succeeded by the President of Congress Octavio Lepage (), who in turn was
succeeded by independent Senator Ramón José Velásquez who served until the end of the term
in .
. Jorge Serrano (Guatemala) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was succeeded
by his vice-President Gustavo Espina (), who in turn was succeeded by Human Rights
Ombudsman Ramiro de León who served until the end of the term in .
. Abdalá Bucaram (Ecuador) was inaugurated in  and was dismissed by Congress in ;
he was succeeded by vice-President Rosalía Arteaga (), who in turn was succeeded by
Congressman Fabián Alarcón who served until the end of the term in .
. Raúl Cubas (Paraguay) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was succeeded by
vice-President Luis Ángel González Macchi who served until the end of the term in .
. Alberto Fujimori (Peru) was inaugurated in  and was dismissed by Congress in ; he
was succeeded by Congressman Valentín Paniagua who served until the end of his temporary
term in .
. Jamil Mahuad (Ecuador) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was succeeded by
vice-President Gustavo Noboa who served until the end of the term in .
. Fernando de la Rúa (Argentina) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was succeeded
by Senator Ramón Puerta (), Governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (), Senator Eduardo
Caamañno (–), and finally Senator Eduardo Duhalde who served until the end of
the term in .

     
. Hugo Banzer (Bolivia) was inaugurated in  and died in ; he was succeeded by
vice-President Jorge Quiroga who served until the end of the term in .
. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Bolivia) was inaugurated in  and resigned in ; he was
succeeded by vice-President Carlos Mesa (–), who in turn was succeeded by the
President of the Supreme Court Eduardo Rodríguez (–), Senator Hormando Vaca
(), and then Congressman Mario Cossío who served until the end of the term in .
. Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador) was inaugurated in  and was dismissed by Congress in ;
he was succeeded by vice-President Alfredo Palacio who served until the end of the term in
.
. Manuel Zelaya (Honduras) was inaugurated in  and was dismissed by Congress in ;




F U L L L I S T O F E L E C TO R A L C OA L I T I O N S

e full list of electoral coalitions that supported a winning presidential candidate, and their member
parties, is listed below:
. Argentina had an electoral coalition in the  election of Carlos Menem (Frente Justicialista
Popular: PJ, PI, PCR, PDC, MPL, PSA); in the  election of Carlos Menem (Frente
Justicialista Popular: PJ, UCeDé), in the  election of Fernando de la Rúa (Alianza por
el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación: UCR, FREPASO); in the  election of Néstor
Kirchner (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV); in the  election of
Cristina Fernández (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV); and in in the 
election of Cristina Fernández (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV).
. Bolivia had an electoral coalition in the  election of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (Pacto por
la Democracia: MNR, PCML, MNRI-Siglo XX, UDC); in the  election of Jaime Paz
Zamora (Acuerdo Patriótico: MIR, PCML); in the  election of Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada (Pacto por la Gobernabilidad/Pacto por el Cambio: MNR, UCS, MBL, MRTKL);
and in the  election of Hugo Banzer (Mega Coalición: ADN, NFR, PDC).
. Brazil had an electoral coalition in the  election of Tancredo Neves (Alianza Democrática:
PMDB, PFL, PTB, PDS); in the  election of Fernando Collor de Mello (PRN, PSC,
PTR, PST); in the in the  election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB, PFL, PTB),
in the  election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Unión, Trabajo y Progreso: PSDB, PFL,
PPB, PTB, PSD, PSL); in the the  of Lula da Silva (PT, PL, PCdoB, PMN, PCB, PV);
in the the  election of Lula da Silva (Brasil, Um País de Todos: PT, PRB, PCdoB, PL,
PSB); and in the  election of Dilma Rousseff (Para o Brasil Seguir Mudando: PT, PRB,
PDT, PMDB, PTN, PSC, PR, PTC, PSB, PCdoB).
. Chile had an electoral coalition in the  election of Patricio Aylwin (Concertación: DC,
PS, PPD, PRSD); in the  election of Eduardo Frei (Concertación: DC, PS, PPD, PRSD);
in the  election of Ricardo Lagos (Concertación: DC, PS, PPD, PRSD); in the 
election of Michelle Bachelet (Concertación: DC, PS, PPD, PRSD); and in the  election
of Sebastián Piñera (Alianza: RN, UDI).
. Colombia had an electoral coalition in the  election of Belisario Betancur (Movimiento
Nacional: PC and ANAPO); and in the  election of Andrés Pastrana (Gran Alianza por el
Cambio: PC, NFD).

    
. Ecuador had an electoral coalition in the  election of León Febres-Cordero (Frente de
Reconstrucción Nacional: PSC, PLR, PCE, FRA); in the  election of Sixto Durán Ballén
(PSCE and PURE); and in the  election of Rafael Correa (PAISE, NPE, ADNE, ICE,
MCDNE, AJE, ABAE, PCE, PTE, ADE, Ruptura de los ).
. Guatemala had an electoral coalition in the  election of Oscar Berger (Gran Alianza
Nacional: PP, MR, PSN); and in the  election of Alvaro Colom (Unidad Nacional de la
Esperanza: UNRG, DIA).
. Nicaragua had an electoral coalition in the  election of Violeta Chamorro (Unión Nacional
Opositora: PLC, PALI, APC, ANC, PNC, MDN, PIAC, PAN, PDCN, PPSC, PSC, PSN,
PC de N); and in the  election of Arnoldo Alemán (Alianza Liberal: PLC, PLIUN, PLN,
PALI).
. Panama had an electoral coalition in the  election of Ernesto Pérez Balladares (Alianza
Pueblo Unido: PRD, PALA, PLR); in the  election of Mireya Moscoso (Unión por
Panama: PA, MOLIRENA, CD, MORENA); in the  election of Martín Torrijos (Patria
Nueva: PRD, PP); and in the  election of Ricardo Martinelli (Alianza por el Cambio:
CD, PA, UP, MOLIRENA).
. Paraguay had an electoral coalition in the  election of Fernando Lugo (Alianza Patriótica
para el Cambio: PRF, PPS, PDC, PFA, PEN, BSyP, PLRA).
. Venezuela had an electoral coalition in the  election of Hugo Chávez (Polo Patriótico:
MVR, MAS, MEP, PPT, PCV); in the  election of Hugo Chávez (Bloque del Cambio:
MVR, MP, Solidaridad); and in the  election of Hugo Chávez (Revolución Bolivariana:
PODEMOS, PPT, PCV, MEP, UPV, Liga Socialista, Tupamaro, Gente Emergente, MIGATO,
Unión, MDD, CMR, CRV, IPCN, MCM, MCGN, Poder Laboral, ONDA, MNI, UPC,
FACOBA, PROVEN, and REDES).

C
F U L L L I S T O F G O V E R N M E N T C OA L I T I O N S

e full list of government coalitions that supported an incumbent president, and their member
parties, is listed below:
. Argentina had a government coalition in the administration of Menem – (Frente
Justicialista Popular: PJ, PI, PCR, PDC, MPL, PSA); Menem – (Frente Justicialista
Popular: PJ, UCeDé); De la Rúa – (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación:
UCR, FREPASO); Kirchner – (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV);
Fernández – (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV); and Fernández
– (Frente para la Victoria: PJ, FG, PI, PCA, PH, PDV).
. Bolivia had a government coalition in the administration of Paz Estenssoro – (Pacto
por la Democracia: MNR, PCML, MNRI-Siglo XX, UDC); Paz Zamora – (Acuerdo
Patriótico: MIR, PCML); Sánchez de Lozada – (Pacto por la Gobernabilidad/Pacto
por el Cambio: MNR, UCS, MBL, MRTKL); Banzer/Quiroga – (Mega Coalición:
ADN, NFR, PDC); and Sánchez de Lozada – (no name).
. Brazil had a government coalition in the administration of Sarney – (Alianza
Democrática: PMDB, PFL, PTB, PDS), Collor de Mello/Franco – (PRN, PSC,
PTR, PST); Cardoso – (PSDB, PFL, PTB), Cardoso – (Unión, Trabajo y
Progreso: PSDB, PFL, PPB, PTB, PSD, PSL); da Silva – (PT, PL, PCdoB, PMN,
PCB, PV); da Silva – (Brasil, Um País de Todos: PT, PRB, PCdoB, PL, PSB); and
Rousseff  (Para o Brasil Seguir Mudando: PT, PRB, PDT, PMDB, PTN, PSC, PR, PTC,
PSB, PCdoB).
. Chile had a government coalition in the administration of Aylwin – (Concertación:
DC, PS, PPD, PRSD); Frei – (Concertación: DC, PS, PPD, PRSD); Lagos –
 (Concertación: DC, PS, PPD, PRSD); Bachelet – (Concertación: DC, PS,
PPD, PRSD); and Piñera – (Alianza: RN, UDI).
. Colombia had a government coalition in the administration of Betancur – (Movimiento
Nacional: PC and ANAPO); and Pastrana – (Gran Alianza por el Cambio: PC,
NFD).
. Ecuador had a government coalition in the administration of Febres-Cordero –
(Frente de Reconstrucción Nacional: PSC, PLR, PCE, FRA); and Durán Ballén –

    
(PSCE and PURE).
. Guatemala had a government coalition in the administration of Berger – (Gran
Alianza Nacional: PP, MR, PSN); and Álvaro Colom – (Unidad Nacional de la
Esperanza: UNRG, DIA).
. Nicaragua had a government coalition in the administration of Chamorro – (Unión
Nacional Opositora: PLC, PALI, APC, ANC, PNC, MDN, PIAC, PAN, PDCN, PPSC, PSC,
PSN, PC de N); Chamorro – (Alianza Liberal: PLC, PALI); and Alemán –
(Alianza Liberal: PLC, PLIUN, PLN, PALI).
. Panama had a government coalition in the administration of Balladares – (Alianza
Pueblo Unido: PRD, PALA, PLR); Moscoso – (Unión por Panama: PA, MOLIRENA,
CD, MORENA); Torrijos – (Patria Nueva: PRD, PP); and Martinelli –
(Alianza por el Cambio: CD, PA, UP, MOLIRENA).
. Paraguay had a government coalition in the administration of Lugo – (Alianza
Patriótica para el Cambio: PRF, PPS, PDC, PFA, PEN, BSyP, PLRA).
. Uruguay had a government coalition in the administration of Lacalle – (PC, PB);
Sanguinetti – (PC, PB); and Battle – (PC, PB).

D
C O D E B O O K : C H A P T E R 
ELECTORAL COALITION
is a dichotomous variable, coded  if the winner of the presidential election is backed by an electoral
coalition, and coded  if the winner of the presidential election is not backed by an electoral coalition.
SMP
is a dummy variable coded  if simple majority plurality is used to define presidential elections, and
coded  if simple majority plurality is not used to define presidential elections.
REELECTION
is a dummy variable coded  if the incumbent president can bid for re-election, and coded  if the
incumbent president cannot bid for re-election.
TERM LENGTH
reflects the fixed number of years the president is elected to serve.
CONCURRENT
is a dummy variable coded  if presidential elections are concurrent to legislative elections, and coded
 if presidential elections are not concurrent to legislative elections.
UNICAMERAL
is a dummy variable coded  if congress is unicameral, and coded  if congress is not unicameral.
PR SYSTEM
is a dummy variable coded  if the majority of votes are translated into seats by proportional represen-
tation electoral rules, and coded  if the majority of votes are not translated into seats by proportional
representation electoral rules.
THRESHOLD
is a dummy variable coded  if parties must meet a threshold of votes to gain legislative representation,




reflects the total number of seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total
seats in the lower house.
MDMH
reflects the mean district magnitude in the largest chamber, which is generally the lower chamber, or
the only chamber.
ENEP
reflects the number of parties that compete in legislative elections.
LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY
reflects the number of government seats divided by the total seats.
OUTSIDER
is a dummy variable coded  if and outsider presidential candidate competed in the election.
AGE OF DEMOCRACY
reflects the number of years since transition to democracy.
POPULATION
the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship
– except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered
part of the population of their country of origin.
CPI
reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that
may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
GDP
reflects the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Aggregates are based on constant  U.S. dollars.
GINI
reflects the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals
or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.

E
C O D E B O O K : C H A P T E R 
GOVERNMENT COALITION
is a dichotomous variable, coded  if two or more parties formed a government coalition in the given
year, and coded  if two or more parties did not form a government coalition in the given year.
FORMAL
is an index derived from a categorical component analysis in which the values continuously range from
 (lowest possible level of power) to  (highest possible level of power). 
e following policymaking
powers are included in the analysis:
. Veto override: ordinal variable measuring the veto override threshold. It takes values from 
to , where  means no veto; , veto subject to majority override; , veto subject to qualified
majority override; and , no override.
. Veto chambers: ordinal variable measuring the number of chambers intervening and the voting
procedure in a veto override. It ranges from  to . Its codification is:  = No veto;  = Veto, one
chamber;  = Veto, two chambers voting together;  = Veto, two chambers voting separately.
. Partial observations: ordinal variable reflecting the existence of partial observations and the
override threshold. It is coded as follows: No partial observations=; Partial observations subject
to simple majority override = ; Partial observations subject to qualified majority override =;
No override =.
. Line item: dummy variable measuring whether the president can promulgate the non-observed
parts of a bill. It is coded as  if the president can promulgate the non-observed parts of a bill,
and  otherwise.
. Budget veto: dummy variable identifying whether the president can veto the budget bill. It is
coded as  if there is budget veto and  if there is not.

:  
. Sessions: dummy variable measuring whether the president can convene Congress for extraor-
dinary sessions. It is coded as  when the power exists, and  otherwise.
. Reserved areas: dummy variable measuring whether the president has exclusive initiative on
important financial or economic legislation. It is coded as  when the president has the power,
and  when he has not.
. Urgency bills: ordinal variable measuring the existence of urgency bills and the reversionary
outcome in case of congressional inaction. Its values range from  to , where  means no
urgency bills; , power to submit urgency bills; and , when in addition to the power to
submit urgency bills, the executive proposal becomes law if Congress does not act on it in a
constitutionally-defined period.
. Residual decree: dummy variable identifying whether the president has a residual authority to
issue decrees of legislative content in emergency situations. It is coded as  when the president
has the power, and as  when he has not.
. CDA content: ordinal variable intended to capture the existence of explicit constitutional
decree authority and restrictions on its content. It ranges from  to , where  means no explicit
decree authority; , decree authority restricted to certain areas; and , decree authority without
substantive restrictions on content.
. CDA outcome: ordinal variable identifying the existence of explicit constitutional decree
authority and the reversionary outcome in case of congressional inaction. It is coded as follows:
no explicit decree authority = ; decree lapses in the absence of congressional approval = ;
decree stands in the absence of congressional approval = .
. Referendum: ordinal variable reflecting the existence and degree of presidential authority to
submit a bill to approval by popular vote. It takes values from  to , where  means no
presidential authority to submit a bill to referendum or authority subject to congressional
authorization; , unilateral authority to call a referendum but outcome non binding; and ,
unilateral authority and outcome binding.
. Budget spending: dummy variable identifying whether Congress can increase spending. It is
coded as  if Congress cannot increase spending and , otherwise.
. Budget outcome: dummy variable measuring whether the presidential proposal is the rever-
sionary outcome in the absence of congressional approval. It is coded as  if the executive?s
proposal becomes the reversionary outcome, and  otherwise.
NON-FORMAL
is an index derived from a categorical component analysis in which the values continuously range from

:  
 (lowest possible level of power) to  (highest possible level of power). 
e following presidential
power’s in areas different from policymaking are included in the analysis:
. Political decentralization: ordinal variable measuring the sub-national executive authorities
appointed by the president. It is coded as follows: = city mayors and regional executives
popularly elected;  = city mayors popularly elected but regional executives appointed by
president;  = no sub-national elections.
. Appointment court: ordinal variable measuring the influence of president on the appointment
of constitutional court magistrates. Its values range from  to , where  means no participation;
, president nominates with other institutions; , president nominates and Congress ratifies
by qualified majority; , president nominates and Congress ratifies by simple majority; and ,
president appoints or constitution does not establish procedure.
. Appointment attorney general’s office: ordinal variable measuring the influence of the president
on the appointment of the attorney general. It is coded as follows: No participation = ;
president nominates with other institutions = ; president nominates and Congress ratifies
by qualified majority = ; president nominates and Congress ratifies by simple majority = ;
president appoints or constitution does not establish procedure = .
. Appointment comptroller: ordinal variable measuring the influence of the president on the
appointment of the comptroller general. It is based on a scale with values ranging from  to ,
where  represents no participation; , that president nominates with other institutions; , that
president nominates and Congress ratifies by qualified majority; , that president nominates
and Congress ratifies by simple majority; and, , that President appoints or constitution does
not establish procedure.
. Interpellate: ordinal variable identifying whether Congress has the authority to interpellate
cabinet ministers. It acquires values from  to , where  means that Congress has the
authority to interpellate cabinet ministers; , that Executive decides whether the minister
attends personally; and , that there is no interpellation.
. Censure: ordinal variable measuring the authority of Congress to censure cabinet ministers. It
is based on a scale from  to  and is coded as follows:  = binding censure;  = non-binding
censure;  = no censure.
. Censure dissolution: ordinal variable measuring whether censure is restricted by threat of
dissolution of Congress. It is coded as , when censure is unrestricted by dissolution; , when
censure is restricted by dissolution; and , when there is no censure.
. Censure initiation: ordinal variable measuring whether censure initiation requires less or more
than a majority of votes in Congress. Its values are: , initiation by less than a majority; ,

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initiation by simple majority; , initiation by qualified majority; and , no censure.
. Censure vote: ordinal variable measuring whether censure vote requires simple or qualified
majority. It is based on a scale ranging from  to , where  means censure by simple majority;
, censure by qualified majority; and , no censure.
. Censure chambers: ordinal variable indicating whether one or two chambers intervene in the
censure. Its values are: , when only one chamber intervenes, , when two chambers intervene,
and, , when there is no censure.
. Impeachment bodies: ordinal variable determining whether impeachment requires the in-
volvement of one or two bodies and is coded as follows:  = impeachment, one body;  =
impeachment, two bodies;  = no impeachment.
. Qualified majority accusation: ordinal variable indicating whether accusation for impeachment
requires qualified majority vote. It ranges from  to , where  is accusation by simple majority;
, accusation by qualified majority; and , no impeachment.
. Qualified majority punishment: ordinal variable determining whether final vote for impeach-
ment requires qualified majority. Its values range from  to , where  means decision by
simple majority; , decision by qualified majority; and , no impeachment.
. Impeachment reasons: ordinal variable indicating whether impeachment can proceed for
political reasons. It is coded as follows:  = impeachment for political reasons;  = impeachment
for legal crimes only;  = no impeachment.
. President’s incapacity: dummy variable determining whether Congress can dismiss the president
for mental or physical incapacity. It is coded as  if Congress cannot dismiss the president for
incapacity and as  if it can.
. Emergency declaration: dummy variable indicating whether Congress must declare or ratify
the declaration of emergency. In this variable,  indicates that President declares and notifies
Congress about the emergency, and  that Congress must declare or ratify it.
. Emergency content: dummy variable indicating whether there are explicit limits on the rights
that can be suspended in emergencies. A value of  means that there are no limits or generic
limits, and a value of  that there are only a limited number of rights that can be suspended
during an emergency.
. Emergency temporal: ordinal variable indicating whether the termination of the emergency
is subject to an explicit temporal limit. It is coded as follows:  = absolute temporal limit;

:  
 = Congress can postpone the emergency;  = no temporal limit or president can extend it
unilaterally.
VOTE PERCENT
reflects the valid percentage of votes casted for the incumbent president in the immediately previous
first round presidential election.
REELECTED
is a dummy variable coded  if the president is serving in his second consecutive term, and coded  if
the incumbent president is serving in his first term.
TERM LENGTH
reflects the fixed number of years the president is elected to serve.
CONCURRENT
is a dummy variable coded  if presidential elections are concurrent to legislative elections, and coded
 if presidential elections are not concurrent to legislative elections.
UNICAMERAL
is a dummy variable coded  if congress is unicameral, and coded  if congress is not unicameral.
TOTAL SEATS
reflects the total number of seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the total
seats in the lower house.
ENLP
reflects the number of parties that have legislative representation.
LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY
reflects the number of government seats divided by the total seats.
ELECTORAL COALITION
is a dichotomous variable, coded  if the winner of the presidential election is backed by an electoral
coalition, and coded  if the winner of the presidential election is not backed by an electoral coalition.
CRISIS
is a dummy variable coded  if the democracies was in political turmoil, and coded  if not.
LEFT





is a dummy variable coded  if and outsider presidential candidate competed in the election, and
coded  if there was not.
AGE OF DEMOCRACY
reflects the number of years since transition to democracy.
POPULATION
the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship–
except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered
part of the population of their country of origin.
CPI
reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that
may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
GDP
reflects the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Aggregates are based on constant  U.S. dollars.
GINI
reflects the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals
or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.

